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Abstract 
The New Zealand health system is two-tiered with elective treatments are performed by both 
publicly funded state hospitals and by private hospitals. Publicly funded operations are rationed 
using a prioritisation system which was introduced in 1998 to curtail expanding waiting lists for 
elective surgery. One of the aims of the new booking system was to generate national tools for 
prioritising patients in order to improve the equality of access to public elective surgery 
throughout New Zealand. However, priority scoring systems were not implemented in a 
consistent manner and access to elective surgery remains very unequal. Despite large media 
attention and a high public profile, waiting times have attracted little research in medical 
geography or within the wider social sciences community. The subject has been partly reserved 
for public health commentators within the medical field, who have found that variation in waiting 
times has much to do with the referral practices of physicians, the management of waiting lists by 
District Health Board (DHB) staff and the amount of private practice that occurs within each 
district. Most notably several studies have identified that in areas associated with high private 
admissions, patients tend to suffer higher waiting times for the same procedures in the public 
hospital system. 
This study examines the performance of the New Zealand Booking System (NZBS) during the 
years 2004 to 2007 to assess the equitable delivery of publicly funded elective surgery 
procedures. Waiting times (NBRS) and admissions (NMDS) datasets were sourced from the New 
Zealand Health and Information Service (NZHIS) of The Ministry of Health. Mean and Median 
waiting times were compared spatially between each of New Zealand‟s 21 DHBs, compared with 
Australian waiting times and then broken down  into five common medical specialties. Waiting 
times were then analysed by ethnicity, level of material deprivation and other individual factors 
using data from the 2006 New Zealand Census. Finally, rates of admissions were calculated for 
the public and private hospital sectors during the study period. These were  used to correlate 
waiting times results with the amount of private practice in each DHB. ACC cases were extracted 
from the dataset to avoid bias in waiting times as much of this work is contracted out to the 
private sector and not subject to lengthy waiting times for treatment. A number of medical 
specialists and hospital administrators were interviewed to discuss results, explain prioritisation 
tools and management practices. 
Results showed large variations in the median waiting times of New Zealand DHBs. A north 
south gradient is observed in which southern DHBs suffer longer waits for care. Vastly better 
results were observed for Australian public hospitals than those seen in New Zealand. For 
waiting times as determined by individual factors, Maori and Pacific Island patients and those 
from lower socio-economic backgrounds suffered longer waiting times nationwide although, in 
certain DHBs inequalities for access to elective surgery were exacerbated. However, ethnic 
differences were more pronounced than socio-economic variations. Admissions results showed 
significant positive correlations between the amount of private practice and the waiting times 
experienced in each DHB which are supported by previous research. Feedback from interviews 
confirmed inconsistency in the use of scoring tools, manipulation occurring on behalf of the DHB 
management to achieve performance goals set by the Ministry of Health and provided some 
further explanation of the other quantitative results. Access to elective surgery is determined 
partly by location of residence, ethnicity, deprivation and where hospital resources are located 
but most importantly by the willingness to pay for treatment within the private hospital sector and 
the ability to manipulate the public prioritisation system. 
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1 Introduction 
“If you believe that health care is a public good to be guaranteed by the state, then a single-
payer system is the next best alternative. Unfortunately, it is fiscally unsustainable without 
rationing.” (Krauthammer, 2009) 
1.1 Introduction 
The way health care is administered varies widely between western countries depending on 
social, cultural, political and economic history. Specific goals of health systems determine 
how governments choose to allocate welfare resources amongst western societies. Some, 
offer universal health care systems in which patients receive fully subsidised treatment in 
public hospitals. Others choose to rely almost entirely on private markets to deliver an 
efficient allocation of health resources. These contrasting models of provision each 
represent particular goals of governments, the recent being one of efficiency and the former 
searching for equitable provision and for the best outcomes across society. Over time 
political pressures faced with the rising cost of medicine have forced governments to adapt 
to popular demands and restructure health care systems according to goals of equity, 
efficiency and effectiveness (Blank and Burau, 2007). 
Many western health systems have developed out of the Keynesian welfare state in which 
governments have provided comprehensive public provision of health services (Pinch, 
1997). However, since the challenges of the 1970s state fiscal crises - governments have 
had to focus on goals of efficiency as a response to growing public demands and increasing 
expenditure on health care services. Krauthammer (2009), for example, has noted that in 
comprehensive health care systems that guarantee wide public access to hospital care, the 
rationing of services is somewhat unavoidable. Health service rationing is widely practiced 
by western countries that provide a comprehensive array health care services, especially in 
single payer systems such as New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Canada (Freeman, 
2000). The need to ration reflects the reality that government resources are scarce and a 
limit has to be placed on the amount of health services that can be practiced through the 
state. Shortages in the supply and uneven distribution of hospital resources are all too 
common in western societies. Governments have often placed an emphasis on equity of 
access to health services according to particular population needs (Scarpaci, 1989). 
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However, an unequal distribution of hospitals and other health care resources inevitably 
means that inequalities arise in access to treatments.  
1.2 National Context 
In New Zealand, inequalities are especially relevant in the market for „elective‟ treatments 
where the state funds around 50% the cost of such procedures. The other half is funded 
through private contributions to health insurance schemes and  other private sources and 
these procedures  are carried out by private hospitals (Moore, 2011). Elective treatments, 
such as joint replacements, cataract removal or varicose vein surgery, are hospital services 
for people who do not require immediate medical treatment (MoH, 2011). The public hospital 
system administers a prioritisation system for the delivery of elective services in which 
patients are forced to wait in line for treatment. Patients have been known to spend 
anywhere from 10 days to 24 months on these waiting lists, and some people never receive 
treatment for their conditions (Gauld and Derrett, 2000). Patients are often led to exit the 
public hospital sector to take up treatment in private hospitals at their own expense 
(Fougere, 1974). In New Zealand the poor and middle classes are serviced by an  under-
resourced public hospital system while affluent patients enjoy hotel-like private hospital 
facilities without the wait that is experienced by users of the public hospital system (Kearns 
et al., 2003).  
Waiting lists have been a matter of public concern in New Zealand for many years. The 
ability of the public hospital sector in New Zealand to deliver elective treatments has been 
widely scrutinised throughout the media and has always been a politically sensitive topic of 
debate. Throughout the 1980s and 90s public hospital waiting lists increased substantially 
which contributed towards political pressure for reform within the health sector (Gauld and 
Derrett, 2000). This led to the introduction of a new „booking system‟ in 1998 which promised 
a more equitable way of prioritising patients for surgery along with the reduction of lengthy 
public hospital waiting times (McLoed et al., 2004). The booking system provides 
prioritisation criteria to gain access to elective surgery which has meant many thousands of 
patients were dropped from waiting lists during the following period and fewer would become 
eligible for surgery in the future (Roake, 2003). While this achieved the political goal of 
reducing waiting lists, there was little improvement in throughput in the delivery of elective 
treatments. The booking system merely acted as a process to ration patients away from the 
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public hospital sector as Shaw (2006) points out: “The Government‟s health system „waiting 
list initiative‟ is nothing more than rationing.” 
Directly following the introduction of the booking system feedback through the media and 
physicians widely discredited the success of such a system. Some newspaper article 
headings read: 
 “Waiting times project fails to convince GP‟s” (Hill, 1998) 
 “New booking system a scam, says surgeon” (Hoby, 1998) 
 “Surgery booking system „has flaws‟” (Keene, 1999) 
 “Surgeon slams new booking system” (McNeil, 1999). 
In the years following the introduction of the booking system the waiting times blew out as 
public hospital providers adjusted to new waiting time targets that were specified by the New 
Zealand Ministry of Health. There have been many reports and political implications around 
lengthy waits with some found to have died while awaiting surgery for operable conditions. 
Two newspaper article headings read: 
 “Man fears death waiting for op” (Guyan, 1998) 
 “Waiting heart deaths cause political heat” (Stuff, 2003) 
 “Willie Jackson refuses to die waiting” (Press Release, 2008). 
 
By 2010 District Health Board (DHB) providers of health and disability services had restricted 
entry into the booking system to make sure they could treat patients within the six month 
guideline given by the Ministry of Health (Ministry of Health, 2010a). This has been achieved 
via two methods; firstly by tightening GP referral practices and then by increasing the 
prioritisation score that is required to proceed to surgery. In reality, access to elective 
services has reduced nationwide, but the big question remains whether access differs 
spatially between DHBs and also between different population groups in New Zealand. 
Figure 1 suggests that there are large inequalities in patients‟ access to elective treatments 
within the public hospital system. The spatial differences have been put down to a lack of 
consistency between the use of prioritisation criteria as was originally proposed in the 
enactment of the New Zealand Booking System (NZBS), but it remains unclear whether 
certain groups of the population suffer poorer access than others. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
4 
 
 
Figure 1: Herald Newspaper Article on Waiting Times for Elective Surgery (Johnston, 2011a) 
Surgical interventions are provided in both the public and private sectors in New Zealand. 
While the public sector provides a wide range of emergency, acute and elective services, the 
private sector specialises in the provision of elective treatments. Private hospitals have 
based their marketing on the deficiencies of the public hospital sector and promised no 
waiting time for their services. When patients are denied access to treatment in the public 
sector often their only choice is to go private funding through private payments or through 
insurance contributions (Fougere, 1974). Lower socio-economic groups are less likely to be 
able to afford private treatments. Therefore, the private hospital sector has traditionally 
catered for more affluent patients, compared to poorer patients who are more likely to be 
dependent upon the public hospital system (Besley et al., 1994). 
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1.3 Academic Context  
Despite evidence of differing access to elective services in New Zealand, until recently, there 
have been few studies monitoring spatial differences or localised inequalities in access to 
these treatments. To the author‟s knowledge, few geographers have attempted to interpret 
these differences before. Research on the development and recent performance of the 
NZBS has been undertaken only by those from medical and public health disciplines (Derrett 
et al., 2009, Derrett et al., 2003, Gauld and Derrett, 2000, McLoed et al., 2004, Newdick and 
Derrett, 2006, Roake, 2003). Derrett et al (2009) have made a particularly large contribution 
towards understanding regional differences in access, the effects of private interaction in the 
market for hospital services and the differences in access experienced by deprived 
communities. Twenty years prior to Derrett et al‟s (2009) study, Barnett and Barnett (1989) 
published work on privatisation of hospital systems and found that higher private hospital 
admissions were associated with longer waiting lists in the public hospital sector. 
Health geographers have often focused on wider issues of social policy, resource allocation, 
rationing, equity and access, restructuring of health systems and health outcomes. Social 
policy debates have been aligned with analysis of the welfare state (Mohan, 2003, Boston et 
al., 1999, Fougere, 1984, Joseph and Flynn, 1988, Moran, 1994). Hospital resource 
allocation has been discussed using measures of bed supply and surgical facilities. 
Intertwined with resource allocation are practices of rationing hospital services that have 
been of interest to health geographers in recent years (Moon and Brown, 2001, Mohan and 
Gorsky, 2001, Gatrell, 2002, Ham and Robert, 2003, Mechanic, 1997, Mohan, 2002). With 
health service rationing come issues of equity and inequalities in which hospital access has 
been widely discussed (Oliver and Mossialos, 2004, Panelli et al., 2005, Raymont, 2001). 
Geographers have long examined theories of inequality and exclusion in relation to 
environmental risk and other related vulnerabilities. They have also found in many cases that 
people living in relatively deprived circumstances suffer higher levels of morbidity and 
mortality compared to the remainder of society (Dew and Kirkman, 2007a). Some have 
shown that these individuals suffer poorer access to health services, in particular Primary 
Health Care (Barnett and Lauer, 2003). Much of the analysis takes account of the income 
effect that limits patient access to PHC services, specialist consultation and private hospital 
treatments (Schoen et al., 2000). Geographers have also looked at the way that Maori and 
Pacific Islanders also suffer less access to health services due to falling into these lower 
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socio-economic groups (Brown, 1999) and tend to suffer higher levels of morbidity when 
compared to the remainder of the New Zealand population (Salmond and Crampton, 2000). 
Restructuring has been a central theme throughout debate concerning health service access 
with processes such as privatisation, rationalisation and public management theories 
scattered throughout the literature (Moon and Brown, 2001, Mohan, 2002, Barnett, 1999, 
Barnett, 2000a, Barnett, 2000b, Barnett and Barnett, 2003a, Barnett and Barnett, 2005, 
Gauld, 2009, Kearns and Moon, 2002, Mohan, 1995a, Scarpaci, 1989). Geographers have 
also documented the health outcomes that have been derived from these policies. Health 
outcomes have been measured by morbidity and mortality rates. Inequalities have been 
found for particular groups of the New Zealand population, specifically low socio-economic 
groups and ethnic minorities (Brown, 1999, Salmond and Crampton, 2000, Barnett and 
Lauer, 2003, Glover et al., 2004, Pearce et al., 2006) . 
Regarding research into interactions between the public and private sector, health 
geographers have commented on changes that have taken place within each sector but few 
have analysed the effects of private health care on public hospital resources. The only 
known geographers in New Zealand to examine such topic are Barnett and Barnett (1989). 
Fougere (2001, 1974), a sociologist, has looked at the way patients exit the private health 
system to receive no waiting services and the detrimental effect that this has had on the 
public hospital system. Others outside geography have looked closely at this phenomenon, 
although, some disagree and consider the private hospital sector takes pressure off public 
hospitals (Di Matteo, 2000, Duckett, 2005, Howden-Chapman and Ashton, 2000, McTurk, 
1998, Rankin, 1998, Vaithianathan, 1999). 
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1.4 Purpose 
The main purpose of this thesis is to identify differences in access to publicly funded 
treatments and to measure the effect of private practice on the provision of public services. 
The focus of this thesis is to analyse how waiting times vary and determine factors that 
contribute to poor access experienced by some groups. 
 
1.5 Aim and Objectives 
The main aim of this thesis is to determine the performance of New Zealand‟s Surgical 
Booking System in delivering access to elective surgery and to examine the extent to which 
private sector involvement is influencing public surgical waiting times. 
The aim will be achieved by meeting three objectives. These are: 
1. To observe the performance of the NZBS and to assess how the length of waiting 
times varies geographically. 
 
2. To investigate how public surgical waiting times vary between different sub groups of 
New Zealand‟s population. 
 
3. To examine contextual factors, specifically whether the provision of privately funded 
elective surgery is affecting public surgical waiting times. 
  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
8 
 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is comprised of nine chapters and the structure is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapters 2-4 will establish the theoretical base for the 
analysis that will follow in later chapters. Chapter 5 will outline the methods used to 
undertake analysis throughout the remainder of the thesis. Chapters 6-8 will present the 
results and will be followed by Chapter 9 which will provide discussion and conclusions. 
Each of the chapters will now be discussed in more detail. 
 
 
Figure 2: Thesis Structure 
Chapter 1 has provided an introduction to health systems and the location of  the provision 
of elective surgery within the New Zealand hospital sector. It then introduced the reader to 
the academic context of this thesis and the purpose, aims and objectives were stated.  
The purpose of Chapter 2 is to is to establish the context of the thesis in the wider 
international literature on hospital systems. The evolution of hospital systems throughout 
western societies is discussed. The goals of health systems are introduced, of which equity, 
efficiency and effectiveness are framed as key concepts. These will be revisited throughout 
the thesis. The adoption of welfare policies by western countries is then illustrated showing 
that public health policy differs significantly between industrialised countries. Pressures on 
the hospital sector such as ageing populations, technological advances, rising expectations 
and health inequalities are acknowledged. Government responses are discussed as are a 
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wide variety of forms of health service restructuring. Methods of health service rationing are 
observed as governments respond to the increasing cost of health care. Finally, the 
outcomes of health service restructuring and rationing are discussed before an overview and 
critique of literature is undertaken that will examine how geographers and others have 
approached these themes. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the New Zealand Hospital Sector. It aims to examine how 
the hospital system has adapted to restructuring and how this has affected access to 
hospital services. The establishment of the hospital system will be considered. During this 
time the New Zealand Government pursued goals of equity and social security which framed 
their on-going approach towards health and welfare services. The pressures faced by the 
New Zealand Government are discussed and  in the health sector they are very 
representative of what has been seen internationally. Government responses to these are 
examined, including various types of restructuring and an emphasis on rationing health 
services. As in Chapter 2 outcomes will then be discussed. 
Chapter 4 introduces the New Zealand Booking System (NZBS). Firstly, the events which 
led up to the introduction of the booking system in 1998 are investigated. Processes involved 
in the booking system, prioritisation tools and waiting times are then explained in detail. The 
way the Ministry of Health reports on District Health Board‟s (DHBs) performance in 
providing elective services is critically evaluated. Finally, the author provides a review and 
some analysis of the NZNBS drawing from past studies and setting the scene for the 
objectives of the analyses in the following chapters.  
The purpose of Chapter 5 is to introduce the data and methods used in the research. To 
begin with the objectives will be revisited and the structure of results chapters will be 
explained. This will be followed by an explanation of data collection methods, information on 
sources, variables within particular datasets, and techniques used to analyse the data. 
Statistical and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) methods will be discussed before 
details of qualitative interviews are made clear. Finally, a discussion of limitations give an 
insight into some of the problems encountered during this research.  
Chapter 6 is the first of the results chapters. It focuses on the first objective which is to 
analyse the extent of geographical variation in public elective surgical waiting times. Waiting 
times for all elective operations are compared across New Zealand DHBs for the years 
2004-2007 and compared with similar data from Australia. Waiting times are then broken 
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down by specialty and compared across New Zealand to see if there are significant 
differences between specialties. 
Chapter 7 addresses the second objective of the thesis, which is to determine the extent to 
which public elective surgical waiting times vary between different sub groups of New 
Zealand‟s population. Initially, waiting times are broken down by individual factors such as 
age, gender, ethnicity and deprivation are examined. This is then followed by a more 
detailed analysis of the extent of variation in waiting times by ethnicity and deprivation for 
each DHB.  
Chapter 8 focuses on the third objective which is to uncover contextual factors for 
differences in waiting times and specifically to see whether the success of the private 
hospital sector is having a detrimental effect on public surgical waiting lists. To begin waiting 
times will be calculated by urban-rural profile to determine if access to public elective 
services depends on the proximity to specialised urban hospital resources. At this point 
hospital admission rates will be calculated for the public and private sectors for a means of 
comparison between admission rates and the waiting times experienced within each DHB. 
Chapter 9 will discuss the findings of the three results chapters in conjunction with interview 
feedback from key stakeholders in this research including a group of medical specialists and 
hospital administrators. Finally, the chapter discusses some theoretical implications, policy 
recommendations and suggestions for future research before summarising the main 
conclusions of the research. 
1.7 Conclusion 
The first chapter has introduced the aims of this thesis within the context of previous 
research and current issues concerning access to elective surgery. Waiting lists/times have 
always been a politically sensitive matter but since the introduction of the NZBS they have 
been of increasing public concern. Geographers have widely discussed inequalities of health 
outcomes and service provision, but few have looked at access to elective treatments. The 
next chapter will establish the context of the thesis in  the wider international literature of 
hospital systems and provide an overview of the varying roles that Western governments 
take in the provision of health and welfare services. 
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2 Health and Welfare Systems of Western Societies 
2.1 Introduction 
The role of health care amongst other social welfare services in Western countries has been 
well documented within international literature (Altman et al., 2003, Besley et al., 1994, 
Freeman, 2000). After World War Two (WW2) welfare systems were developed as 
confidence remained in the belief that planning, scientific analysis and social engineering 
could deliver solutions to the majority of social democratic capitalist societies (Pinch, 1997). 
Since the 1970s state fiscal crises have challenged welfare systems and have since 
prompted significant changes in government approaches to solving public policy problems. 
Advanced industrialised countries have prompted repeated changes in the provision of 
welfare services. The success of restructuring within the health care sector remains 
uncertain although many have written about the accomplishments and failures that changes 
of this nature bring (Mohan, 1989, Barnett, 2000b, Boston et al., 1999). 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the way geography and other social 
sciences have examined the role of governments in providing access to health services. The 
chapter will begin by looking at the evolution of the hospital sector throughout western 
nations and the adoption of particular goals used in the production of health. Hospital 
services will then be situated within a broader „welfarist‟ approaches which typified 
Keynesian principles of centralisation and redistribution that originated in the 1930s. The 
second section will introduce the pressures felt by hospital providers and governments in the 
context of rising public expenditures and growing inequality in access to services. Thirdly, 
the chapter will introduce techniques such as restructuring and various types of rationing 
which have been used by most governments in order to alleviate pressure on the hospital 
sector. A review and critique of geography‟s contribution to studies of health services will 
conclude the chapter. 
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2.2 The Role of Hospitals in Western Countries 
Hospitals are important for the provision of health care amongst other social and welfare 
services. The way health care is administered varies widely from country to country 
according to an array of political, social, cultural and economic factors. Geography provides 
useful conceptual perspectives for unravelling problems within health systems and by 
providing a „holistic‟ approach. Analysis can further understanding outside what traditional 
health sciences and other related disciplines may offer. According to Barnett and Barnett 
(2009), the discipline of geography has a useful „whole systems‟ approach which is valuable 
when analysing health systems. There has been a long history of geographical analysis in 
health service delivery, especially with the continual changes that have occurred within 
modern health systems (Barnett and Copeland, 2009). This section will identify the changes 
that have occurred in the delivery of health care services, situate health amongst other 
welfare services and illustrate variation in the goals of health care provision which has driven 
government policy agendas. 
2.2.1 The Evolution of Hospital Systems 
During the 19th century hospitals in Western economies operated under assistance from the 
state, charitable or religious trusts and were developed under pressures of urbanisation, 
industrialisation, and emerging health concerns. Hospitals at this time were set up largely to 
serve the poor; affluent communities chose to use small community private practices of one 
or more doctors much like the way we make use of primary care today. The focus during this 
period was around public health and preventative medicine to reduce the spread of 
infectious disease. At the turn of the 20th century a social transformation began in which 
hospitals moved to the centre of health systems. As populations grew, the middle class 
begun to demand more comprehensive care and in many countries for-profit investor owned 
hospitals emerged which led to the commodification of medical care (Mohan, 2002). From 
this point on the role of science and technology in medicine flourished as hospitals were 
legitimised in shifting costs to consumers as a key revenue flow. In the 1930s social justice 
concerns and the rise of organised labour meant further pressure was put on the state to 
provide universal hospital care (Bohland and Knox, 1989).  
It was not until WW2 that developed countries begun to develop „national‟ health systems 
which rose out of the Keynesian welfare state. Examples of this have been the 
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establishment of the Social Security Act (1938) which guaranteed unlimited access to 
hospital care in New Zealand, the development of the United Kingdom (UK) National Health 
Service (NHS) in 1948 and the formation of Medicare and Medicaid which guaranteed health 
care to limited populations of the elderly and poor in the United States of America (US) in 
1965. More recently, Canada has enacted the Canada Health Act (1974) and Australia has 
established its version of Medicare in 1974, each of which guarantee universal coverage of a 
wide variety of hospital services to their citizens (Barnett and Barnett, 2009). 
As a result of increases in the demand for hospital care over the past century it is not 
surprising that hospital care commands the largest share of health expenditure amongst 
developed countries. In Canada, hospital care accounted for 35% of health expenditure in 
1995, a total of $26.5 billion (Heathcare Quarterly, 1997). In Australia similarly, 35.3% or $29 
billion was spent in 2004 and spending on hospital services continue to grow as a 
percentage of health expenditure (Australian Federal Government, 2009). In New Zealand 
49.6% or $2.1 billion was spent in 2000 on hospital and surgical services (Ministry of Health, 
2002). Although large amounts of health expenditure in the latter half of the 20th Century 
have been placed within hospital services, more recently governments in many countries 
have begun to put a renewed emphasis on primary health care (PHC) led systems (Barnett 
and Copeland, 2009). 
The emergence of aims to strengthen PHC systems were signalled by the signing of the 
Alma Ata Declaration (1978) and PHC-led initiates have taken precedence since the 1990s 
in Western countries incorporating a greater role for prevention and treatment. General 
practitioners (GPs) have become increasingly important for the financial management and 
prioritisation of patients based on their knowledge of community and population health needs 
(Barnett and Copeland, 2009). The emergence of PHC systems represented a shift back 
towards population health and prevention in a move to improve health status (Macinko et al., 
2007), to reduce pressure on hospital services (Starfield et al., 2005) and reduce the impact 
of income inequality (Shi and Starfield, 2000, Hefford et al., 2005). 
Changes in the physical and social environment, a decrease in the prevalence of disease 
and increases in life expectancy of those living in Western countries have led to increasing 
pressures on health systems. This has meant continual change in the organisational 
structures of health systems to meet the needs of society. The organisation of health 
services, the challenges they face and the reason systems have changed have been an 
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important focus of health services geography (Barnett and Barnett, 2009). In order to 
understand these issues we need to recognize the goals of health systems and to be able to 
frame these within the context of various social and political environments.  
2.2.2 Goals of Health Systems 
In an ideal world, optimal health policy would guarantee high quality health services 
universally across society on an equal basis. Since WW2 one of the principal goals of health 
policy in industrialised nations has been to seek to ensure equity of access to, and the 
quality of, hospital care. Most OECD countries interpret this principle as meaning  that health 
care should be provided on the basis of need rather than the ability to pay (Van Doorslaer et 
al., 2006). The variation between national concerns can be explained the effectiveness of 
their health system. These goals of health systems are distinguished and shaped by national 
institutional, political structures, social and cultural norms (Blank and Burau, 2007). 
Barnett and Barnett (2009) argue there are two broad goals of health systems. The first is to 
raise the health status of the community. This can be achieved by preventative means in the 
form of population health measures or through curative treatments. In addition, support from 
other welfare services such as housing or education, which lie outside the health sector, is 
valuable to raising the health status of the population. The second is to ensure appropriate 
access to high quality services across the community. Public, private and non-profit agents 
provide such services through a number of different mechanisms. The overall aim is to 
provide care on the basis of equal need and therefore to minimise inequalities in access to 
care on the basis of cost and distance to guarantee high quality services to all. 
Three goals of health care are summarised in Figure 3. This illustrates how the three 
principles of efficiency, equity and effectiveness are inter-related in the choice of national 
health systems adopted by governments. The move to, or from, each circle represents a 
trade-off between the three values. Attempts to achieve these three goals have occurred 
mainly through governments‟ repeated attempts at restructuring health systems. 
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Figure 3: Goals of Health Care: Efficiency, Equity and Effectiveness (Blank and Burau, 2007) 
Since the 1960s three distinct models of health systems in Western countries have evolved. 
These comprise redistributive, market and managerial models as illustrated in Figure 4. 
These have also been described as forms of restructuring (Barnett and Copeland, 2009). 
The redistributive model, typical of the UK‟s NHS or New Zealand‟s national health system, 
arose from welfarism and Marxist principles and promotes equity through the provision of 
universal access to a wide variety of health services (Pinch, 1997). The focus is on directing 
resources to areas of population need. The redistributive framework represents deliberate 
efforts on behalf of governments to alter the distribution of property, wealth or income held 
among groups of society though progressive taxes or other mechanisms (Blank and Burau, 
2007). By adopting this sort of framework providers are forced to explicitly ration innovative 
and expensive treatments limiting the effectiveness of some services (Spicker, 2008). 
Efficiency remains important in such systems though tight public management of health 
finances.  
 
Figure 4: Goals of Restructuring in each Model of Health Care Provision 
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The market model (illustrated in Figure 4) arose out of public choice theory (Self, 2000), neo-
liberalism (Pinch, 1997) and are exemplified by goals of efficiency for the financing and 
performance of health services. Market principles encourage some level of innovation in 
health care therefore increasing the effectiveness of medicine but may threaten equity by 
restricting public access through individual ability to pay for treatment (Bohland and Knox, 
1989). This may remind us of the US, market-based, highly technological model where, 
traditionally, only limited public provision has been guaranteed to the very poor and to elderly 
citizens with the remainder of the population  left to provide for themselves through private 
insurance or individual payment (Scarpaci, 1989). Only since the recent Obama health 
reforms of March 2010 has the US pledged to increase health insurance coverage for a 
larger percentage of the population (Tumulty et al., 2010). 
Managerial models of health systems and restructuring (illustrated in Figure 4) aim to 
maximise efficiency and effectiveness but, as a result, tend to forfeit principles of equity. 
Restructuring towards this type of system emerged out of a form of „New Public 
Management‟ (Hood, 1991) which aimed to improve accountability by integrating services 
(Barnett and Copeland, 2009). Many countries have adopted principles of managerialism in 
their striving for efficiency including New Zealand, the UK, the Netherlands and Japan. 
Issues of equity, inequality and exclusion have been theorised by geographers in relation to 
changing health policy in the wake of market and managerial restructuring (Kearns and 
Moon, 2002). These include discussions of equity and equality which can be applied to all 
health systems and in the wider context of welfare services.  
2.2.3 The Welfare State 
Much investigation into the provision of health services delivered through national health 
systems of developed countries has been sought in the context of the Keynesian welfare 
state. Studies of the welfare state have involved much comparative analysis at a national 
and international level. Authors have constructed „typologies‟ in which they group countries 
according socio-political context. Examples of these frameworks include: 
 Castles‟ (1999) concept of „families of nations‟ which clusters nations according to 
their history and geographic features.  
 Esping-Anderson‟s (1990) welfare state regimes which identifies distinct welfare state 
logics, including liberal, conservative/corporate, and social democratic ideologies. 
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 Therborn‟s (1987) division between market-orientated, full employment, 
interventionist and compensatory welfare states. 
 Titmus‟ (1974) three models of residual, industrial achievement-performance and 
institutional redistributive welfare states. 
 
Figure 5: Types of Health Care System by Provision and Funding (Wall and Owen, 2002b) 
Figure 5 illustrates one way in which welfare states can be characterised into „typologies‟: 
the Consumer Sovereignty Model, where a free market system is predominant: the Bismarck 
Model in which social insurance schemes are prevalent: and thirdly, the Beveridge Model, 
where nations which operate a collectively funded national health system. Each system uses 
different institutional mechanisms in order to deliver „welfare‟ or social services such as 
health or education to society. Each nation represents a unique mixture of finance, provision 
and governance pertaining to essential public services depending on the cultural values, 
demographic, historical and political structures as well as significant spatial variation across 
geographical and political boundaries within each country (Blank and Burau, 2007). 
Glennerster (1979) argues that public spending on any social service depends on five main 
factors: government ideology, cost of demands, taxation structure, the government‟s balance 
of power and economic drivers. 
In countries with more individualistic „consumer sovereignty‟ models, governments remain 
largely removed from the health system leaving the market to control the allocation of 
resources. This libertarian approach is typical of the US health care market where only the 
very poor and elderly citizens are publicly covered through government provided social 
insurance schemes (Medicaid and Medicare). Government offers employers tax incentives 
to offer private insurance but they are not required by law to do so, and many do not. Health 
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care is most commonly sought through costly health insurance schemes which many cannot 
afford. Outside of Medicaid and Medicare, the portion of the US population under the age of 
65 who are uninsured has increased from 17% to 20% from 2000 to 2007 (Ayanian, 2009). 
Australia is also increasingly becoming more libertarian but the country still retains a 
comprehensive public health system (Vaithianathan, 2004). The effective control of free 
market health systems is least in these countries which rely on private insurance in that 
there is a predominance of private funding, and further fragmentation of third party insurers 
and many provider agencies. 
In models of social insurance as illustrated in „Bismarckian‟ economies all health funding is 
paid for through independent institutions which raise finance through worker and employer 
contribution schemes. While governments which adopt such approaches are not 
administered through public systems, they are regulated and mandated through public 
means (Freeman, 2000). Countries typically using  such approaches are Germany, Japan, 
Netherlands and Singapore. In social insurance systems, control is weak in that finance 
raised towards health care is clearly visible as a percentage of peoples salaries, also the 
health care industry is fragmented into many private third party institutions who take some 
convincing to induce change (Moran, 1999). 
Public or collectively funded health care where universal access is pursued is typical of a 
national health system operating under the „Beveridge Model‟. As we have seen above the 
UK, New Zealand, and Swedish health systems are all typical of this approach. Freeman 
(2000) recognises how it is common for national health services to be funded through one 
central agency. For example, in the UK and Sweden over 90% of funding comes from public 
sources flowing mostly from central government. Britain‟s health care service, the NHS, has 
been depicted as a „command and control‟ system representing a strong collective finance 
and redistributive model (Moran, 1999). Differing approaches taken by governments 
represent some distinction in the way that health care policies are adopted. 
2.2.4 Health Care Policy 
Lowi (1966) characterises public policy into three basic ways that governments can 
intervene in different sectors to achieve relevant objectives for society. Regulatory, 
distributive and redistributive methods can be applied to the health sector in order to create 
favourable outcomes. Regulation is used to provide rules, restricting or imposing constraints 
on certain activities which is supported by law and appropriate sanctions. Distribution is 
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applied in the provision of goods or services to society. The redistributive role of government 
is also important in altering the distribution of income, wealth and property within society. 
This third function of government, the reallocation of resources which is present in all 
democracies is fundamental to the operation of the „Welfare State‟ through progressive tax 
and other means of redistribution. The redistributive role is based on needs and entitlement, 
under objectives of equality it is the government‟s role to shift resources from healthy to non-
healthy individuals. Issues of health care resulting from governments allocation decisions are 
commonly highly contested and always controversial as decisions always entail conflict 
(Blank and Burau, 2007). 
Comparative Studies 
Shared policy challenges arising from the economic and welfare state crises of the 1970s 
and 80s has led to a number of comparative studies of nations health care policies. 
Globalisation, travel and information technology were a factor in making it more relevant and 
necessary to interpret these international differences (Bennett, 1991). Ovretveit (1998) 
argues that in order to solve problems comparative health research has a role in creating 
knowledge that helps people to understand their differences and similarities and that health 
managers can improve services by sensitively adapting ideas that have worked elsewhere. 
Comparative studies are useful in order to study different systems under various institutional 
and value contexts to uncover which policies work and those that do not work. Deleon and 
Resnick-Terry (1999) describe this body of work as the „comparative renaissance‟. 
Geographers have analysed local geographies of health services by acknowledging 
contextual factors and trying to explain changes in health services policy (Jones and Moon, 
1992). Comparative studies have indicated that there are global trends in the development of 
health policies and that national health services of the industrialised world are becoming 
ever more alike (Harrison et al., 2002, Wessen, 1999, Mohan, 1998). Given the common 
problems faced by a variety of different countries, it is not surprising that policies have 
tended to converge.  
Many studies document how these strategies are being shaped and follow common global 
trends in the formation of health policy (Harrison et al., 2002, Wessen, 1999). 
Chernichovsky‟s (1995) research suggests that health care reforms, regardless of the 
differences in health care systems, which have taken place have led to the creation of a 
common paradigm of health care financing, management and organisation of resources 
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which differentiates across both conceptual (market vs. centrally planned) frameworks and 
ideological (public vs. private) lines. However, Mohan (1998) argues that social scientists too 
easily accept the notion of convergence and so fall into what Taylor (1989) refers to as „the 
error of developmentalism‟ of which criticises authors for creating arbitrary „typologies‟ to 
characterise states by superficial similarities. Mohan (1998 p116) suggests that … “an 
appropriate framework for analysing change in the welfare state must start from the 
underlying characteristics of the societies it is analysing rather that from the characteristics 
of the health care systems within them.”  
2.3 Pressures on the Hospital Sector 
Up until WW2, health care was limited to providing „public health‟ solutions as curative 
capabilities were limited and for the most part ineffective. It was not until the 1950s and 
1960s that the focus shifted from public health to curative care. In an effort to provide health 
and other welfare services to society governments around the world have faced increasing 
expenditure relative to national incomes. As Fuchs (2005) notes, efforts to control and 
monitor health expenditure are relevant because spending used in health can otherwise be 
used to provide value to other public services such as housing, education and environmental 
protection.  
A variety of pressures have led governments to place limits on health services and all have 
faced controversy over struggles of allocation although some systems have fallen under less 
scrutiny than others. The first section will look at some of the pressures of efficiency and 
effectiveness faced by the health sector including the continual ageing of world populations, 
the proliferation of costly new technology/treatments in medicine and the limited supply of 
skilled physicians combined with increasing public expectations and demands. 
Along with these pressures concerning the efficiency and the rising cost of hospital care 
there has also been concern over the equity of access to hospital care and tendencies for 
some populations to experience especially high admission rates. The second part of this 
section will examine some of the inequalities that geographers and commentators from other 
disciplines have found in a variety of different contexts. Because of the huge emphasis of 
rights in health care, great scrutiny is placed on national health systems of developed 
countries to achieve equitable and equal outcomes across society. Issues of exclusion and 
inequality are of public interest and therefore are important to consider amongst other 
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pressures placed on the hospital sector. Inequalities generate pressures on health systems 
as they threaten the equity objectives of the welfare state and the political autonomy of 
governments in developed nations. 
2.3.1 Pressures of Efficiency and Effectiveness for the Provision of Hospital Care 
Ageing Populations 
It is no surprise that the elderly demand a disproportionate amount of health resources and it 
is for that reason that ageing of populations globally face increasing health expenditure. In 
2003 for the US, social insurance for the elderly represented over 45% of annual health 
related Gross National Product (GNP) (Bitton and Kahn, 2003). This, combined with the fact 
that once these people reach retirement status they no longer contribute wages through the 
tax system, means there is less national income to fund government expenditure. 
Demographic ageing is prevalent because of the decline in fertility since the 1970s, the baby 
boom post-WW2 and the increase in life expectancy due to better lifestyles, health habits 
and increases in health technology (Spicker, 2008). 
Technological Change 
Increases in heath technology have been hugely influential for enhancing health provision in 
diagnosis, prevention and intervention. However, innovative treatments tend to cost 
significantly more than older forms of treatment. Over the past century morbidity trends have 
indicated a gradual decline in so called „traditional‟ diseases (e.g., tuberculosis, poliomyelitis, 
and diphtheria) while there has been an increase in the demand for more comprehensive 
treatments e.g., for organ failures, injuries and cancers (Gauld, 2009). According to Zwillich 
(2001) one of the most important factors in the escalation of health care costs has been the 
proliferation of new pharmaceuticals and medical technology. The consensus among 
academics is that the biomedical revolution persistently drives up health care expenditure 
(Aron and Patz, 2001).  
Priority setting has come to the attention of policy makers as we have seen the rapid 
expansion of „last chance‟ treatments. These are those that signify the last chance for 
prolonging the life of the medically needy. There has been a tendency to pursue treatments 
up to the point where marginal benefits outweigh the cost of treatment (Altman et al., 2003). 
As a result there has been an over-reliance on and utilisation of high-tech interventions 
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(Ubel, 2001). Unintended consequences may result as demand increases for these services. 
The threshold in prioritisation of patients seeking treatment of a less serious nature may be 
threatened. This may occur when the demand for technological intervention increases and 
costs flood out those lower priority cases. Fuchs (2005) emphasises the need for physicians 
and hospitals to work within capped budgets and, where possible, to limit the introduction of 
new technologies. However, this remains difficult as individual patients have become more 
informed though the media and the internet and are becoming less tolerant to 
inconsistencies in the health care system (Scott et al., 2005). 
Rising Expectations 
Health professionals are trained under the guiding principles of the do-everything, 
„maximalist approach‟. Restriction in the provision of new medical technologies risks 
condemnation from practitioners, patients and the public  (Fuller, 1994). Users of public 
health care services are increasingly less willing to accept the „gatekeeper‟ role of GPs, 
particularly when inconsistencies in access and perceived failures of the public health 
system are regularly publicized throughout the media. As a result politicians find it 
increasingly difficult to limit patient access to new technologies (Blank and Burau, 2007). In 
2003 Ministers of Health from Chile, Germany, New Zealand, Greece, Slovenia, Sweden 
and the UK met in Stockholm for the International Forum on Common Access to Health Care 
Services at which they reasserted that a common trend of rising public expectations was an 
important pressure to acknowledge in health systems as well as other pressures of ageing 
populations and the rising cost of innovation (Oliver and Mossialos, 2004). Managed care 
organisations (discussed below) have sought to engage governments, corporate providers 
and doctors to attempt to change public expectations in the national interest (Hart, 1998). 
Quality 
The pressures mentioned above mean that modern medicine in the developed world has 
created an unsustainable demand for doctors. In response, under influence from pressures 
of „globalization‟ more-developed countries have begun recruiting graduates from other 
countries to meet their health care needs (Bundred and Levitt, 2000). This phenomenon has 
been referred to as a „medical carousel‟ (Ncayiyana, 1999) or „the brain drain‟ (Raghuram 
and Kofman, 2002) of which doctors seem to be repeatedly emigrating to countries with a 
higher standard of living. For example, Indian doctors move to New Zealand, New Zealand 
doctors move to Australia, Australian doctors move to the UK, UK doctors move to Canada 
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and Canadian doctors move to the US. In developed countries foreign doctors tend to gain 
employment in less desirable locations. In the UK foreign doctors tend to work in areas that 
British doctors would not live and perform jobs below their professional qualifications 
(Williams, 1998), and in US inner-city hospitals foreign doctors provide services to America‟s 
poor (Mullan, 1997). This draining effect on countries‟ skilled labour resources has put the 
quality of health services at risk and has meant increasingly services have had to be 
withdrawn in certain areas. 
Avoidable Hospital Admissions 
The concept of „avoidable hospital admissions‟ acknowledges that some hospital admissions 
may be successfully prevented if patients were to seek timely and effective treatment (Nolte 
and McKee, 2000). Timely, quality primary health care is essential in prevention of these 
admissions. There are many conditions that if picked up with early diagnosis can be 
prevented from becoming an acute illness or at least prevent deterioration which may involve 
visits to hospital (Sheerin et al., 2006). By achieving this, patients benefit and hospitals are 
relieved of pressure to free up hospital beds for those who need emergency care and cut 
hospital waiting lists (Saxena et al., 2006). In New Zealand evidence has suggested that 
there have been increases in avoidable hospital admissions since the 1980s (Barnett and 
Malcolm, 2010). Of particular significance some studies have suggested that a relationship 
exists between avoidable hospital admissions and the underutilisation of primary care 
especially by lower socio-economic groups, and ethnic minorities (Dharmalingham et al., 
2004, Billings et al., 1996, Gaskin and Hoffman, 2000). In the US research has shown that 
potentially avoidable hospitalisation can be negatively correlated with income and insurance 
ownership (Weissman et al., 1992, Djojonegoro et al., 2000). Alternatively, in Canada where 
coverage for all physician fees and hospital expenses are freely available across the 
population this relationship is not found (Billings et al., 1996). In the realisation that early 
intervention can reduce pressure on the hospital sector, governments in Britain and New 
Zealand have reorganised health services to shift responsibilities from secondary to primary 
care (Department of Health, 2000, Sheerin et al., 2006) 
Supply-induced Demand 
Many have observed that regardless of the extent to which health care services have 
expanded, there has been a sustained pool of unmet demand throughout the population 
(Cundiff and McCarthy, 1994). Supply-induced demand is more common in countries with 
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fee-for-service (FFS) systems where doctors are more autonomous in clinical-decision 
making. This presents a risk when much of the private health sector relies on third party 
payments and there may be little disincentive to prevent the over utilisation of medical 
technology. Demand is generated for technology, prices rise, spending increases, and public 
expectations further increase. This is the situation that is common in the US which is 
dominated by the private health care industry where not surprisingly they spend the most per 
capita on health care than any other developed country, a staggering US $5,711 per-capita 
in 2003 (Borgor et al., 2006). The next biggest spenders were France (US $3,048 per-capita) 
and Britain (US $2,347 per-capita), two nations which had social insurance and national 
health services as their significant health providers (OECD, 2006). Supply-induced demand 
comes with some exceptions in the US in the case of managed care organisations which try 
to inhibit the demand and use of highly technological and expensive services. 
Managed Care 
Managed Care is a tool used primarily in the US for the improvement in the performance of 
health systems. Prompted by Federal legislation in 1973, similar developments have also 
been evident in the formation of primary care organisations (PCOs) in the UK and New 
Zealand. PCOs evolved as a response to, and as a consequence of recent government 
policy. In the US, health maintenance organisations (HMOs) have been the focus of 
managed care, particularly since the 1980s, in response to rises in the cost of health care 
associated with common FFS indemnity insurance. They were initially non-profit but they 
have been increasingly corporately owned (Barnett and Copeland, 2009). HMOs offer a 
range of management techniques and financial incentives which are aimed to control cost 
inflation, assure quality and dismiss the over utilisation of services associated with the 
former FFS insurance (Ham, 1998). These institutions were designed to dismiss 
unnecessary or unproven services in favour of the appropriate treatment and to focus 
spending on low-cost early intervention with the hope that they prevented high-cost 
interventions at later stages (Shapiro et al., 1993).  
HMOs exhibit control over providers, especially in for-profit HMOs by rationing access to 
both primary and secondary services by way of explicit clinical guidelines (Kletke et al., 
1996). Through the growth of HMOs throughout the 1990s the US has been successful in 
slowing health expenditure. However, there is evidence that this has not been sustained 
(Simonet, 2005). Explanations behind this have included: poor quality services generating a 
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consumer backlash; spiralling hospital and physician costs; and extensions to plans to cater 
for more vulnerable Medicare and Medicaid patients (Blendon et al., 1998). The health 
outcomes experienced by members of HMOs has been shown to vary by patterns of 
ownership, with non-profit out performing for-profit organisations (Himmelstein et al., 1999). 
Since the negative publicity around managed care institutions in the early 1990s, consumer 
satisfaction seems to be leaning towards FFS plans and this has been shown in an 
increased market share for these plans, in favour of choice, regardless of facing inflated fees 
(Draper et al., 2002). 
Roemer‟s Law 
In 1959, Milton Roemer drew attention to the feature he believed determines the utilisation of 
hospital resources regardless of context, that is the supply and availability of hospital beds. 
He believed that the capacity of health systems determines and leads to the manipulation of 
consumer demand independent of demographic and population factors (Roemer, 1959). 
Roemer‟s findings in his (1961) study reinforced his hypothesis that the use of hospital 
resources rises following increases in the bed supply, thus indicating that supply induces 
demand for the utilisation of hospital resources. This phenomenon is also known as 
„Roemer‟s Law‟. Roemer‟s law has been demonstrated in a series of national contexts 
including Australasian, North American, Scandinavian, British and other Western European 
countries (Ham, 1988, Anderson and Mooney, 1990). Research has generally been 
undertaken using macro data, most which identifies variation in service demand (measured 
by differing admission rates and length of stay) as being determined by variation in the 
supply of hospital beds and available medical staff  (Wennberg and Gittlesohn, 1982, 
McPherson et al., 1981, Rothberg, 1982, Clarke, 1990, Richardson and Yusuf, 1982). In 
New Zealand, Barnett et al (1980) and Brown et al (1992) uncovered similar findings that 
public hospital admission rates reflect regional variations in bed supply rather than 
differences in need. Pressures for efficiency and effectiveness as mentioned throughout 
Section 2.3.1 often conflict with goals to increase equity for the provision of hospital services. 
The next section discusses pressures that are evident when considering the equitability of 
access to hospital services. 
2.3.2 Pressures of Equality for Hospital Access 
A wide range of literature has explored geographies of equality, inequality, and exclusion in 
aspects of health policy (Scarpaci, 1989, Barnett and Lauer, 2003, Howden-Chapman and 
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Tobias, 1999, Pearce et al., 2006, Van Doorslaer et al., 2006). Compared to the large body 
of literature that has compared inequalities in health service utilisation there has been few 
studies on the „quality‟ of health services delivered among certain groups within 
communities. This becomes important when interpreting whether or not money is being 
spent effectively and so delivered to those who are in most need of health services. 
Evidence has shown that there are socio-economic and ethnic biases in service utilisation, 
ingraining forms of exclusion throughout health services (Barnett and Barnett, 2009). 
Exclusion imposes pressures on health systems because goals of equity and effectiveness 
are threatened as health services are not delivered to populations most in need. These 
issues of equality mean that concerns arise related to poor access to PHC and result in 
further avoidable hospital admissions. The theories of exclusion and inequality have been 
developed almost entirely from a „welfarist‟ perspective and many studies represent this 
through their detailed discussion of health provision and neo-liberal changes to the welfare 
state (Barnett and Barnett, 1989, Fougere, 1974, Mohan, 1995b). 
Past international studies into health systems have identified inequalities associated with the 
following factors: 
 socio-economic status  
 gender  
 age 
 ethnicity. 
Commonly cited within the literature is the „inverse care law‟ (Watt, 2002), which applies to 
each category of inequality. The inverse care law states that the availability of medical care 
tends to vary inversely with the need of the population served (Barnett and Barnett, 2009). 
Statistical discrimination (Balsa and McGuire, 2001) and stereotyping (van Ryn and Fu, 
2003) have also been suggested as possible explanations for differences in access to care. 
Social and economic variants have much influence on the health outcome of different groups 
among any particular nation. In several studies a lower social class as determined by 
income, education or socio-economic status (SES) levels have been undertaken 
internationally linking these with higher rates of morbidity and mortality (Fuchs, 2004, 
Fukuda et al., 2004, Marmot and Wilkinson, 1999, Manderbacka et al., 2009). Australian 
researchers found similar trends in that rates of chronic disease vary largely across the 
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socio-economic gradient and drew the conclusion that policies made at a population level 
should acknowledge such inequalities (Glover et al., 2004). Even in comprehensive 
collectively funded national health systems with universal coverage like the UK, health 
outcomes vary significantly between income groups. One particular study identified that the 
lowest income group was four times more likely to be admitted to hospital than the highest 
income group (Angell, 1993). Despite this, studies have shown that patients of a higher 
socio-economic background are more likely to receive comprehensive care from physicians. 
The hospital sector has observed similar trends in that patients of lower socio-economic 
status seem to have shorter lengths of stay and in some cases have been less likely to be 
referred for surgery than other patients with parallel needs (Barnett and Barnett, 2009). 
Studies have also looked into the association of age and gender with inequalities in the 
prevalence of morbidity and in the access to health services. We know that women make 
greater use of health resources not only because gynaecological services are exclusively 
reserved for women but because of their longer life expectancy (Wall and Owen, 2002a).  
MacLoed, et al found a clear association between age and sex with admission rates in their 
(1999) study of coronary heart disease in Scotland. Likewise, Vallgarda (1999) notes that 
there has been a disproportionate increase in admission rates throughout the twentieth 
century for those in higher age brackets over younger admissions, with higher admission 
rates for old men than women. At the same time as demand seems to be growing for 
hospital services, Schrag, et al‟s (2001) research into rectal cancer intervention shows that 
treatment rates radically decline with increasing age of diagnosis. This evidence raises 
concerns for politicians and policymakers alike as ageing global populations demand an 
increasing share of health resources and age and gender related inequalities become 
increasingly visible throughout the population. 
Smedley, Stith, & Nelson (2002) point out many racial and ethnic minorities are subject to 
poor health through individual risk factors, these are compounded by a greater prevalence of 
minorities in the lower socio-economic tiers. House & Williams (2000) acknowledge that the 
disparity that racial and ethnic minorities face are largely due to differences in social, socio-
economic, and behavioural risk factors and through variance in environmental living 
conditions. Risk factors for certain groups have been shown to influence ethnic minorities in 
their extremely high rates of hospital admissions. Racial and ethnic minorities are 
disproportionately represented in a variety of serious illnesses such as cardiovascular 
disease (Schneider et al., 2001), various forms of diabetes (Chin et al., 1998) and renal 
Chapter 2: Review of Relevant Literature 
28 
 
disease (Epstein et al., 2000). They also suffer disproportionate access to some diagnostic 
tests (McMahon et al., 1999), treatments (Imperato et al., 1996) and many surgical 
procedures (Smedley et al., 2002). The targeted provision of health care to these groups is 
necessary but has been inefficient in addressing racial and ethnic disparities in health status 
(Williams, 1999).   
Health systems have been subject to an array of pressures that have placed limits on the 
delivery of health services. Discussed above are global pressures driven by demographic 
changes, the medical revolution, supply of skilled doctors and the rising expectations of 
providers, politicians and the public along with pressures of inequality and exclusion. All of 
these have implications on health system goals of equity, efficiency and effectiveness. The 
next section will discuss responses made by governments on behalf of health systems to 
provide better health outcomes delivered at a reasonable cost to taxpayers. 
2.4 Responses by Governments 
This section begins by approaching the conceptual understandings behind responses to 
pressures seen in the provision of hospital services. Regulation and agency theory are 
discussed in relation to dominant forms of hospital restructuring. The three goals of equity, 
efficiency and effectiveness will then be revisited in the discussion of three main forms of 
health services restructuring. Then a series of strategies adopted by different countries over 
the past three or so decades will be examined. The final part of this section will acknowledge 
governments‟ continual efforts to ration health services through competing goals of 
efficiency, equity and effectiveness. 
2.4.1 How have ‘Responses’ been Conceptualised? 
Writers have acknowleged the „crisis‟ of the welfare state in which pressures, such as those 
acknowleged in the previous section, are placing unsustainable demands on Western 
welfare systems. The pressures have been producing conflict between rising demands and 
expectations and, alternatively, falling state resources (Pinch, 1997). Agency and regulation 
theories and other key frameworks for analysing structures in health systems have been 
used to understand changes in provision (Giddens, 1984, Wolch and Dearm, 1989, Pinch, 
1997). „Regulation theory‟ has been used to compare political, social and economic systems 
to understand and determine differences in a variation of health systems at a macro level 
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and study inter-country variation. Agency theory views the world as a series of relationships 
in the form of incentivised contracts. Agency theorists believe that a contract based system 
provides control in the implementation of policy and limits the possibility of opportunistic 
behaviour (Gauld, 2009). Agency theory is relevant when national health policy is being 
applied in local contexts and is largely a process that is developed with interaction between 
different levels of political agents. 
Barnett and Copeland (2009) describe health care restructuring as a new form of regulation 
as defined by „regulation theory‟ (Pinch, 1997) especially when key changes are initiated in 
the relationship between the state, providers, and patients. The theory is used not to uncover 
a single explanatory factor but to unravel a series of intertwined and complex relationships to 
explain inter-country differences. Regulationists believe that distinctions in regulation will be 
found among nations according to different institutional practices, cultural traditions and the 
social and political struggles. Health restructuring has been influenced by „globalisation‟ and 
the diffusion of ideas from past reform. However, restructuring seems to take different forms 
in different places (Barnett and Copeland, 2009). The concept of „fordism‟ as a mode of 
regulation is typical to that of the „welfare state‟ however, some systems developed further 
than others. Following WW2, European and US welfare systems developed in starkly 
different ways. European systems evolved towards a social democratic form of welfare 
system, whereas the US adopted a free market/laissez-faire approach to the allocation of 
public services (Pinch, 1997). 
Agency theory has the ability to link macro ideas down to the micro level such to integrate 
people with places and the local context with the global context (Kearns and Moon, 2002). 
Agency theory deals with political processes, concerning power relationships between 
managerial and provider behaviour as a result of decisions made at higher levels of 
governance. This has been useful in examining and identifying the ways in which macro 
health policies have affected the decision making process at the local or micro level. 
However, agency and regulation theory overlook some political and social processes that 
are so important to the hospital sector. For example, Agency theory fails to consider the 
huge influence the US political system has had in passing revolutionary health care reform. 
In early 2010 the US state of Massachusetts had the ability to provide the deciding vote in 
Senate to seal or spell the demise of controversial Obama health reforms (Clarke, 2010). 
Subsequently the bill passed giving the whole nation a better prospect of increased 
coverage of health care into the future. Regardless of examples like this, regulation and 
Chapter 2: Review of Relevant Literature 
30 
 
agency have provided geographers with a valuable tool to help examine health services 
geography. 
2.4.2 Forms of Health Service Restructuring 
The goals of health systems (equity, efficiency and effectiveness) discussed earlier in this 
chapter are used to justify government responses in various forms of restructuring in hospital 
services. Health service restructuring aims to redistribute resources more equitably between 
geographic regions, lessen cost by service integration and improved provider accountability 
and by better managing expenditure on services (Barnett and Barnett, 2009). There are 
various forms of restructuring each that have occurred predominantly since the 1980s that 
have varied by country and social welfare setting. There are three basic forms of 
restructuring applied to health systems in order to make improvements in equity, efficiency 
and effectiveness and they are loosely based on the adoption of redistributive, managerial or 
market based systems. Table 1 provides a useful overlay of the three forms of restructuring 
against goals of equity, efficiency, effectiveness and favourable political outcomes. Within 
the table are different strategies which governments have adopted which have fallen under a 
type of health service restructuring or a goal. However, strategies are not exclusive to one 
box, some perform a number of functions although some may be limited. 
 
 Table 1: Forms of Restructuring 
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Needs-based funding 
The theoretical underpinnings of welfarism and Marxism in terms of redistributive 
restructuring place strong emphasis on equity and to some extent efficiency. Freeman 
(2000) notes that by centralising funding, enhanced public control is achieved. This is 
demonstrated by strong public control of national health services in countries where 
redistributive systems operate. Governments operating such systems will also adapt their 
approaches around cost efficiency, containment and allocation of funds towards likely 
priorities in order to satisfy public interests (Fattore, 1999). With the pressures mentioned in 
earlier sections of this chapter processes need to represent policies aimed at meeting the 
growing demands for health care within a fixed budget.  
New Public Management 
New public management (NPM) is a style of restructuring that became a dominant 
international trend in public administration during the 1980s and 90s. NPM is part of the 
managerial revolution that applied new strategies to achieve goals of efficiency, service 
integration and accountability. The rise of NPM established in the UK, soon spreading to the 
US, Australia, New Zealand and finally to the Scandinavian countries and continental Europe 
(Lane, 2000). The NPM movement was born out of the „new right‟ movement (Hood and 
Peters, 2004) and has been associated with some „mega trends‟ in administration theory 
(Hood, 1991). These are: (1) to decrease government expenditure growth by reducing levels 
of spending and downsizing staff (Dunsire and Hood, 1989); (2) shifts away from core 
government institutions in favour of privatisation and quasi-privatisation (Dunleavy, 1989); 
and (3) the introduction of an international agenda focusing on policy design, decision styles, 
international cooperation and general issues of public management (Hood, 1990).  
Hood (1991) characterises the ways in which NPM came to embody public service 
management. Aspirations of accountability have led government departments to clearly 
defined targets, allowing for responsibility for action, and performance-led resource 
allocation. Goals of efficiency have meant a greater reliance on competition in the form of 
public tendering and private management techniques in the public sector. Political pressures 
have also created pressures to disaggregate public administration to smaller units of 
governance as it was believed that this would make it more manageable to encourage 
competition between providers (Hood, 1991). 
Chapter 2: Review of Relevant Literature 
32 
 
Devolution 
Devolution is an important strategy which falls within NPM. Many have commented on 
changes in the structure of welfare states as many countries shift to devolve government to 
smaller administrative units as part of a „new wave‟ of management theory (Flynn, 1995, 
Pinch, 1997). It has commonly been referred to as the „hollowed out‟ state (Jessop, 1994a, 
Jessop, 1994b, Rhodes, 1994, Barnett, 2000b, Barnett, 1999). Importantly, „hollowing out‟ 
means the shift of responsibility in which central governments can distance themselves from 
making contested decisions which result in unpopular inadequacies in local health services 
(Mohan, 1995b). The extent to which this has occurred has resulted in variations the way 
different states have adapted to the process of reform (Pinch, 1997). Barnett (2000b) notes 
that the „hollowed out‟ state represents not only a process of devolution but also a process of 
privatisation as it enables a wide range of non-elected community, non-profit and private 
providers to compete for contracts. 
Internal Markets 
The internal market also is a mixture of managerial and market based restructuring. This 
encourages governments to seek a balance between neo-liberal and centralist ideologies 
such that cooperation is favoured over competition so that more balanced goals of equity 
and efficiency can be realised (Barnett and Barnett, 2009). The health systems of Sweden, 
UK and New Zealand are distinguished by fiscal, administrative, political decentralisation 
such that all countries have a high degree of public integration and control within their health 
systems (Saltman and Bankauskaite, 2006). All three health systems introduced a 
purchaser/provider split during the late 1980s and early 1990s in order to try and mimic 
market conditions in order to stimulate competition amongst providers (Walsh, 1995, Blank 
and Burau, 2007).  
Under the public contracting that came in with the introduction of the internal market a 
market-style dynamic was introduced into the NHS (Harrison, 2004). This internal or „quasi‟ 
market has brought about a system of managed competition with strong aspects of planning 
and regulation to provide incentives in order to improve efficiency (Le Grand and Bartlett, 
1993, Renade, 1997). In Germany and the Netherlands focus was placed on the purchasers 
rather than the providers so that individuals were free to change insurance firms in a drive to 
increase competition between insurers (Greb et al., 2004, Lieverdink and van der Made, 
1997). This introduction of a „third way‟ or a „pick and mix‟ policy approach meant 
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governments begun to encourage collaboration but more recent times have brought about 
further emphasis on competition internally within public systems in order to extend to a wider 
range of services (Crinson, 2005, Greener, 2004, Powell, 1999).   
Privatisation of Hospital Services 
Privatisation or free market restructuring was born out of neoliberalism, public choice and 
ultimately the need for efficiency in the face of global economic pressures triggered by a 
global spike in the price of oil, growing unemployment and the record inflation of the 1970s. 
The „new right‟ movement led to the emergence of political parties which promoted the 
introduction of the market as a more efficient way of distributing health services. These 
parties campaigned for the deregulation of private markets with the view to breaking state 
monopolies in the provision of welfare services. Many countries of the OECD have sought to 
introduce market mechanisms into largely publicly funded and provided health systems 
(Fougere, 2001). As part of the neo-liberal movement countries begun to reconsider their 
public-private mix as a result of tension between equity and affordability (Van Doorslaer et 
al., 2006).  
The inadequate resourcing of public systems to distribute health care according to people‟s 
demands and expectations forced those who could afford it to adopt a „new citizenship 
theory‟ in which responsibility is placed on the individual over collective rights or universal 
benefits (Pinch, 1997). Mohan (1995a) suggests that the most significant factor has been the 
uptake of private health insurance throughout society which shows the inadequacy of public 
health resources in serving the infinite scope of demand throughout the population. The 
pursuit of customer choice and aims to relieve pressure on publicly funded health systems 
also led many conservative governments in Western countries to put increased emphasis on 
expansion of private health systems (Vaithianathan, 2002). 
The ideology of centralised control over all health resources was challenged in the early 
1980s in that publicly provided care was deemed inefficient, wasteful and unproductive. 
There was the belief that the market should allow prices to determine the tastes and 
preferences of the consumer (Scarpaci, 1989). Eyles (1989) cites privatisation as a social 
policy in reply to the challenge of cost containment. This leads to the debate as to whether or 
not the private health sector is more efficient than its public counterpart. Much evidence 
points to inefficiencies found in the provision of private health care as discussed in earlier 
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sections on supply induced demand which explains why the free market fails to allocate 
health care resources efficiently.  
While the private market fails to deliver via some means, there has been some success in 
privatising and outsourcing the ancillary services which public hospitals require in order to 
operate, such as catering, cleaning, laundry facilities, IT services and even in some medical 
imaging specialties. The contracting out of such services has become common in a variety 
of different countries including the US, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the UK (Pinch, 
1997). Evidence suggests 20-30% of cost can be saved through the use of the private sector 
for these purposes (Walsh, 1995). Freeman (2000, 1999) notes competition assures more 
and better services for the every dollar spent in the health sector. 
Regardless of which is more efficient, public or private provision, health care has 
increasingly been conceptualised and reconstructed as a commodity and as a product (Ham, 
1997, OECD, 1994, Raffel, 1997). This transformation led to the increased emergence of for-
profit service delivery in the hospital sector (Brown and Barnett, 2004). Such development 
has been most noticeable in the US where the insurance market dominates. Bohland & Knox 
(1989) nickname the US health care system as the „medical-industrial complex‟ 
characteristic of the large medical corporations that dominate over the health marketplace. 
Innovation 
Market principles encourage some level of innovation in health care therefore increasing 
effectiveness of services. However, given the limited nature of funds that governments can 
designate for health care expenditure decisions have to be made on the nature and range of 
the health care services to provide (Gatrell, 2002). Most Western nations have chosen to 
guarantee universal coverage but limit the range of health services. Alternately, the US has 
opted for a market based system of high technological innovation and a comprehensive 
range of procedures for their population. As mentioned above some health systems have 
implemented market based restructuring to improve innovation and make improvements to 
quality of health services and to improve consumer choice. 
Deinstitutionalisation  
Deinstitutionalisation is the process applied to the transformation of mental health care 
services in a variety of international contexts with the key goal of raising the effectiveness of 
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service institutions. Deinstitutionalisation is a form of restructuring of which focuses on 
reducing the population size of mental hospitals (Joseph and Kearns, 1996). Since the 
1960s large-scale, often „monolithic‟ institutions have been disestablished in favour of 
community-based facilities. During this process many patients were released into the 
community which created problems of dependency, homelessness, helplessness and anti-
social behaviours (Wolpert and Wolpert, 1976). Subsequent research has been done to 
detail the ramifications of deinstitutionalisation and difficulties for ex-psychiatric patients in 
reintegrating into the community (Kearns et al., 1987, Laws and Dear, 1988). These trends 
were reported particularly in the cities of North America where these findings were 
contextualised into concepts such as „the public city‟ (Dear, 1980) „the service dependent 
ghetto‟ (Wolch and Gabriel, 1985) and the reproduction of urban space (Dear and Wolch, 
1987, 1989). 
2.4.3 Rationing 
The main purpose of any form of rationing is in pursuit of efficiency which has been 
increasingly important for hospital systems in recent times. Rationing can be conceptualised 
as a form of managerial restructuring. However, rationing has always been part of medical 
decision making. It is a reflection of scarce health resources the allocation of which is 
decided as a result of clinical decision making rather than trying to satisfy popular 
expectations (Wall and Owen, 2002b). Issues of cost containment and access lead 
governments to consider the rationing of health services often resulting in restrictions in 
access through financial and geographic barriers (Gatrell, 2002). No government can supply 
unrestricted access to health resources for all its citizens so all medical systems must utilise 
rationing as a tool to restrict financial cost (Ham and Robert, 2003). Fleck (2002) notes that 
rationing is an integral process to, and is often the reason for, health care reform. This 
discussion leads to further consideration of such systems. 
The main point of rationing is to limit the services delivered to minimise spending and to 
enable governments to stay within their annual budgets (Spicker, 2008). This can be 
achieved by inhibiting demand but more common is the practice of governments to place 
limits on supply. Scrivens (1980) recognises two main ways that government can limit 
supply: restrictive or dilutant rationing. Restrictive rationing is used when people are 
restricted from using certain services. Alternately, dilutant rationing is led through some 
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reduction in the service, through limiting quality, accessibility or limiting period for which the 
treatment is given (Scrivens, 1980). 
 
Figure 6: Forms of Rationing (Blank, 1997) 
Types of rationing are underpinned by each government‟s approach towards choices of 
health care provision, resource allocation, and priority setting (Blank and Burau, 2007). 
Figure 6 above shows a variety of ways that governments and health authorities can ration 
health services dependent on the type of political and social environment that they operate 
within. 
Countries such as Britain or New Zealand which have had a far stronger control over the 
supply of health care, find it easier to use non-price or explicit forms of rationing. This is 
socially determined by the fact that government can justify spending less in one area on the 
grounds that the money is being spent on higher priority services. Whereas, countries based 
on the principle of free market economics find it more difficult to reallocate funds or deny any 
treatment to specific patients as there is no certainty whether the funds will be put to better 
use elsewhere (Blank and Burau, 2007).  
There are a number of options that governments have used to ration health services in order 
to control public expenditure as illustrated in Figure 7. Frech & Lee (1987) suggest that those 
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with the most elastically demanded services should be the most severely rationed. Society‟s 
potential, and some would say unlimited demand can be restricted by five common methods 
of rationing: denial, filtering, user payments, delays, and some restriction in quality. This 
leaves the society‟s effective demand manipulated according to the government policies as 
seen above. Each of the five rationing tools mentioned by Spicker (2008) is briefly discussed 
below along using examples from New Zealand and overseas. 
 
Figure 7: Rationing Processes (Spicker, 2008) 
Rationing by Denial or Exclusion 
Some systems use eligibility criteria to specify who gains treatment at certain points of entry 
into the health system. Eligibility criteria are important for rationing health systems. Health 
budgets cannot sustain treatment for all cases of morbidity due to the scarce nature of health 
resources but eligibility criteria mean that health systems can limit those treated to that of a 
certain level of illness (Spicker, 2008). Elster (1992) gives a range of examples of eligibility 
criteria have been used as criteria for acceptance or rejection, they include: age, race, 
religion, gender, family status and sexual status. These exclusions are imbedded in the 
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inequalities that were discussed earlier in this chapter. Age is one criterion which 
understandably forms a target for rationing in relation to the disproportionate use of health 
resources by the elderly. Some authors have suggested this to be the case but have also 
acknowledged that this is not possible in some countries because of the political power of 
the elderly (Callahan, 1987). This notion is most strongly resisted in the US but alternatively, 
the UK assesses age as a primary criteria for rationing health services at all levels of the 
NHS (Williams, 2000). 
Rationing by Filtering 
Filtering is an important means in which health systems can restrict health expenditure by 
authorising treatment only to those whom absolutely require it (Spicker, 2008). People who 
clinical needs are separated from others by way of referral and deflection mechanisms. 
Much research has scrutinised the role of GPs in acting as „gatekeepers‟ for the referral on 
to specialists and secondary care (Farham, 2010, Toon, 1994, Gervas et al., 1994). The 
emergence of „managerialism‟ has reinforced doctors as the managers and gatekeepers of 
medicine such that they hold a monopoly of control over medical knowledge, contents and 
conditions of work, regulation, recruitment and policing of the profession. Because of the 
authority held by the medical profession collectively through the operation of rules and 
procedures, doctors have gained control at the local level over the consumption of scarce 
medical resources (Pahl, 1977).  
Rationing by Imposing Cost 
One key way that government can inhibit demand is by way of the market in the charging for 
medical services. By raising the price of medical interventions, demand is reduced and if 
raised high enough will clear the market. Vary rarely are people made to wait for the 
provision of private goods; the fact is if you‟re willing to pay for the service required it will be 
available for you to purchase (Spicker, 2008). Rather than waiting, people tend to be 
excluded from treatments due to unwillingness or inability to pay for a service. For example, 
in the US where the free-market operates under a system of insurance, many choose not to 
pay the high premiums demanded by insurance firms. In 2007, 45 Million people were not 
covered by any form of health insurance (Blank and Burau, 2007). 
Health providers can also restrict demand for a service by making it deliberately unpleasant 
to get, awkward to reach or humiliating to claim. Deterrence in this form is unusual but there 
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are several examples. Whether or not health providers meant it or not the stigma attached to 
claiming psychiatric care are significant (Spicker, 2008). In the 19th and first half of the 20th 
century authorities shamed and discouraged hospital patients from using care by parading 
them through the grounds of the workhouse so they would know just where they were 
(Smith, 1964). In current health systems there are no longer such crude methods of shaming 
patients but there are several systems which make it onerous to seek access to care, such 
as having to get a prescription for medicine or having to be referred before seeking advice 
from a specialist. 
Rationing by Waiting 
One of the most common forms of rationing, especially in national health services such as 
those illustrated in Britain or New Zealand is to delay the delivery of a service. Waiting lists 
are most appropriate when a particular resource is strictly limited and its availability 
unpredictable where the management and allocation of a resource creates the need to wait 
(Roake, 2003). Rationing by delay can be seen in its most simple form as waiting in a queue 
in which the first person that presents is the first served, and is usually seen as being fair. 
However, as people face differing health needs on the basis of urgency such simple systems 
need be disregarded in favour of priority systems, in which some people can be seen to be 
„jumping the queue‟ (Spicker, 2008). 
For decades surgeons have relied on systems of triage based on measures of urgency 
(urgent, semi-urgent and routine). Given the limited resources, the triage system contributed 
to long waits in some specialties (Roake, 2003). Also, prioritising schemes often lead to 
political pressures to add innovative new surgeries for specific individuals while at the same 
time those who would have been otherwise treated are excluded from treatment (Blank and 
Burau, 2007). Like queuing for concert tickets, or at the petrol pump, waiting for surgery 
represents a monetary loss of the value of your time spent waiting for a service. Rationing by 
waiting accordingly entails a welfare loss (Frech and Hopkins, 2004). Unlike other queues, 
this loss imposes a cost not only for time spent waiting in doctors surgeries but in lost 
productivity, income, quality of life (including physical and psychological pain and suffering) 
and increased reliance on family members as well as health and welfare services generally 
(Danzon, 1992). 
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 Figure 8: Factors Influencing Waiting Lists for Elective Surgery (Roake, 2003)  
Waiting lists are widely reported to place great barriers on access to elective surgery, 
especially in two-tiered public/private health systems. The meaning of waiting lists was to 
prioritise access to surgery for all non-urgent conditions. There is a large amount of criticism 
over the lack of transparency that is sometimes shown for patients of greater need and a 
lack of certainty over access to surgery (Roake, 2003). It has been suggested that waiting 
lists have been generated simply because demand often outstrips supply for health services 
and, or in conjunction with, the inefficiency of health service providers (Gauld and Derrett, 
2000). Waiting lists are dynamic. As Roake (2003) has indicated the size and rate of 
movement within a waiting list will depend on a number of factors as illustrated in Figure 8. 
Rationing by Limiting Quality 
Dilution of services is another way of inhibiting supply. Less common than other forms of 
rationing it is seen as a decrease in the quality, duration, or amount of a service offered. This 
is primarily because these actions run counter to professional ethics and teachings to ensure 
maximal treatment for the patient. However,  some services are difficult or not able to be 
diluted such as operations and other specialist treatments (Spicker, 2008). More successful 
in providing universal health care services and controlling costs are Britain, New Zealand 
and Japan because policies are adopted to limit the availability of high cost, high technology 
medicine (Blank and Burau, 2007). 
Pressures generated on health systems from the latter half of the twentieth century onwards 
have generated a series of coordinated responses in the form of a series of major 
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restructurings. Processes of health restructuring are aimed at reaching common goals of 
equity, efficiency and effectiveness through the fulfilment of redistributive, managerial and 
market orientated reform. The next section of this chapter will examine the outcomes that 
have been generated as a result of the restructuring that has been discussed above. 
2.5 Restructuring Outcomes 
2.5.1 Hospital Closure and Rationalisation 
Many have looked at the impending closure of rural and suburban hospitals as the health 
market has moved to centralise resources in and around urban centres. Urban migration of 
doctors has occurred towards towns and cities in search of technology, valuable training and 
the proliferation of lucrative proprietary care (Raghuram and Kofman, 2002, Bundred and 
Levitt, 2000). In many countries that experienced this form of urbanisation in health care 
there was a shift away from hospital services. In the UK especially, cost effective care spelt 
a movement toward more comprehensive ambulatory provision for peripheral areas 
(Saltman and Bankauskaite, 2006). Successive British governments have envisaged 
„primary care led‟ health care in which GPs have become „gatekeepers‟ and managers 
(Blank and Burau, 2007). 
Much literature has been written about the relocation of hospital services from rural settings 
to urban centres. One study looks at the closure of 52 rural hospitals into primary health 
clinics or „wellness centres‟ in Saskatchewan, Canada (James, 1999). Another looks at rural 
hospital closure in the US between 1980 and 1986 and the implications for rural 
communities compared to benefits of the overall health system (Mullner and Whiteids, 1988). 
In the UK, rural hospitals, sometimes known as „cottage hospitals‟ have faced the same fate. 
Inequalities with access to specialised care are generated as a concentration of health care 
services relocate to core urban populations (Stukel et al., 2005). Hunt (2006) examines how 
community resistance to hospital closures in Cumbria was mounting to additional rural 
hospital closures as the communities became more isolated and were forced to travel 
increasing distances in order to gain access to secondary treatments. 
Inequalities have been widely reported on patients‟ travel, relocation and cost of time wasted 
travelling to and from specialist treatment. The notion of ‟distance decay‟ is commonly 
referred to when medical services and facilities are moved further away from patients  with 
the  result that patients use less of a service. People are substantially more likely to make a 
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trade-off between the cost and benefits of accessing treatment (Barnett and Barnett, 2009, 
Pinch, 1997). Therefore, the closure of hospitals in rural centres and the move towards 
providing service out of urban locations means rural populations are suffering reduced 
access to quality hospital services. 
2.5.2 Health System and Health Outcomes 
Health systems have come a long way during the past century to better meet the needs for 
care and in generating positive benefits for health. As seen above, all countries have to 
ration health services to ensure they maximise efficiency while ensuring equitable access to 
effective care is maintained. Goals of service provision have been formulated by 
governments and international agencies to report on the contribution health care makes to 
health outcomes. Health interventions do not always create equitable outcomes so agencies 
have had to focus on reducing health inequalities between different groups as well as 
addressing conventional goals of increased life expectancy. However, as Barnett and 
Barnett (2009) point out that it is difficult to measure contributions to health systems and 
their effects on health outcomes because key indicators of success often conflict with losses 
in other areas which are detrimental to overall health status of a population. 
2.5.3 Public Private Interactions in the Delivery of Hospital Services 
Many governments are accepting of the fact that inequalities will be generated as a result of 
having parallel health systems in which privately funded health insurance operates alongside 
public provision (Schoen et al., 2000). The belief is common that people should be allowed 
to spend their own resources as they choose (McLeod et al., 2004a). There has been much 
debate as to whether private sector participation increases or decreases the burden on the 
public system. Arguments that the latter are true and have motivated govenments to leave 
the health market unregulated, in some cases encouraging private participation. Wheras the 
other side of the argument is that pressures form to restrict and regulate the private sector. 
Many have investigated how privatisation affects waiting times for elective proceedures in 
the public sector. Proponents of private financing in the provision of health care say that the 
growth of private health providers will shorten wating times for treatment (Bhatia and 
Natsheh, 2005). However, the majority of research suggests that in countries that have 
parallel systems such as the UK, New Zealand, and Sweden the problem of waiting times 
still exists and in areas of high insurance ownership the problem of waiting times seems to 
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be exacerbated (Tuohy et al., 2002, Columbo and Tepay, 2005, Duckett, 2005).Duckett 
(2005) argues that strategies to decrease waiting times should be carefully arranged to avoid 
creating the wrong incentives such that they reward hospitals with long waiting times. 
The question of whether private system expansion is supportive or erosive in damaging 
public provision of health services is very important. A large body of literature seems to 
support a common notion that privatisation has a detrimental affect on waiting times and the 
equity of public health systems. Derrett, Bevin, Herbison and Paul‟s (2009) study found that 
private provision for the well-off is associated with less access generally to publicly funded 
elective surgery in New Zealand. The Canadian Health Services Research Foundation 
(2003) has described the hypothesis that privatisation reduces waiting times as mythical. 
Duckett (2005) suggests that those drafting policy should be careful about pursuing policies 
in which expanding private health care is used as a method of reducing waiting times. 
Vaithianathan (2002) suggests that the answer lies embedded within governments‟ 
approaches to regulation within the private sector.  
This section has discussed some of the outcomes that have originated from various forms of 
health service rationing. The next section will discuss some of the ways geographers have 
approached topics of health service provision and will establish this thesis in the context of 
some of the wider international literature. 
2.6 Overview and Critique of Literature 
The field of health geography has traditionally been divided into two distinctive areas of 
focus. The first being analysis of the spatial distribution of morbidity and mortality and 
secondly, the geographical complexities around the provision, access to and inequality of 
health care (Parr, 2003). This thesis seeks to understand the latter strand of health 
geography, surrounding issues of access and concerns of inequality found within the New 
Zealand health system. Being able to provide critical geographical analysis of health allows 
us to consider the implications of conducting research  under the watch of  the medical 
profession and in light of the political significance of health policy. In consideration of this 
health geography seeks to influence those who make or interpret policy to ensure that they 
make decisions appropriate for the improved provision of health services.  
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Studies of health care policy concerning issues of access have largely been aligned with 
analysis of welfare state as seen throughout earlier sections of this chapter (Kearns and 
Moon, 2002). Throughout the 1990s geographers have discussed the health care 
implications of neo-liberal policies (Barnett and Barnett, 1999, Moran, 1994, Mohan, 1995b) 
which has heightened concern for equity under a gradient of health status (Salmond and 
Crampton, 1999, Hayes, 1999) and for access to services (Van Doorslaer et al., 2006, 
Earickson, 2000). Outside of health geography much investigation in similar areas had been 
undertaken independently or in collaboration with other disciplines. The closest relationship 
probably remains with public health, but there are also strong links with economists, 
historians, policy analysts, statisticians and sociologists (Kearns and Moon, 2002). 
The first objective of this thesis seeks to examine just how access to elective treatments 
varies spatially across New Zealand. The literature does not visit issues for the provision of 
elective services, it looks only  at other indicators of hospital resourcing, such as the number 
of hospital beds or the level of funding by region (Barnett, 2000b). 
Objective two will identify if certain groups of the population are more likely to suffer less 
access to these health services according to individual social and demographic 
characteristics. Geographers have found inequality in the way health resources and services 
have been allocated between different populations according to their socio-economic status 
and ethnicity in a variety of different contexts. In the UK, socio-demographic deprivation was 
found to be associated with lower rates of treatment for lung cancer (Jack et al., 2006). 
Significant relationships between low diagnosis/treatment rates and socio-economically 
deprived individuals have also been found in France, Denmark, Switzerland and Japan 
(Rapiti et al., 2006, Berchi et al., 2004, Norredam et al., 1998, Fukuda et al., 2005). In the 
US ethnic minorities were shown to have a significantly lower chance of having breast 
cancer treatment (Haggstrom et al., 2005). Inequalities have not only been found in access 
to medical treatments but are emphasised by differences in health status and mortality. 
Inequalities of this sort have been reported by age (Vallgarda, 1999, Schrag et al., 2001), 
gender (Wall and Owen, 2002a, Barnett and Lauer, 2003), ethnicity (Smedly et al., 2002, 
House and Williams, 2000, Barnett and Malcolm, 2010) and socio-economic backgrounds 
(Fuchs, 2004, Fukuda et al., 2004, Marmot and Wilkinson, 1999, Manderbacka et al., 2009, 
Pearce et al., 2006).  
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Objective 3 focuses on finding contextual differences which affects the way health care (in 
particular elective services) are organised and delivered depending on public private 
interaction in the health sector. This topic has largely been unvisited by geographers and 
has not been approached in this way before as analysis measures access to health services 
depending on the public/private mix of a particular region‟s health services  with the 
exception of Barnett and Barnett over twenty years earlier (Barnett and Barnett, 1989). 
Overall, the themes approached within this thesis largely fall outside the body of literature 
that has been approached by health geographers and direct links are forged between the 
analysis of sociology, economics of health, politics, and public health disciplines. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The provision of social and welfare services in Western industrialised economies has been 
widely discussed and reviewed throughout the international literature. Governments‟ roles in 
the provision of welfare services have been grouped into „typologies‟ by a number of 
different theorists and according to factors such as societal makeup, political structures and 
cultural norms. The value that individual governments place on equity, efficiency and 
effectiveness differs between nations and shapes public involvement in the provision of 
health services. We have seen that government approaches towards the provision of health 
care vary significantly between countries despite having common goals and objectives.  
Most countries have been subject to common pressures on the hospital sector such as the 
ageing of world populations, the technological revolution of medicine, issues of supply 
induced demand and a wide range of inequalities threatening access to care. Governments 
have responded in different ways dependent on which „typology‟ or type of health system 
they belong to. Some welfare states privatised hospital services to create competition in the 
anticipation of gains in efficiency. Also, governments enhanced methods of rationing health 
services including the urbanisation of hospital services, improved filtering of patients, and 
waiting systems, amongst others. However, these cost saving measures can contribute to 
further inequalities in the access to quality health services which has led to the continuing 
debate over the privatisation of health services. 
The following chapter will examine similar issues found in the New Zealand health system. 
New Zealand has a health care system that has been compared closely to that of Britain‟s 
NHS in that it has experienced similar reform and exhibits parallel public/private systems in 
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which the private health sector is seen to complement gaps or discrepancies in the provision 
of public health services. The author will now examine the role of public and private hospitals 
in delivering care to New Zealand‟s population, the long history of hospital and health 
services restructuring and will look more closely into the impact of privatisation on access to 
public hospital services. 
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3 Perspectives on The New Zealand Hospital Sector 
3.1 Introduction 
New Zealand‟s hospital sector has been significantly influenced by international pressures 
and has drawn on other nations‟ experiences for the adoption of hospital care policies. New 
Zealand‟s welfare state origin roughly mimics that of the UK experience not only through its 
roots of social security and its establishment of a national health system but has also 
followed similar principles of health service restructuring particularly since the 1980s. The 
approach has subsequently changed from an emphasis on Keynesian type redistributive 
policy which focused almost entirely on goals of equity to a mixed model which showed 
signs of more liberal managerial and market based policy that grew out of goals of efficiency. 
New Zealand‟s approach represents a mixture of ideologies reflecting frequent changes in 
government, rising national health expenditure and growing inequalities in service provision. 
The outcome has been the creation of a dual public/private system of hospital care of which 
the public system concentrates its efforts on acute and ambulatory services while leaving the 
private sector to profit on public sector inadequacies in the provision of elective surgery. 
This chapter will provide an overview of the New Zealand health system with particular 
emphasis on the provision of hospital services. It begins by discussing the origins of the 
hospital sector and discusses the goals that have become important in New Zealand‟s 
adoption of health policy amongst broader welfare principles. Goals of hospital care and 
implementation of health policy have been widely influenced in New Zealand by inequalities 
and stretched by pressures that will be discussed in the next section of the chapter. 
Government responses will then be examined in the form of health service restructuring and 
various types of rationing that have taken place to curtail growing public expenditure on 
health care. Finally, the outcomes of health service restructuring will be observed by taking a 
look at the current state of the hospital sector and by examining the interaction that takes 
place between the public and private hospital sectors. 
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3.2 Hospital Care in New Zealand 
3.2.1 The Beginnings of Health and Disability Services 
As in many other countries, hospital care contributes the bulk of New Zealand‟s health 
expenditure. The government has played a dominant role in determining the development of 
New Zealand‟s health care system, especially since the Social Security Act was passed in 
1938. This section will discuss the development of New Zealand‟s health system particularly 
focusing on the evolving role of hospitals in the delivery of health services. Secondly, it will 
examine some of the goals that the New Zealand government has adopted to achieve higher 
health outcomes and service delivery to the population. Finally, New Zealand‟s health 
system will be compared to other countries in terms of its welfarist principles and alignment 
to concerns of social security. 
The New Zealand hospital sector was formed in 1846 when George Grey, the Governor 
General at the time, commissioned four district hospitals built to serve Maori populations and 
the poor (Gauld, 2009). Hospitals of this period were considered as places to keep away 
from, only to be resorted to in acts of desperation (Dew and Kirkman, 2007b). While the 
government moved to establish hospital facilities it encouraged private provision and 
supported voluntary agents (McGuigan, 1975). In 1872 the first Public Health Act was 
passed in reaction to increases in population, ineffective service provision and in the 
realisation that hospital services would not develop in an organised way without government 
intervention. By the 1880s around three quarters of hospital care expenditure was being 
funded by government. In 1885 the Hospital and Charitable Institutions Act was signed 
which meant that health funding became a local responsibility subsidised by government 
contributions. As a result inequalities in patient access to hospital care grew substantially as 
a result of regional differences in funding. State contributions also fell almost by 50% in the 
years 1884 and 1886 (Gauld, 2009). 
In the 1880s The British Medical Association of New Zealand (BMANZ) was founded to 
„professionalise‟ medicine. This development was very important in the development of New 
Zealand‟s health system as this agent became  very powerful in lobbying for the profession 
and for the private interests of individual physicians (Gauld, 2009). At the turn of the 20th 
century the government was persuaded that local finance of the health sector was inefficient 
and began taking back control of health administration. In 1918 the BMANZ suggested a 
„Toronto Scheme‟ be adopted in the New Zealand context, an idea where hospitals would 
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provide separate premises to provide facilities for private patients who would pay a 
negotiated fee according to the treatments required. Profits were to be reinvested into the 
hospital (Dow, 1995). This set the scene for a system in which physicians enjoyed lucrative 
FFS treatments as complementary source of income outside salaried work done in the public 
sector. The Department of Health was established in 1920 and health care was restructured 
into seven public health divisions to acknowledge a growing belief that hospitals should 
provide both curative and preventative services within primary, secondary and tertiary 
sectors.  
As a result of the social and economic hardship that grew out of the great depression there 
was increasing pressure to renew the health system (Gauld, 2009). Michael Joseph 
Savage‟s Labour Party promised universal publicly provided hospital services and primary 
care in their election campaign of 1935 which threatened the private interests of physicians. 
Subsequently, significant resistance was generated by the BMANZ . However, a 
compromise was reached between The first Labour Government and the medical profession 
in the signing of the Social Security Act of 1938 which aimed to provide a comprehensive 
state funded health service (French, 1977, Dow, 1995). The act provided for „free‟ access to 
hospital care but its provision remained very unequal. As a result of resistance met by the 
medical profession, the state was not able to completely deliver on its promises of a unified 
state funded and coordinated health service, so a dual system emerged in which public and 
private sectors were to operate in tandem providing both primary and secondary services. 
In 1941, the Government established the general medical services (GMS) benefit system in 
which offered subsidies to GPs for the provision of primary services but GPs were also 
allowed to charge a fee per consultation up to one third above the GMS (Dew and Kirkman, 
2007b). In the hospital sector the influence of social security legislation meant the reduction 
of private participation in the hospital sector. Between 1938 and 1948 private hospital sector 
participation decreased from 22.1% to 15% and some of the existing facilities were taken by 
the public sector and others were disestablished (McGuigan, 1975). Over a similar period 
the government‟s contribution towards hospital services doubled from 39% to 73% of its total 
health expenditure. 
The 1950s saw the election of a National Government which sought to reinvest money into 
the dwindling private sector. Encouraged by the understanding that every private bed filled 
was one that the state did not have to provide, the government came up with a number of 
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initiatives (Hay, 1989). The state introduced grants for the establishment of new institutions 
and capabilities in private medicine and introduced „maintenance subsidies‟ for private 
providers. As the private sector re-established into the 1960s, the distinction between public 
and private and primary and secondary care became clearer. By the 1970s private 
institutions contributed 20% of all hospital beds. Generally patients paid for this care through 
memberships to private health insurance schemes. From goals of the first Labour 
Government, e.g.  social security and principles of access in accordance to need there came 
a fragmented health system in which the private sector had re-emerged and access was 
largely determined in accordance with ability to pay. During this period public hospital 
coverage had improved but public perception of the system compared with private services 
had declined significantly (Gauld, 2009). By the 1980s 48% of New Zealanders were holders 
of private medical insurance policies which were purchased primarily in order to enable 
better access to primary care and specialist consultations (Hay, 1989). 
In 1967 the first national funding formula was introduced for the allocation of funds to 
Hospital Boards, which had previously been sought from local rates. The allocation was set 
according to bed supply rather than indicators of health needs. As a result there were large 
variations in funding which meant some regions were better served than others and growing 
waiting lists for non-urgent surgical procedures (Barnett et al., 1980). The third Labour 
government (1972-1975) successfully campaigned on the problematic state of the health 
service and went on to begin a series of reviews within the system, conducted by the 
Department of Health. The recommendations were configured in the form of a White Paper, 
„A Health Service for New Zealand‟ (McGuigan, 1975), which formed a template for the 
reform of the health sector. Labour‟s White Paper suggested a focus on preventative 
medicine, the integration of health services and establishment of a system that is determined 
according to need and not ability to pay. However, sections of the White Paper were 
unsupported by the medical profession to the extent that it launched a campaign to discredit 
the government much like in the way that it had done in the wake of the 1938 Social Security 
Act (Gauld, 2009). 
The succeeding National government (1975-1984) favoured corporatist methods which 
meant collaborating with established interest groups within the medical community such as 
the New Zealand Medical Association which had resisted proposals put forward by the 
previous Labour Government (Gauld, 2009). The National Government stimulated the 
private sector by extending private bed subsidies to geriatric care in 1977 and in 1982 with 
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the introduction of an „approved procedures list‟, which gave doctors the power to refer 
patients who required surgery in a specialty that experienced high waiting lists directly to 
private hospitals where services could be obtained promptly. This was subsequently 
cancelled in 1987 when spending on such services was deemed unsustainable (Barnett and 
Barnett, 1989). The political and financial costs of a supply driven allocation system led to 
the introduction of two major changes to hospital services in 1983. These were the 
introduction of population-based funding and the establishment of area health boards 
(AHBs) which were further developed throughout the 1980s. Population-based funding 
aimed to cap expenditure to stop the open-ended spending that had occurred since 1938.  
Some minor health restructuring occurred in 1989 with the final integration of elected, 
regionally based AHBs which aimed to integrate population health and hospital services. 
Improvements in performance and accountability represented broad goals of public sector 
restructuring. Despite the introduction of general management tools, result orientated 
reporting capped budgets and informal contracts between AHBs and the Minister of Health 
(Beaglehole and Davis, 1992), expenditure in health continued to increase throughout the 
1980s (Malcolm, 1993). In 1990 National was elected and begun a radical agenda of 
liberalisation including the privatisation of state assets and deregulation of the labour market 
(Barnett, 1999). This episode of reform in the beginning in the early 1990‟s kicked off a 
„turbulent decade‟ which spelt a period of repeated change for New Zealand‟s health sector 
(Barnett and Barnett, 2003a). This period of change will be further discussed later in this 
chapter. 
3.2.2 Goals of Hospital Care in New Zealand 
Equity, efficiency and effectiveness were discussed throughout Chapter 2 and are goals of 
health service restructuring and more generally overall objectives of national health systems. 
New Zealand‟s health care system follows that of a redistributive model guaranteeing 
universal access to a wide variety of hospital and community services (Pinch, 1997). The 
redistributive model places great emphasis on equity of service provision to redirect 
resources towards population need. The redistributive framework was underwritten by the 
1938 Social Security Act which promised all New Zealand citizens in need, free access to 
appropriate treatment as identified by health professionals. In doing so, New Zealand was 
the first nation to introduce a universal system of free inpatient treatments (Somjen, 2000). 
Health expenditure was to be funded through progressive taxation in order to offer the direct 
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provision of hospital care together with a parallel system of subsidies for the use of primary 
care (Fougere, 2001). 
Since the post-depression move to enact the Social Security Act in 1938 two political parties 
have pursued slightly different policy objectives during their time in office. The Labour Party 
has been a long-time advocate of redistributive social security policy which promotes goals 
of equity to ensure universal coverage throughout the population. Whereas, National are 
strong supporters of market principles to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of hospital 
systems. This was demonstrated in the 1950s when National encouraged the growth of the 
private hospital sector in the belief that efficiencies would flow through to the public sector 
(Hay, 1989). This turns our attention to the way that New Zealand‟s health system has grown 
out of governments‟ adoption of certain welfare principles. 
3.2.3 New Zealand’s Adoption of the Welfare State 
The 1938 Social Security Act signified a strong move by the first Labour government to 
adopt the principles of the Keynesian welfare state. As described in the previous chapter few 
countries fit perfectly into typologies but adopt more of a mixed approach to the provision of 
welfare services (Blank and Burau, 2007). While New Zealand has strong social security 
roots it also has adopted some more liberal consumer sovereignty principles particularly 
during National Party governance. Towards the later part of the 20th Century globalisation 
and a convergence of ideologies has had consequences for the organisation of welfare 
(Mohan, 2003). Barnett and Barnett (2003a) suggest New Zealand like the UK represents a 
„middle way‟ in that it has a mix of both public and private finance and services, particularly 
in surgical services, primary, and geriatric care. 
Authors have argued that welfare regimes are evolving away from the traditional Keynesian 
welfare national state towards a „Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime‟ (Jessop, 
1999). The Schumpeterian workfare state incorporated the goal of raising the structural 
competitiveness of New Zealand‟s economy, manipulating the supply side by reducing 
expenditure in welfare and focussing attention of the needs of the labour market (Barnett, 
1999). Such a suggestion has attracted significant discussion from geographers especially 
these forms of welfare and hospital restructuring (Barnett, 2000a, Barnett and Barnett, 1999, 
Barnett and Barnett, 1989, Barnett and Barnett, 2005, Joseph and Kearns, 1996, Fougere, 
2001, Gauld, 2009). These authors work will be further discussed in later sections of this 
chapter. 
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As seen in Chapter 2, convergence in the policy used to govern health systems is widely 
seen throughout developed nations. Convergence is naturally helpful as governments 
search for solutions to common problems seen in other countries. As New Zealand‟s 
government has limited resources and tools available, the formation of policy is very much 
based on ideas obtained from overseas. Gibson and Means (2000) argue that policy levers 
are scarce and there only so many ways to solve a specific problem. The fact that most 
health systems have common challenges in performing different functions means that New 
Zealand like many other nations tend to build on overseas health policy for its own. Various 
health systems and countries are all faced with the common goals of ensuring equity/access, 
quality and cost containment of provision. The relative importance that the government 
places on each of these factors determines the direction of national health policy in each 
country (Blank and Burau, 2007). 
New Zealand‟s hospital sector rose out of the 1938 Social Security Act which offered 
universal access to inpatient hospital services. Since then public and private hospitals have 
since evolved in a complementary fashion. The public system provides both acute and non-
acute or elective services. However, acute services and emergency services have 
traditionally taken priority and demanded most resources out of the public sector and 
subsequently long waiting lists have been generated for elective services (Dew and Kirkman, 
2007b). Private hospitals have taken advantage of high demand so to specialise in these 
procedures. As seen in Chapter 2, various pressures have affected the hospital sector. The 
next section will discuss these pressures further in the New Zealand context and set the 
scene for a significant period of restructuring in the hospital sector. 
3.3 Pressures on the New Zealand Hospital Sector 
Since the adoption of the 1938 Social Security Act, New Zealand has aimed to provide a 
comprehensive publicly funded health service which provided treatments in accordance with 
individual need. During which, the ageing of the New Zealand population, the increasing 
availability of expensive technologies and treatments and a growing propensity to demand 
more care has meant that subsequent governments have had to pay greater attention to 
growing health expenditure (Gauld and Derrett, 2000). Public hospital coverage has 
increased over time but since the establishment and growth of a private hospital sector the 
public perception of the state funded health service has been in decline (Gauld, 2009). 
Chapter 3: New Zealand Perspectives 
54 
 
This section will discuss the pressures felt by the hospital sector in the context of New 
Zealand. These include issues of demographic change, technological improvement, rising 
expectations, waiting lists, funding issues, shortages of qualified medical staff and avoidable 
hospital admissions. The second part of the section will look at inequalities of access to 
hospital care in New Zealand. This is very much a pressure felt by government as it aims to 
produce equitable outcomes to its citizens. Major inequalities that will be discussed follow 
socio-economic and ethnic considerations. Particular mention will be made of Pacific Island 
and indigenous Maori populations and their poor access to inpatient care. 
3.3.1 Pressures Felt by the Hospital Sector 
Chapter 2 discussed some important factors which are placing pressure on the hospital 
sector. Summarised below are some of the pressures experienced particularly in the New 
Zealand context. The pressures are largely based on efficiency and equity concerns. 
Efficiency related to the increasing cost, and propensity to consume high quality inpatient 
care; equity related to inequalities and exclusion that arise as certain groups fail to access 
sufficient hospital care. Both are factors that put huge stress on the New Zealand hospital 
sector. 
Ageing Population 
The post-war baby boom placed increasing pressure on public hospitals as free maternity 
care was initiated by the 1938 Social Security Act. Later on, the post-war baby boom was 
having a more profound effect on health expenditure. Due to changes in the age profile of 
the New Zealand population there has been a large increase in the demand for geriatric 
care. The concentration of treatment is shifting from young to elderly as New Zealand‟s 
population ages (Gauld, 2009). 
Rising Expectations 
While free hospital services had been established following the enactment of the 1938 
legislation, the newly established publicly funded health system failed to satisfy the demand 
for new treatments (Davis, 1981). As technology increased in the health sector, the pace of 
service expansion funded by public expenditure fell behind the public‟s rising expectations 
for hospital care in New Zealand. Later on much of this perception became fuelled by the 
belief that the public health system was deteriorating (Department of Health, 1969). The 
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growth of patient waiting lists for non-urgent medical and surgical treatments made it clear 
that demand had outstripped the supply of affordable hospital services (Fougere, 1984). As 
seen above the private hospital sector experienced steady expansion through the 1950s and 
1960s and so did the private health insurance market through which people exited the public 
sector to gain better access to surgery. This drained resources away from the public hospital 
sector further inflating problems for public sector capacity and contributing to the further 
growth of waiting lists. 
Waiting Lists 
Well established in New Zealand as in other countries has been the excess in demand for 
elective surgery over the supply of publicly funded health resources used to provide these 
services (Hay, 1989, European Observatory on Health Care Systems, 1999). Waiting lists 
can be conceptualised as a pressure for hospital systems and also as a response in the form 
of rationing. By 1973, 33,000 patients found themselves on waiting lists (Fraser et al., 1993), 
by 1987 that figure had grown to over 50,000 (McKendry et al., 1993). This showed that the 
gap was increasing between government funding and the service funding required to provide 
non-essential surgery. The issue of waiting lists has been an enduring issue faced by the 
public health sector in New Zealand (Hospital and Related Service Taskforce, 1988). 
Between 1982 and 1992 waiting lists in New Zealand doubled even despite significant 
increases of throughout during the same period (Gauld and Derrett, 2000). 
Funding Problems 
Throughout the 1950s, the centralisation of funding which had been proposed by the 
Hospitals Amendment Act 1951 meant government faced increasing pressure from hospital 
providers to raise funding which it was unable to meet (Hay, 1989). Typically rural centres 
have greater elective surgery capacity and are able to meet surgical volumes while urban 
centres tend to be dominated by acute workloads (Roake, 2003). Historically, the expansion 
of the private sector has filled the gaps in the market where the public sector has struggled 
to ensure access to elective services (Derrett et al., 2009). Geographically this has meant 
private interests clustered around large centres such as Auckland, Wellington and 
Christchurch where resources are stretched in the public provision of elective surgery. This 
further drew resources away from the public sector in the areas of most need. 
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Shortage of Medical Professionals 
Immediately following the 1938 Social Security Act the percentage of hospital-based 
professionals increased significantly to keep up with the demand of new specialised services 
and technology. The public hospital-based workforce had grown from 7,763 in 1952 to 
15,183 in 1969 (Department of Health, 1969). However, despite high rates of medical 
expenditure many areas have begun facing acute shortages of doctors which have meant 
policy concerns have shifted from equity to efficiency issues. Barnett (1991) argues that 
recent New Zealand medicine graduates have favoured urban areas therefore leaving rural 
areas inadequately served. Rural areas are facing insufficient access to health services in 
New Zealand particularly in primary care (Panelli et al., 2005). However, the distance from 
urban settlements is also a leading factor leading to difficulties for access to secondary 
health care (Kearns et al., 2006). 
Avoidable Hospital Admissions 
As mentioned in the previous chapter hospitals face avoidable hospital admissions when 
patients are left without immediate access to primary care for early detection (Sheerin et al., 
2006, Nolte and McKee, 2000). Many conditions which may have otherwise been effectively 
dealt with are not and so patients deteriorate to the point where they require hospital care. 
Much of the problems that lead to this phenomenon arise out of inequalities in the health 
system which are discussed below.  
3.3.2 Inequalities in the Hospital Sector 
Socio-economic Inequalities 
Not only do people living in the most deprived areas have a lower life expectancy but also 
higher morbidity and hospital admission rates compared to the remainder of the population 
(Dew and Kirkman, 2007a). Increased social polarisation caused by increased poverty and 
problems of access to primary care have meant that more deprived communities have 
lacked access to health services (Barnett and Lauer, 2003). The two-tier structure of the 
New Zealand health system contributes inherent inequities through ability to pay for primary 
and secondary care. User fees are commonly found throughout the public system and force 
people to rely heavily on private health insurance to supplement public benefits including 
more ready access to primary care, specialist consultations and hospital treatments (Schoen 
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et al., 2000). In particular, patients from lower socio-economic backgrounds are likely to be 
disadvantaged as they are left unable to afford to purchase private care so are left waiting 
until their condition deteriorates (McLeod et al., 2004a). Schoen et al., (2000) found that 
throughout New Zealand, lower income groups were nearly two times more likely to report 
difficulties seeing a specialist (44% vs. 24%). 
Maori and Pacific Island Inequalities 
Maori and Pacific Islanders who are over represented in lower socio-economic groups 
(Salmond and Crampton, 1999), are less likely to have health insurance (Kokiri, 2000) and 
as a result are less likely to access the private sector (Ministry of Health, 1999). The 
economic reforms of the 1980s also meant that incomes for Maori declined in relation to 
other New Zealander‟s (Brown, 1999), as Maori tend to concentrate in manual occupations 
such as meat works which were more negatively affected during the reforms. Not only this, 
Salmond and Crampton (2000) found that Maori are more likely to develop symptoms and 
die earlier than other New Zealanders living at a similar level of deprivation. Maori and 
Pacific islanders generally face higher rates of morbidity (Howden-Chapman and Tobias, 
1999) and mortality (Ajwani et al., 2003) than any other the ethnic group in New Zealand 
society. Risk factors include high behavioural influences like smoking, obesity and 
overcrowded living conditions and also measures of exclusion in that these ethnic groups 
suffer a lower chance of accessing health care (Dew and Kirkman, 2007a). 
New Zealand is not immune to the pressures that international health systems have faced 
over the past half century. The rising cost of hospital care has been driven by demographic 
changes, increases in technology and the increasing expectations that society places on 
these systems. Unfortunately, the pressure government faces by increases in expenditure 
have impacted on the equity of hospital provision in New Zealand. Social inequalities have 
become increasingly prevalent as government has attempted to remedy efficiency concerns. 
The next section will discuss responses made by government through the 1990s on behalf of 
the hospital sector, a period which has been described as the „turbulent decade‟ (Barnett 
and Barnett, 2003a). 
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3.4 Responses made by Government on Behalf of the New Zealand Hospital 
Sector 
In the previous two sections of this chapter we have seen how the New Zealand hospital 
sector has evolved, and the pressures that it has encountered due to the increasing costs 
and demands on the health care system combined with inequalities seen as some groups 
face less access to care and therefore suffer from preventable illnesses. Since the 1990s 
successive governments have focused efforts on improving the equity and efficiency of the 
New Zealand hospital system during which there have been repeated efforts to reform the 
health sector. 
This next section discusses how the New Zealand Government has moved to restructure the 
hospital sector and the particular methods it has adopted to realise goals of equity and 
efficiency. The first part will discuss in chronological order the path that restructuring has 
taken over the past two decades and the second will discuss in some more detail some of 
the methods that governments have used to support progress in the hospital sector. Finally 
the third part will discuss some ways that the hospital sector has rationed particular services, 
an important process, used explicitly to curtail government spending.  
3.4.1 A Hospital Sector in Change 
Despite the reforms of the 1980s, in 1993 the New Zealand health system retained a 
structure based on the 1938 Social Security Act i.e., a national health system of which 
universal health coverage was offered in accordance with individual need (Fougere, 2001). 
When the National government was elected in 1990 they continued Labour‟s approach to 
economic liberalisation with the sale of private assets and further deregulation of the labour 
market (Barnett, 1999). However, National‟s approach to welfare went far further with the 
introduction of a number of new tools targeting the efficiency of social services, particularly in 
housing, health and education (Boston et al., 1999). Kelsey (1997) describes National‟s 
approach as a „blitzkrieg‟ course of economic and social reform. Increasingly social welfare 
services would be governed under tighter constraints with the government enforcing greater 
liability and fiscal constraints (Barnett, 1999). In summary, a hospital system of 
representation and access was replaced by one of monitoring and accountability (LeHeron 
and Pawson, 1996, Lewis and Moran, 1998). 
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In 1993 the government moved to introduce competitive processes into the hospital system, 
to encourage service integration between primary and secondary care and to devolve control 
from central government toward the regions (Barnett and Barnett, 2003b). The Gibbs Report 
produced by the Hospital and Related Services Taskforce (1988) had been discarded by the 
previous Labour Government but became essential to National‟s neo-liberal agenda 
(Barnett, 2000b). This approach seemed to be a mixture of the best performing policy from 
the market and from managerialism established in the early 1980s (Barnett and Barnett, 
2003a).  
Under what has been termed the „big bang policy‟, the system of AHBs were abolished in 
place of 23 Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs), four Regional Health Authorities (RHA‟s), a 
centrally based Ministry of Health (MoH) and a Public Health Commission under 
recommendation from a Green and White Paper (1991) (Gauld, 2009). In this arrangement 
purchaser RHAs were separated from provider CHEs with the intention of increasing 
competition among providers (Bloom, 2000). RHAs were allocated a single capped budget 
according to a population-based formula to spend on hospital services that were to be 
provided by CHEs (Fougere, 2001). 
The move towards the internal market and elements of corporatisation did not pay off 
(Barnett, 1999). In the years following these 1993 reforms efficiency gains were less than 
expected, and public expenditure on hospital services increased rather than declined. 
Although the public private split meant it was possible for RHAs to put surgical procedures 
out to tender, few public contracts were purchased by the private sector due to the RHAs 
offering low prices and the relatively small volumes involved (Barnett and Barnett, 2003a). 
As a result of accusations of gross inefficiency, poor targeting and provider capture  
government moved again to reform the health sector in 1993. The election of a new 
National-led Coalition Government in 1996 signalled the beginning of a retreat from the 
market ideology as a result of widespread public concern over the poor performance within 
the health sector and the government‟s failure to deal with waiting lists. Treasury released a 
report indicating growing waiting lists for elective services and large disparities between the 
health outcomes of different groups (particularly Maori and Pacific Islanders) (Treasury, 
1996). 
RHAs were merged centrally into the Health Funding Authority (HFA) and the twenty-three 
Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs) were renamed Hospital and Health Services (HHS) 
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(Barnett and Barnett, 2003a). During this shift came the abandonment of the language of the 
market, customers becoming patients once again. The aims were to encourage efficiency 
and innovation, improve access, widen choice of services, enhance the work environment of 
health professionals and to increase the sensitivity of the system in meeting the changing 
demands of the New Zealand public (Barnett and Barnett, 2005). The first year of the 
Coalition Government saw large increases in health expenditure (Ministry of Health, 2002), 
which represented a funding boost for mental health services, surgical waiting lists and 
promises of universal free access to under six year olds (Barnett and Barnett, 2003a). 
Since the election of a new Labour-led Coalition Government in 1999 New Zealand has seen 
a further retreat from the market. Prior to the election, the public sought health spending that 
would lead to services that would be fully tax payer funded (New Zealand Election Study, 
2000). Labour pledged to restructure the health system so that public and professional 
confidence could be restored (Donelan et al., 1999). Since the election, the Coalition 
introduced an innovative policy framework which represent a new and distinctive „third-way‟ 
or „pick and mix‟ agenda was introduced similar to what was adopted by the UK‟s NHS 
(Barnett, 1999).  
The principles of spending, competition, and accountability re-emerged combined with a 
renewed focus on health goals (Powell, 1999, Powell, 2000). However, competition was to 
make way for cooperation and bottom-up strategies were aimed to target certain high priority 
groups in certain areas (Gauld, 2009). The new government retained elements of the 
purchaser/provider split while encouraging planning and cooperation. The HFA and HHSs 
were removed in favour of twenty-one District Health Boards (DHBs) which report directly to 
the Ministry of Health (MoH) which provides population-based funding . District health 
boards were to be democratically elected as was the case under the AHB arrangement 
(Barnett and Barnett, 2003a). 
The development of the „New Zealand Health Strategy‟ (Ministry of Health, 2000) signified 
the new broader vision emphasising health goals, increased access to health services, 
reductions in ethnic inequalities and inter-agency cooperation to achieve these goals 
(Barnett and Barnett, 2003a). The key aims were to improve health status and to reduce 
inequalities in health (King, 2000). Labour was subsequently in office for three terms of 
which provided a period of relative stability for the health sector compared to the 1990s. 
Labour‟s aim for improved population health meant that the Coalition invested heavily in 
Chapter 3: New Zealand Perspectives 
61 
 
primary health over this period. However, emphasis for the integration between primary care 
and hospital services remained a priority throughout this period. Government also devoted 
large amounts of money to elective surgery, specifically scoring systems as discussed in the 
following chapter but research indicated that the spending did not translate into front line 
services (Gauld, 2009). During the period 2001 to 2006 the number of elective surgery 
discharges had only increased from 199 to 207 procedures per 10,000 people (Hansard, 6 
August, 2008). 
During the National Party‟s pre-election health plan of 2008 it was proposed that greater use 
would be made of the private sector to cut public waiting times (Thomas, 2009, Key, 2008). 
John Key (2008) stated that: “…fewer operations are being performed per capita, and the 
average waiting time has increased from 55 days in 2002 to 75 days now. We need to boost 
the number of elective surgeries performed in the public and private hospitals, expand the 
services that primary care delivers, and carefully invest in new elective capacity in the public 
health system.” 
Promises were made to: 
 build 20 new dedicated elective surgery theatres with associated beds and facilities 
over the next five years (cost: $36 million per year over five years) 
 target investment where it will provide the greatest boost in elective surgery 
 train 800 additional medical professionals (estimated cost $20 million a year) 
 encourage the smarter use of private hospitals to support elective surgery in public 
hospitals 
 encourage GPs with special skills to provide a wider range of minor surgery in their 
clinics and improve direct referral to some diagnostic tests 
 delegate funding to kick-start the devolution of services to primary care (cost: $13 
million a year) (Key, 2008). 
In 2008 National, and its leader Prime Minister John Key, was elected to lead a Coalition 
Government along with the Association of Consumers and Taxpayers (ACT) and the Maori 
Party. Since then, New Zealand has experienced recession and the National led government 
has moved to reduce bureaucracy with the intention of increasing in front line services. The 
Minister of Health, Tony Ryall has also signalled a move away from primary care with large 
cuts to primary health organisations (PHOs) nationwide despite the improvements they have 
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made to the health of New Zealanders, which Ken Whelan, the Chief Executive of the 
Capital and Coast DHB, believes could not have been achieved otherwise (Newton, 2010). A 
wide variety of these decisions have been made over the past two decades and each forms 
a different type of health service restructuring. The next section discusses some of the ways 
governments have sought to reorganise the New Zealand public health system to better 
serve the country. 
3.4.2 Forms of Health Service Restructuring 
Needs-based funding 
Needs-based funding was adopted by the first Labour Government through the enactment of 
the Social Security Act in 1938. As stated above this policy was pursued until the 
introduction of „new right‟ philosophies and the eventual managerial revolution and 
introduction of the market in the 1990s (Barnett and Barnett, 2005). Needs-based funding 
represents early approaches in which governments sought to provide universal and 
equitable access to hospital services as underpinned like other social services in the 
Keynesian welfare state (Barnett and Barnett, 2009). In the years between 1999 and 2008 in 
which New Zealand was governed by a Labour-led Coalition restructuring in the health 
sector resembled a move back towards a needs-based methods of funding (Gauld, 2009).  
New Public Management (NPM) 
The introduction of new public management (NPM) was limited to Labour‟s 1980s reforms 
and did not follow through to the post-1990 National Government. The establishment of 
AHBs represented a form of NPM in which introduced contractual arrangements and a 
business orientated approach to managing health resources (Barnett and Barnett, 2003a). 
This was a common theme throughout the state sector in the 1980s in which contracting, 
accountability and performance monitoring became enforced by the State Sector Act (1988) 
and the Public Finance Act (1989), which covered AHBs (Boston et al., 1996). Health goals 
and targets now established a new concentration on health goals (Beaglehole and Davis, 
1992). 
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Devolution 
Devolution was a key tool used by central government in the 1980s to make AHBs 
accountable for health budgets, service outputs and responsibility for local health status 
(Barnett, 1999, Barnett, 2000b). It remained an important part of health service restructuring 
throughout the 1990s as governments tossed and turned over the level of decentralisation 
required for the hospital sector. RHAs took over AHBs in 1993 and in 1996 the government 
moved to centralize control of hospital services with the establishment of the HFA. In 2000 a 
new government reverted to a decentralised health authority once again by splitting the HFA 
into 21 DHBs as seen above (Barnett and Barnett, 2005). 
Deinstitutionalisation 
We have seen in Chapter 2 how deinstitutionalisation transformed psychiatric health care in 
New Zealand and other contexts through the 1960s and 1970s (Kearns and Joseph, 2000, 
Joseph and Kearns, 1996). Rationalisation is also a form of deinstitutionalisation that is 
discussed widely in New Zealand contexts as a response of health service restructuring 
involving the closure and centralisation of services (Barnett and Barnett, 2009). 
Rationalisation is a cost saving measure traditionally exercised by the closing or downsizing 
of services in peripheral hospitals in conjunction with the introduction of the internal market 
in 1993 (Barnett, 2000b). Services are rationalised in order to support unrealised economies 
of scale and the release of selected responsibilities through elements of privatisation to 
reduce costs and to provide a greater choice for consumers (Kearns and Barnett, 1992, 
Joseph and Chalmers, 1995). Rationalisation has widely affected service provision at the 
local level and the geography of hospital services throughout New Zealand (Barnett and 
Barnett, 2003a). 
Internal Markets 
As mentioned above one of the main goals of the 1993 reforms was to introduce more 
competitive processes into the hospital system (Barnett, 2000a). The internal market was 
introduced and led to a number of important changes for the hospital sector (Barnett, 
2000a). The internal market led to the separation of purchasers and providers in which 
RHAs purchased health and disability services for the population within their designated 
region from an array of public, private and voluntary providers. 23 CHE corporate providers 
were established each with a government appointed board of directors made up primarily of 
Chapter 3: New Zealand Perspectives 
64 
 
private sector executives, few having prior experience in the health sector. This new system 
exposed traditional providers as private and voluntary agents became able to negotiate 
contracts for publicly funded services. The governments priorities shifted from social 
responsibility and acknowledgement of local needs to goals of productivity and efficiency in 
the provision of hospital services (Barnett and Barnett, 2003a). 
Privatisation of Hospital Services 
The roots of the private hospital sector come out of the 1950s when the National 
Government begun to subsidise private hospitals to produce an alternative to public 
hospitals, in the hope of reducing costs in the public system (Hay, 1989). The private sector 
has since performed a complementary function to services provided by the public sector 
(Dew and Kirkman, 2007b). Privatisation was an important part of the 1993 National-led 
reforms in the process of the creation of the internal market as greater use is made of both 
private and voluntary sectors to the provision of services (Barnett and Barnett, 2009). Since 
the internal market was retired in 1996, governments have focused on the quality and 
outputs of public services. It is only since National was re-elected in 2008 that elements of 
privatisation are sneaking back into the political agenda. The National government has 
specifically warranted the use of private services for the support of public elective services 
and the establishment of public-private partnerships to fund new hospitals via the public float 
of the New Zealand Social Infrastructure Fund (SIF) (Newfield and Coman, 2010). 
3.4.3 Rationing 
Rationing by Denial or Exclusion 
Rationalisation is one of the mechanisms since in the late 1980s by New Zealand 
government to increase the efficiency of hospital services. This intensified following the 1993 
reforms when corporate managers moved to downgrade or close down hospital services 
(Barnett, 1999). Pressures of service closure were greatest in southern regions and the 
midlands where population is spread over large areas and hospitals ran large deficits due to 
new population based funding formulas introduced in the 1980s (Barnett and Barnett, 
2003b). Rationalisation in these areas has led to inconsistencies in service access and 
elective surgical waiting lists (Barnett and Barnett, 2003a).  
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Rural communities have been particularly hard hit by rationalisation as the urbanisation of 
hospital care tends to place constraints on patients‟ access to care because of the clear 
implications for less mobile rural residents (Joseph and Chalmers, 1995, Kearns and 
Joseph, 1997). However, during the 1993 reforms government gave the option to local 
communities to establish „community trusts‟ to avoid the closure of community hospitals 
(Gauld, 2009). By late 1998 nine community trusts had been set up in the Southland region 
(Barnett and Barnett, 2003b). In 1998 services were again prioritised away from those 
deemed to be of „core-service‟ and referred to those that did not meet criteria as „financially 
unviable‟ hospital beds. These services included midwifery, sexual health, and a wide array 
of services in provincial hospitals. However, some were taken over by community boards 
(Gauld, 2009). 
Rationing by Filtering 
Like many other countries New Zealand uses primary care to filter out those who are healthy 
from those in need of treatment and send the latter to the appropriate service whether it be 
hospital, other primary care (i.e. physiotherapy) or for tertiary treatments. This gatekeeper 
role plays an important part in controlling the wider health system against over utilisation and 
expenditure (Brown, 1988, Blank, 1994). The persistent problems with waiting lists 
(discussed below) has led government to develop national guidelines for the prioritisation of 
patients. New Zealand has a reputation as a world leader for the progress of scoring and 
booking systems (Gauld, 2009). The following chapter will discuss the development of the 
New Zealand Booking System (NZBS), a system that has been created to filter patients 
needing elective surgery. 
Rationing by Imposing Cost 
Rationing by imposing cost in the New Zealand context is most widely used for the FFS 
payments throughout the health sector. Following the 1938 Social Security Act a large array 
of primary and secondary health care was offered free to the public and drew an 
unsustainable demand. In 1941, government introduced the general medical services (GMS) 
subsidy which transformed free care into subsidised primary care in which physicians could 
initially charge patients up to one third above the subsidy (Gauld, 2009). This went some 
way towards solving the problems of moral hazard and subsequent overuse of services. 
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In the hospital sector, government moves to adopt a neo-liberal agenda of privatisation have 
made access to particular elective treatments costly. Some patients are denied access and 
others face large delays for access to elective procedures in the public sector and so are 
forced to exit and seek assistance from private hospitals (Fougere, 1974). Unless patients 
own private health insurance they may face large fees which contributes further to the 
inequalities mentioned in previous sections. Now that technology has reached its current 
level government has to place a limit on the amount of services it can provide and leave the 
remainder to the private sector to supply patients who are willing to pay top dollar for prompt 
and effective service.  
Rationing by Waiting 
As mentioned above, waiting lists are a natural response for governments as demand 
overshadows supply the provision of publicly funded elective services. Waiting lists grew 
significantly during the 1980s and continued in an upward trend through the 1990s (Barnett 
and Barnett, 2003a). In 1973 there were 33,000 patients waiting for surgery and by 1995 this 
figure had more than doubled to 85,574 (Gauld and Derrett, 2000). Concern that the system 
of prioritisation was failing to produce suitable rankings were realised in the late 1990s with 
many New Zealander‟s suffering from severe conditions  waiting for significant periods of 
time, lost within lengthy waiting lists (Derrett et al., 2003).  
One problem had been developing a system to manage waiting lists that was more equitable 
than the one being used at the time. The government wished to gain national consistency of 
access for elective surgery by prioritising patients with explicit criteria so that patients of 
equal need have similar access, to create patient certainty for their prospects of surgery and 
to show transparency as to the size and duration of waiting lists (Derrett et al., 2003). Calls 
were made to introduce a prioritisation system in 1998 that would allocate services more 
effectively to patients in need. This is discussed further in the following chapter. Despite the 
huge effort and tens of millions of dollars that was invested into the development of 
prioritisation mechanisms Hunter (1997) and Mechanic (1997) argue that waiting lists or 
waiting times may always remain a part of New Zealand‟s public health system. 
Rationing by Limiting Quality 
The 1990s saw the introduction of managed care in New Zealand for PHC through the 
development of independent practitioner associations (IPAs) (Barnett and Copeland, 2009). 
Chapter 3: New Zealand Perspectives 
67 
 
IPAs, were owned and run by their members and modelled themselves on similar groups in 
the US that performed collective action against corporatisation in the 1980s (McKinlay and 
Stoeckle, 1988). IPA members are bound by group protocols to enter into negotiations with 
funders regarding the limits of their spending on pharmaceuticals and lab tests. The group 
can then put in place their own monitoring systems and have an effect on individual 
expenditure by GPs (Kerr et al., 1996).  
The government incentivised IPAs to reduce expenditure by allowing them to spend any 
savings they made  not already contracted for (e.g., reducing patient fees, elective surgery 
for selected patients, providing community services etc.) (Dew and Kirkman, 2007b). By 
1995, 50% of GPs were IPA affiliates (Malcolm and Powell, 1996), and by 1999 this figure 
rose to 70% (Malcolm et al., 1999). IPAs were soon superseded by Public Health 
Organisations (PHOs) as the New Zealand government showed a renewed interest in 
preventative medicine and moves to strengthen primary care. The establishment of these 
types of collective organisations has delivered important efficiency gains sometimes at the 
expense of equity considerations (Barnett and Copeland, 2009). 
Since the 1990s New Zealand‟s health sector has experienced significant changes as 
governments have made repeated efforts at restructuring health services. This section has 
discussed the path that the New Zealand health sector has taken over the last two decades 
and highlighted periods of reform. Various types of health service restructuring were then 
examined taking a brief look at how they have taken shape in the New Zealand hospital 
sector. Finally, methods of rationing were considered so to explain how the health system 
has responded to pressure on the hospital sector. 
3.5 Outcomes 
We have seen in above sections how the 1990s brought large scale changes in the provision 
of hospital services. The creation of a parallel public/private system has since established a 
system in which access has become the number one concern for everyday New Zealanders. 
Since the government has failed to curtail rising public expenditure it has been forced to into 
rationing hospital services which has contributed to increased waiting lists and rationalisation 
of services. The private hospital sector has become increasingly important to deliver 
services and to keep up with the demand that the public sector is being placed under. 
However, there has been a significant amount of research that has suggested that growth in 
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the private sector has had negative consequences for the public sector as mentioned in 
Chapter 2.  
This section will discuss some of the outcomes that the New Zealand hospital system has 
generated, including problems of access specifically to elective services. The private hospital 
sector which has co-existed with the public sector since the enactment of the Social Security 
Act in 1938 is discussed with particular focus on the market for private health insurance 
Finally, relationships between the public and private sectors are examined along with 
implications on public hospital for their sustainability to deliver elective surgery. 
3.5.1 New Zealand Hospital Systems and Health Outcomes 
Post 2000 the rationale for the decentralisation of decision making was meant to facilitate 
closeness to the community to meet the needs of local populations. The population-based 
funding formula means that populations of a similar size, despite population spread are 
allocated the same level of funding. This means rural populations have faced difficulties 
sustaining high quality medical services. Some DHBs have had to rationalise services, 
others have looked at ways they can share services such as sharing specialist staff and 
resources thus thinking „regionally, not locally‟ (DHBNZ, 2008). For example, the 
establishment of regional specialist centres where DHBs decide to share funding and access 
to certain services. One of these is found in the Hutt Hospital specialist centre for plastic and 
reconstructive surgery, a service that is shared by several DHBs of the lower North Island 
(Gauld, 2009).  
When central government allocate a budget to DHBs have to accept the political 
accountability for those funds. As DHBs were unable to transfer resources geographically 
they searched for other ways to reduce costs. DHBs have been reported to have prioritised 
resources away from elective services towards acute and emergency services which has 
meant widespread problems in access for non-urgent medical treatments (Gauld, 2009). 
Every now and again there have been reports of patients dying whilst awaiting elective 
surgery for curable conditions. Elliot and Crozier (2008) reported a disappointingly high 
patient death rate  for patients awaiting cardiac surgery at Capital and Coast DHB, the report 
showed that avoidable delays had led to at least eight people dying without access to 
treatment. 
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Because of stories like those seen above it is not surprising that a large number of New 
Zealand residents purchase private medical insurance to fund elective treatments and avoid 
public system inadequacies. Because of a long history of poor performance within the public 
system in the provision of elective surgery the private sector has developed its main 
capabilities around these sorts of treatments. Unfortunately, this opens up issues of 
inequality as the hospital care is not available in accordance with need but rather with the 
ability to pay for treatment, as mentioned in earlier sections of the chapter 
3.5.2 Public-Private Interactions in the Market for Hospital Treatments 
At the time of the New Zealand Health Survey of 2002/2003 approximately 40% of New 
Zealanders were covered by private medical insurance (Ministry of Health, 2003). Private 
medical insurance in New Zealand is designed to wrap around benefits offered by the public 
system. Insurance cover for hospital services pays for elective services as the bill for acute 
services is picked up by the taxpayer. Private cover offers prompt access to specialist and 
hospital services that would otherwise incur long waits in the public system (Blumberg, 
2006). 
Fougere (2001) argues that the poor performance of publicly funded hospital systems is to 
blame for the „exit‟ of those who can afford to purchase private health insurance. Poor 
people are less likely to hold private health insurance because they cannot afford it and as a 
result find themselves on waiting lists for public procedures. In additon to being the least 
likely to „exit‟ the public sector, low income earners tend to be the most medically needy 
furthering inequalities already evident in the health sector (Besley et al., 1994). In parallel 
systems such as in New Zealand equity should be considered where the more fortunate can 
access treatment regardless of clinical need based on individual willingness to pay (Flood et 
al., 2002). The biggest concern is that healthier people on higher incomes are purchasing 
private medical insurance as there is significant argument that ownership of insurance 
increases public spending on health care. However, the industry rejects this and believes 
that private care offsets public spending and therefore propose universal subsidies for 
private medical insurance (Blumberg, 2006).  
In McLeod et al‟s (2004) study along with the health of the community, the other major factor 
driving the demand of publicly funded elective surgery was the proportion of people with 
private health insurance. The portion of New Zealanders who are covered by private medical 
insurance has fallen from 50% in 1990 to 40% in 1999 (Howden-Chapman and Ashton, 
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2000). The reason being that at each insurance policy anniversary the premiums increase 
and as a result some low risk (mostly younger) customers exit the market. The exit of this 
particular demographic group within the population leaves a pool of higher risk consumers 
which results in additional price inflation and further drop-outs by the next anniversary. Also, 
a large number of insurance policies are subject to exclusions for pre-existing conditions 
which puts new purchasers of insurance off buying it. New Zealand‟s largest insurer reported 
to have 40%-50% of applications for cover subject to exclusions (Blumberg, 2006), therefore 
lowering the demand for insurance. 
The New Zealand health system is based on two tiers where elective surgery is provided by 
both public and private hospitals. Private hospitals tend to perform mostly elective, non-
complex surgery, or the „lumps and bumps‟ (Frech and Hopkins, 2004). The prioritisation 
measures that are applied in the public system are not applied in private hospitals where 
patients experience dramatically reduced wait time for surgery. Private hospitals initially had 
a very limited array of services but as waiting lists grew opportunities began to expand and 
they became able to cater a wide range of services. Fougere (p1241, 2001) states that 
“…the disarray in publicly funded health care is expected to result in the „exit‟ of those who 
can afford to leave, inflating the roles of private insurers and underpinning the rapid 
expansion of private health sector so that it emerges as an alternative rather than just a 
complement of publicly provided care.” That said, economies of scale prohibit the duplication 
of high cost care such as acute and trauma care for which the public sector will continue to 
provide. It is foreseen that the private sector will continue to see expansion in the area of 
elective surgery (McTurk, 1998). 
Private hospitals are advantaged in a sense that they can utilise economies of scale in the 
specialisation of elective services. Mercer (1998) acknowledges that this is good, so long as 
private hospitals work on a „level playing field‟ with public counterparts. This implies that 
private hospitals bear the true cost of their work, which does not seem to be the case. 
Howden-Chapman and Ashton (2000) describe public hospitals as the “provider of last 
resort” to which private hospitals „off load‟ patients to public services when an operation goes 
wrong, which imposes large costs on the public health system. Another problem is that 
private hospitals end up performing simple and cheap operations, in effect „cream-skimming‟ 
work that would make public hospitals‟ work more affordable (Mercer, 1998). These actions 
mean that indirectly, private sector insurance premiums are being subsidised by an 
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increasing public health bill met by the taxpayer and therefore reducing resources in the 
public sector. 
Fougere (1974) describes „exit‟ as the departure from an organisation or switch to a 
competing product, in health the decision to use private rather than public facilities in specific 
circumstances. As well as working to relocate patients into the private sector, exit works to 
drain the public sector of resources of skilled medical professionals. Demand for the private 
sector services depends on the dissatisfaction of the public sector. This relationship is true 
as much for physicians as it is for patients. As a result, public hospitals lose the specialists 
they are most in the need of because the shortages of resources represent the poor 
conditions they work in. However, it may be thought that patients exiting the public service 
may help to alleviate waiting lists; this is not the case as exit works to reduce the number of 
medical services available to the public sector at a rate greater than it reduces demand. 
Therefore, public sector performance tends to get worse as a larger amount of exit occurs 
(Fougere, 1974). Derrett, Bevin, Herbison, & Paul (2009) claim the most significant factor 
influencing waiting times is supply of physicians. 
We know that patients prefer private hospitals on the basis of being ablie to obtain more 
timely surgery for procedures considered as „non-urgent‟ within the public sector as well as 
the ability to choose their doctor and the high-quality „hotel‟ services offered (Vaithianathan, 
2002). “If specialist physicians pace themselves‟ in the public hospitals, they are more likely 
to have a greater supply of clients coming to them in their private practices” (p39, Howden-
Chapman and Ashton, 2000). Payment in the private sector is often by FFS and is 
commonly more profitable for the surgeon than the sessional payments for similar 
procedures in the public system. As a result surgeons have strong reasons to encourage 
patients toward private care by maintaining high wait times in the public sector (Duckett, 
2005).  
Professional ethics are important in determining specialists‟ integrity. However, operating in 
a system where the culture of the public system has eroded over time opens up opportunism 
for misdirected intentions. Many specialists are attracted to income driven incentives in 
accordance with the higher financial returns for FFS paying private patients even though 
work in the public sector is reported to be much more interesting clinically. Considerable 
public concern is generated out of distortions from specialists‟ split time allocation between 
public and private employment, the income related inequalities that relate from a parallel 
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health system and a lack of monitoring of private medical services in New Zealand (Howden-
Chapman and Ashton, 2000). 
3.5.3 Geographic Inequalities in Access to Publicly Provided Surgery 
Derrett et al (2009) found that there are large variations in New Zealander‟s ability to access 
a publicly funded operation, depending on which DHB they reside in. A report published in 
The Press stated that: “In Canterbury, almost 12 people per 10,000 had private surgery and 
about 11 per 10,000 had public surgery. On the West Coast, where access to private 
surgery was more difficult – with only 2.5 people per 10,000 getting a privately funded 
operation – almost 30 people in every 10,000 got a taxpayer-funded operation“ (Thomas, 
2009). Derrett et al (2009) found similar results when they investigated the relationship 
between publicly and privately provided elective surgery rates for total joint replacement 
(TJR), prostatectomy and cataract surgery during the period 1 July 2000 and 30 June 2005 
generated off data sourced from the New Zealand Health Information Service (NZHIS). In 
this study they found that DHBs with the lowest public provision had the highest private 
provision. The outcome of Derrett et al‟s (2009) study has shown that people‟s ability to 
access elective services continues to vary according to where people lived or whether 
people had the disposable income to spend on private surgery. Elective surgery provision 
remains inequitable geographically despite the goals of equity and fairness promoted with 
the introduction of the prioritisation system. Derrett, Bevin, Herbison, & Paul (2009) call for 
more in investigation and discussion of consequences anticipated within New Zealand‟s two-
tiered health system. 
The outcomes of the New Zealand hospital sector have been shaped by the decentralisation 
of hospital management since the introduction of the DHB structure and according to the 
performance of private medicine. This section has discussed the way that the New Zealand 
Health and Disability Act (2000) in the establishment of DHBs has created difficulties in the 
funding of services, particularly in rural areas, and the  rationalisation of services that has 
occurred as a result. Secondly, the private hospital sectors‟ influence on the public hospital 
services was examined. Ownership of private health insurance, subsequent use of private 
hospitals‟ and physicians incentives to perform surgery in the private sector have been 
reported to contribute towards inefficiencies in the public health systems capacity to deliver 
elective surgery. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
New Zealand was one of the first countries to establish a public health system under which 
the principles of social security guaranteed universal free access to hospitals in accordance 
with need. This was reinforced through the evolution of the Social Security Act (1938). Since 
then subsequent governments struggled to control public expenditure in health as a result of 
an ageing population, scientific and technological advancement in medicine and a growing 
propensity to consume more care. As a result during the latter part of the twentieth century 
the New Zealand Government responded by performing a series of repeated hospital 
restructurings in which market mechanisms and elements of corporatisation were introduced 
into the health sector in search of efficiency. Methods of rationing were also unsuccessful in 
controlling a continually rising public health bill.  
A series of reforms throughout the 1980s and 1990s has resulted in parallel public/private 
system in which the private sector performs almost entirely elective surgery, a function which 
the public system struggles keep up with. Private sector involvement in elective services has 
been shown to drain the resources out of the public sector and create significant inequalities 
throughout New Zealand. The provision of elective care has become increasingly significant 
as the public system struggles to deal with increasing waiting lists as treatments are largely 
determined on ability to pay rather than according to need. 
As a result of growing inequity in the public provision of elective surgery procedures 
determined by growing waiting lists, a lack of transparency and a lack of certainty whether 
patients would receive surgery there were calls to introduce a new and improved method of 
prioritisation to replace the old waiting list system. This led to the introduction of the NZBS in 
1998 as the government moved to solve the problems associated with publicly funded 
hospital provision. Chapter 4 details the establishment of the NZBS, discusses how the 
system of prioritisation was supposed to function and examines problems that have 
generated a number of new concerns for the provision of publicly funded elective surgery. 
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4 The New Zealand Booking System (NZBS) 
4.1 Introduction 
Waiting lists have been a well-documented method for industrialised governments to ration 
health services. This form of rationing has, and continues to centre mainly around clinicians 
determining access for provision of specific services (McLoed et al., 2004). Waiting lists 
have been particularly common in the provision of elective surgery and have long been seen 
as an indicator of poor performance within the health sector (Howden-Chapman and Ashton, 
2000). Although rationing is necessary in any health system, where scarcity is a factor, it 
remains essential that government and policy-makers are made to ensure resources are 
equitably distributed (McLoed et al., 2004). 
This chapter outlines the origins of the New Zealand surgical booking system and sets out 
the process and tools that were aimed at providing a more equitable system for the 
prioritisation of patients to ensure adequate and equitable provision of elective surgery. 
Firstly, the chapter will take a snapshot of the booking system and the way it has been set 
up in order to function effectively. Secondly, literature will be reviewed on the perceived 
problems associated with the booking and prioritisation system and the unintended 
consequences for the equity of provision and the generation of inequalities. Some inherent 
problems with the way surgical outputs are measured and reported to the Ministry of Health 
(MoH) are discussed. These issues are systemic within the processes and workings of the 
booking system and are reported to contribute to inequalities in the provision of elective 
surgery. 
4.2 Establishment of The New Zealand Booking System (NZBS) 
As waiting lists reached record levels during the late 1980s and early 1990s they acted as a 
prompt for government to enact the Health and Disability Services Act 1993 (Derrett, 2005). 
A Green and White Paper proposed the formation of an advisory committee in order to give 
advice to the Minister of Health to consider any decisions in relation to the allocation of 
health care resources (Upton, 1991). In response to recommendations in 1992 the Core 
Services Committee (CSC) was established to undertake public consultation exercises and 
commissioned a report by Fraser et al (1993) to document the problems associated with 
waiting lists. Fraser et al (p8, 1993) recommended: 
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“… the present system of hospital waiting lists be abandoned and replaced by a system of 
„booked admissions‟ for non-urgent surgery and medical and diagnostic procedures. Patients 
should be assessed by defined criteria, according to their need and likely benefit (worthwhile 
health outcome) from the procedure. Patients who satisfy the criteria should be offered a 
date for surgery within a defined period of time. Patients who do not meet the criteria at the 
time of their specialist assessment should not be registered with the hospital‟s booking 
system (or placed on a „waiting list‟), but they should be referred back to their general 
practitioner for on-going review.” 
Clinical Priority Assessment Criteria (CPAC) tools were then developed through the 
consensus of working groups facilitated by the CSC in order to prioritise patients referred for 
access to high volume, high cost elective procedures (National Advisory Committee on Core 
Health and Disability Support Services, 1993, Hadorn and Holmes, 1997, National Health 
Committee, 2002). The main objective of the tools was to establish priority criteria so as to 
ensure that those in greatest need and potential to benefit are given greater priority in order 
to make clinical decisions more systematic and transparent (Howden-Chapman and Ashton, 
2000, Shipley, 1996).  
The longer term goal of CPAC tools was to achieve consistency in assessing and prioritising 
patients for elective surgery (New Zealand Government, 2000). The booking system also 
aimed to improve the national consistency of access  therefore improve the equity of 
provision by both improving vertical and horizontal equity (McLoed et al., 2004). That is, 
those who are high need with greatest ability to benefit were to be treated first while making 
certain that, regardless of where they live, all New Zealanders have equal access to a wide 
range of services (Mooney, 1994, Derrett, 2005). 
From the hospitals‟ perspective the booking system would act to control the supply and 
demand of non-essential surgery (Roake, 2003). The increase in rationing,  effected by the 
new booking system in 1998, signified a revolutionary approach in the eligibility for the 
treatment of non-essential services. However, Fraser et al‟s (1993) original report cautioned 
that when in pursuit of surgery, any scoring system for according priority of access to 
treatment could be open to abuse by clinicians and patients alike. The report also 
acknowledged the risk of trouble honouring „booked‟ appointments for surgery where 
resources become inadequate. CPAC tools were initiated largely without trial and were 
subject to significant issues when they were introduced. Further methods for determining 
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priority were yet to be developed in full collaboration with clinicians, epidemiologists and the 
general public on  evidence  incorporating quality of life data (Gauld and Derrett, 2000). 
The NZBS is complicated by a range of terminology and acronyms associated with some 
important concepts. Figure 9 lists them in the form of a glossary. 
 
Figure 9: Glossary for Terms used in the New Zealand Booking System 
4.2.1 CPAC Tools  
Figure 10 shown below gives a simplified example of a CPAC tool that specialist consultants 
can use to prioritise patients in order to make bookings for surgery. The maximum score is 
divided into twenty points allocated in regards to clinical severity and five points for a 
patient‟s ability to benefit. As Figure 10 shows severity and ability to benefit are then further 
broken down. Severity is broken down into measures of suffering, disability and cost of delay 
and ability to benefit is broken down into the anticipated degree of patient improvement 
anticipated and the likelihood of that improvement. The most common method for allocating 
scores when the system was introduced was by summing scores to a maximum score of 100 
points. This meant multiplying the twenty five point score by four (Roake, 2003).  
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Figure 10: CPAC Example (Roake, 2003) 
DHBs are free to modify or adapt CPAC tools as far as they deem necessary. Most CPAC 
tools are developed in conjunction with clinicians, hospital managers and others (McLoed et 
al., 2004). CPAC tools have evolved so that most specialties in each DHB have their own 
points scoring and prioritisation systems (Health Funding Authority, 1998). Some CPAC 
tools have evolved into simpler forms, such as a five-point scale of urgency assessed by the 
specialist (Ministry of Health, 2010a). As well as the factors considered in Figure 10 
surgeons also prioritise by impact on quality of life, potential for future complications, level of 
symptoms, co-morbidity, degree of psychological and emotional impact (Roake, 2003). A 
copy of a complete CPAC scoring sheet for ophthalmology can be found in Appendix 1. 
4.2.2 Process of the Booking System 
Development of the booking system was initiated by the „National Waiting Times Project‟. 
The old system of prioritising simply by triage based on urgency was replaced by a dynamic 
and complex new pathway to elective services. Roake (2003) illustrates the booking process 
in Figure 11 below. 
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Figure 11: National Waiting Times Project (Roake, 2003) 
As shown in Figure 11, the first stage in the process is that an individual may develop 
symptoms in which case he or she will personally make the choice of whether to consult a 
GP or not. A doctor may also pick up symptoms during a routine check-up. 
Once the patient has entered primary care the GP assesses symptoms and determines the 
appropriateness of a referral to a specialist. At this stage GPs discuss options of whether a 
patient may choose to seek treatment through the private system or continue through the 
public system by way of the booking system. A GP‟s main role is to guide a patient as to 
where the patient is going to get the best service (McLeod et al., 2004a). This being so, the 
symptoms may not meet the criteria to gain treatment through the public system but they 
may exceed those required to justify a surgical procedure in the private sector. This 
public/private decision is usually determined on perceived waiting times for public surgery, 
whether the patient has private medical insurance, disposable income and the patients‟ 
willingness to pay for treatment.  
In the case that the public system is pursued, the booking system begins with the GP‟s use 
of referral guidelines to determine the patient‟s suitability for onwards treatment. The GP 
writes a letter of referral to the public outpatient clinic where they are prioritised according to 
assessment criteria for first specialist assessment (ACA). ACA determines how long it will 
take to access an appointment with a surgical consultant (Derrett, 2005). This appointment is 
called the first specialist assessment (FSA). Once the letter of referral has been sent to the 
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outpatient clinic the DHB is required to appropriately acknowledge and process all patient 
referrals within ten working days and then ensure FSA is conducted within six months of 
referral (Ministry of Health, 2010a).  
On conducting the FSA the surgical consultant will confirm the patient‟s diagnosis and 
consider whether the patient is fit for surgery. CPAC tools are used to determine whether or 
not the patient will receive surgery and if the patient meets the right criteria, how long they 
will have to wait for surgery (Derrett, 2005). If the patient falls below the treatment threshold, 
therefore not meeting the criteria for surgery, the consultant will then refer the patient back to 
the GP for on-going management unless the condition worsens. Treatment thresholds are 
discussed below. 
It is not until CPAC scoring is complete that patients are either „booked‟ or „not-booked‟ for a 
procedure (Derrett, 2005). Once the patient is assessed to be above the treatment threshold 
the DHB is required to book the surgery within a period of six months (Ministry of Health, 
2010a). Those that fail to meet the threshold but who, in their consultant‟s view, would still 
benefit from surgery, are recorded on what is called the active review (AR) list. These 
patients remain under the consultant‟s care in which they return to the outpatient clinic for 
clinical reassessment at least every six months. In the case that the symptoms of those in 
AR worsen or the DHB discovers unrealised capacity, a patient may be called up as long as 
they are fit for surgery. The Ministry of Health assesses DHBs on the performance of the 
booking system by way of seven elective service flow indicators (ESPIs). These measures, 
as well as the perceived problems associated with ESPIs, are discussed later on page 82. 
4.2.3 Treatment Thresholds 
Figure 10 on page 77 depicts the assessment of the surgical consultant via the use of a 
CPAC tool. As mentioned above, the score generated by this tool is used to prioritise 
patients. The clinical threshold (CLT) is the number of patients that the specialist considers 
in need of surgery. Roake (2003) acknowledges evidence that surgeons only allocate a 
CPAC score if and when surgery is required. Therefore, all patients who are given a CPAC 
score should be considered as over the CLT for surgery. Within the Booking System DHBs 
cannot afford to treat everyone above the CLT.  
The „Booked‟ status of the patient is dependent on the Treatment Threshold (TT), also 
colloquially known as the financial threshold (FS). McLeod et al (2004) states “the financial 
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threshold is the financially sustainable level of access to elective surgery each hospital is 
able to offer, within its budget.” In order to obtain treatment in a state-funded NZ hospital a 
patient has to have a CPAC score at or above the actual treatment threshold (aTT). The aTT 
is the 10th percentile CPAC priority score of patients that received treatment in the previous 
twelve months (Derrett, 2005). The additional 10% of capacity is reserved for any 
unexpected management issues affecting the provision of elective surgery and to allow 
those patients who may need to be allocated a higher priority than their initial CPAC 
measure indicates (Naden, 2003). 
CPAC tools were designed to work in conjunction with the surgical booking system and 
financial thresholds (McLeod et al., 2004b). Allocation of how much surgery the state will 
perform is determined by each DHB which is restricted to a capped budget from the Ministry 
of Health each financial year. As each DHBs health budget is determined on the basis of 
population, the financial threshold may vary regionally (McLoed et al., 2004). Additional 
problems occur as DHBs in charge of allocating the health budget have unlimited influence 
over the money they are allocated and engage in „volume shifting‟ in which funding for non-
urgent treatments is often shifted to acute or emergency services (Gauld and Derrett, 2000). 
This reduces capital in elective services and in effect raises the TT. 
The commitment threshold (CT) is a score at which DHBs provide further certainty to the 
patient that they will receive treatment within six months of the patients FSA. In practice a 
CT should be closely aligned to the previous year‟s aTT for each DHB. Reports of CTs well 
above aTTs has been observed in some DHBs which induces patient uncertainty and 
alleviates DHB pressure for meeting ESPI targets (Naden, 2003).  
The explicit nature of rationing is felt by a group of patients who fall between the CLT and 
the aTT (Roake, 2003). This category of patients who have not accrued enough points to 
qualify for surgery generate what is commonly known as the residual waiting list (RWL), this 
subgroup of the community represents an topic of immense public concern as further 
explained below (Gauld and Derrett, 2000). A system of active review (AR) was established 
in order to meet the demands of those on residual waiting lists, restricted only to patients 
whom surgery was considered the best option for their care (Ministry of Health, 2010a). 
However, the AR list only captures a small portion of the RWL, the remainder being those 
that are returned to their GP for conservative care. 
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4.2.4 Residual Waiting Lists (RWLs) 
The original intention was to clear existing waiting lists so the booking system could be 
introduced for all new patient assessments. In May 1996 the Bolger National Government 
earmarked $130 Million to establish the „Waiting List Fund‟ that would be used to clear 
backlogs in the system prior to 1998 when the booking system came online. With the 
election of a new Coalition Government in December 1996 there was a guarantee of waiting 
times no longer than 6 months and a promise of an additional $84 Million a year for 3 years 
for the „Waiting List Fund‟ to help achieve government promises.  
Government had envisaged that those on existing waiting lists would be reassessed under 
new prioritisation criteria and either treated or turned away because of ineligibility such that 
waiting lists for non-urgent surgery would no longer exist (Gauld and Derrett, 2000). In reality 
the public system was unable to clear the backlogs. Less than half of those who had been 
on waiting lists had obtained treatment but the remainder were effectively dropped from the 
secondary health system and referred back to primary care for on-going treatment (Barnett 
and Barnett, 2003a, Howden-Chapman and Ashton, 2000). 
Following the implementation of the booking system on 1 July 1998 few improvements 
occurred. Patient certainty did not greatly improve and the majority of hospitals failed to give 
a date for surgery after 10 days post their first specialist assessment. Practical ramifications 
of the booking system were emerging such as the continuing development and on-going 
implementation of CPAC tools, which were inconsistent among hospitals and practising 
physicians  (Roake, 2003, Derrett et al., 2003). Furthermore, the funding of public hospitals 
fluctuated which affected thresholds and ultimately meant inconsistency of treatment for 
patients of equal need (Gauld and Derrett, 2000). 
Because the services provided fall within a capped budget, not all patients can expect to 
gain access to treatment. In this respect the booking system does not overcome the 
problems associated with leaving a portion of patients, who are assessed as critically „in 
need‟, untreated (Howden-Chapman and Ashton, 2000). Physicians and patients are put in 
an impossible situation when all avenues for treatment have been exhausted. Often the only 
option for the patient is to pay for surgery in the private sector. Because the patient is forced 
to pay the full cost of treatment through insurance premiums or out of disposable income, 
these health services are allocated not by way of ability to benefit but in accordance with 
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ability to pay. It is clear that such „cost shifting‟ from hospitals to individuals creates room for 
inequities to be created (Gauld and Derrett, 2000).  
The booking system appealed to politicians as the booking system was designed in such a 
way that, as the transition to new prioritisation methods reached completion, waiting lists 
would diminish or opportunely vanish (Howden-Chapman and Ashton, 2000). In reality 
patients who do not reach the appropriate threshold are not booked for treatment and left to 
wait in the community until their condition worsens. The evidence is clear that being forced 
to wait long periods for surgery can have a significant effect on quality of life and there is the 
real risk that that those on the residual waiting list have become an invisible group in New 
Zealand Society (Gauld and Derrett, 2000). 
4.2.5 Elective Service Patient Flow Indicators (ESPIs) 
Each of the 21 DHBs reports to the Ministry of Health on eight elective services patient flow 
indicators (ESPIs) which are used to measure the performance of elective service delivery. 
Each of the eight indicators are aligned to a stage as patients move through the elective 
services booking system and are detailed according to the number of patients that: 
 each DHB fails to appropriately acknowledge and process all patient referrals within 
ten working days 
 
 have waited longer than six months for their FSA 
 
 are waiting without a commitment to treatment whose priorities are higher than the 
aTT 
 
 are resigned to the residual waiting list (no longer applicable) 
 
 are given a commitment to treatment but not treated within six months 
 
 are in AR but have not received a clinical assessment within the last six months 
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 have a score above the aTT, but have not received treatment within six months and 
with respect to those patients placed on AR, have not received a clinical assessment 
within six months 
 
 were prioritised using nationally recognised processes or tools (Ministry of Health, 
2010a). 
4.2.6 The Reporting System: ESPIs in the Spotlight 
There are several fundamental flaws in the way ESPIs are measured and reported. These 
are deep seated in the booking system with the effect that those patients within the RWL are 
hidden and left unreported by ESPIs. As mentioned above, this is because of the way the 
booking system has been set up to prioritise, and therefore exclude all patients that the DHB 
does not have the capacity to treat within the next twelve months.  
Many of the indicators have become meaningless. The figures reported by DHBs are low 
and in many cases zero. Indicators were observed over the period March 2009 and February 
2010 and ESPIs 1, 4 and 8 and in most DHBs results were either 0% or 100% a „squeaky 
clean‟ result. The two most significant indicators are 2 and 5 which measure the percentage 
of patients in each DHB who have been waiting for more than six months for their FSA or 
likewise been waiting at least the same period for surgery after being given a CT. The author 
considers this to be the case because they are the best indicators of waiting time and 
therefore the most appropriate gauge of public access to elective procedures within the 
booking system. 
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Figure 12: ESPI 2/5 Measuring the Percentage of Patients Waiting Longer than 6 Months for FSA and Surgery: 
March 2009-February 2010 (Ministry of Health, 2010a). 
Figure 12 illustrates the average of monthly ESPI indicators 2 & 5 for each of the 21 DHBs 
during the period March 2009 to February 2010. In the blue/left bar is ESPI 2, the per cent of 
patients waiting longer than six months for FSA and in the red/right bar is ESPI 5 which is 
the percentage of patients waiting longer than six months for their procedure following FSA. 
While there is marked variation amongst the 21 DHBs, each DHB is meeting its target of less 
than 2 per cent for ESPI 2 and less than 5 per cent for ESPI 5, set by the MoH. Therefore, 
as Howden-Chapman & Ashton predicted in (2000), waiting lists are effectively non-existent 
with all DHBs meeting their objectives set by MoH to measure the performance of the 
booking system. 
The problem with indicator 5 is that it is restricted only to those patients who meet the aTT. 
In the old system all patients worthy of surgery would have been recorded on waiting lists 
and now patients assessed as clinically in need of surgery (i.e. above the CLT) who do not 
meet the financial threshold are sent back to primary care for on-going conservative care. 
These patients are not recorded in a central database or reported in any form to MoH. 
Essentially, this group becomes invisible and as a result DHBs appear to be performing 
extremely well by MoH standards. In an apparent contradiction, waiting lists have been 
eliminated while many patients are presenting with conditions that warrant surgical 
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intervention but the waiting are being excluded due to the finite resources in the public 
hospital system 
As a result of new money, specifically targeting electives, that became available under the 
Labour Government prior to 2008, a new funding scheme was established whereby DHBs 
incurred financial penalties if they failed to provide surgical services within the six month 
timeframe. As a consequence of the financial penalties DHBs reacted by „dumping‟ patients 
from their waiting lists and referring them back to primary care. As a result of massive public 
outcry and a significant input of government funding patients were reinstated onto waiting 
lists. As a result all DHBs have moved to implement changes to improve the referral process 
which has the potential to further integrate specialist and primary care (Gauld, 2009). 
DHBs have provided in depth guidelines on a wide range of conditions to advise GPs and 
aid the appropriate referral of patients to acute and elective services. Figure 13 shows the 
cover of a best-practice guide compiled for GPs by the Canterbury DHB called 
„HealthPathways‟. These sorts of initiatives have been developed to try and reduce demand 
and ultimately lower wait time for FSA. This results in fewer people having access to 
specialist assessment and leaves patients at greater risk from remaining undiagnosed for 
treatable conditions. However, this sort of strategy can be helpful as communities surgical 
needs are often masked when public perception of excessive waiting time  to gain a FSA. 
This has a dual effect in that GPs will be less likely to refer patients and patients will be less 
likely to present in primary care if they know there is an excessive waiting period (Roake, 
2003). 
 
Figure 13: Health Pathways (Canterbury District Health Board, 2009) 
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4.3 CPAC Tools: From a Clinicians’ Perspective 
Internationally, literature on the way elective surgery is allocated has focused on equity, 
waiting times and methods of prioritisation for access. However, in New Zealand recent 
concerns have centred over the variation in the methods that surgeons have adopted when 
making priority assessments that determine the fair and equitable access to publicly funded 
health care (Derrett et al., 2009). McLeod et al (2004) carried out a useful qualitative study 
which examined GP, registrar and surgeon reflections on the social inequalities generated 
by the surgical booking system. Several themes emerged as contributing factors towards 
equity of access for elective services. These included structural barriers and potential for 
different pathways to care, clinician advocacy, the rationing of public services and varying 
considerations doctors reserved for the application of CPAC tools. 
4.3.1 Primary Care 
GPs are often referred to as the „gatekeepers‟ of hospital care in New Zealand in that they 
control the supply of patients flowing through to specialist care and most elective procedures 
(Fougere, 2001). As mentioned previously, the GP assesses the patient and, if appropriate, 
sends a letter of referral to the outpatient clinic in which he or she has the chance to 
advocate for the patient as far as deemed necessary. Unsuitable referrals have the effect of 
slowing down the booking system so it is important that GPs only refer people most in need 
of surgery and have a understanding of prioritisation criteria (McLeod et al., 2004a, Ministry 
of Health, 2010a). Where publicly funded care is not an option, GPs may find other forms of 
care for their patients or may try different avenues for care outside of the public sector. 
For some minor conditions such as varicose veins or hernia, GPs are instructed to not refer 
patients through to the booking system. Delays in accessing treatment often cause large 
social and economic costs to individuals and the health system, especially for residents of 
isolated communities. A GP is quoted in McLeod et al‟s (p44, 2004) study as saying: 
“She‟s been coming to me for a year ….for pain relief and seeing the district nurse. She‟s 
had to have alterations done to her house, she‟s had to apply for transport,…., and she‟s a 
poor Maori, low socio-economic older woman, you know she can‟t afford to run in and out 
from the coast…. She‟s probably got a relative to drive her ….she‟s cost the system a 
fortune because of the delay.” 
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For patients like these GPs reported trying to find ways around the public booking system.  
These have included strategies like determining whether accident-related public insurance 
would cover such condition or contacting individual surgeons or hospitals for advice (McLoed 
et al., 2004). In McLeod et al‟s (2004a) study many GPs commented on the inequalities that 
resulted from disadvantaged patients not being able to afford private surgery. McLeod et al 
(2004) also acknowledge that socio-economically disadvantaged people tend to be more 
likely to move to new locations and therefore, are more likely to be lost to follow up due to 
the longevity of the booking process. 
GPs reported that they advocated for a patient in the referral letter based on their perception 
of a patients‟ clinical need and their ability to benefit from publicly funded care. A GP makes 
a comment on their patients‟ ability to benefit: 
“…a lot of people that are on the waiting list for joints are immobile anyway, not because of 
their joint but because of their lifestyle, because they are overweight and they‟ve got chronic 
obstructive lung disease and that sort of thing. I can‟t see what on earth they are going to get 
anyway from their operation.” (p44, McLoed et al., 2004) 
The severity of a patient‟s condition is also reported to be used for assessment purposes but 
more notable is the GP‟s advocacy related to a patient‟s social circumstances and the 
consideration of ethnic disparities between Maori and non-Maori. Another comment from a 
GP shows the extra consideration socio-economic and ethnic factors play when referring 
patients onwards to FSA: 
“…they were all Maoris, low socio-economic…you advocate and go the extra mile for them 
….You give them social history,…they‟re not some white middle class woman with a nanny 
and a gardener….You let them know that those people are in different circumstances.” (p44, 
McLoed et al., 2004) 
When patients are referred back to their GP because they failed to meet the TT for surgery 
the GP is not informed which components of the priority criteria have prevented their patient 
from being eligible for surgery. This is to stop clinicians deliberately inflating scores or 
„coaching patients‟ on which symptoms to lie about or exaggerate at further specialist 
assessment (McLeod et al., 2004a). Similar problems were present in the previous waiting 
list system where some patients were known to complain loudly, in which case specialists 
moved those patients up the list effectively jumping the other patients in the queue. This 
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feature is more commonly known as the „squeaky wheel‟ phenomenon (Gauld and Derrett, 
2000, Roake, 2003, Howden-Chapman and Ashton, 2000). Priority systems are susceptible 
to „gaming‟. However, the more transparent processes are, the less gaming that has been 
shown to occur but full transparency remains a difficulty (Roake, 2003). 
4.3.2 Specialist Assessment Criteria for First Specialist Assessment (ACA) 
During the FSA, the specialist has the task of prioritising patients by using a single CPAC 
tool in which he or she will consider the patients clinical need and ability to benefit from 
surgery. Surgeons accepted the likelihood of clinical disparity between individual 
assessments: 
“I think everyone does it differently and that‟s another part of the problem. You may get a 
completely different score depending on who you see and how they perceive your symptoms 
and how you communicate your symptoms (Registrar).” (p44, McLoed et al., 2004) 
According to the Ministry of Health (2010a), booking systems CPAC prioritisation tools are 
intended to be used at the first specialist assessment. Problems occur when less qualified 
people undertake such assessments. One surgeon commented in McLeod et al‟s (2004a) 
study that his or her secretary occasionally, unofficially fills out the assessment forms. 
Variations in who does the scoring, whether it be consultants, registrars, nurses or even 
administrators contributes to variation in CPAC scores (Roake, 2003). 
Like GPs, surgeons and registrars think about patients‟ social circumstances when 
determining prioritisation for surgery, such as ability to re-enter the workforce and 
considerations of independence. Socio-demographic and cultural factors are also taken 
account of. Specialists acknowledged how, in some cultures, it is common that patients will 
not present to a doctor until the latest possible stage when the symptoms become 
unbearable and their condition has become severe. Regardless of such examples, when 
surgeons were asked about equity, most believed that socio-economic status and ethnicity 
should not play a role in prioritising patients within the booking system. Respondents in 
McLeod et al.‟s (p45, 2004) study were adamant that they did not treat patients differently 
according to their ethnicity: 
“Definitely dispute that. I think that there is no substance in that. For me as a practitioner, as 
a surgeon, I don‟t look at what colour they are, where they come from, or what their religion 
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is. If somebody‟s got a condition that needs treatment, we give it, and I can vouch for all 
other surgeons in this hospital, or any other hospital as surgeons (Surgeon).” 
Although specialists strongly claimed they did not give special concessions based on 
ethnicity some suggested different ethnic groups have different preferences for surgery. This 
may impact on clinician advice and decision-making. One surgeon from McLeod et al.‟s 
(2004) study explained how Maori were less likely to accept surgery and that cultural 
differences need to be taken into account when considering these patients. 
Other surgeons felt that people from different ethnic groups were disadvantaged in that they 
lacked understanding of the booking system and, as a result, were unable to advocate for 
themselves or challenge priority decisions. Also, Maori and Pacific people tend to face 
higher rates of co-morbidity which a specialist from McLeod et al‟s (p45, 2004) study argued 
contributes to lack of access for these people: 
“…we have what we call co-morbidities…diabetes and obesity. And those problems are 
probably not distributed evenly amongst the population and it may well be that some of the 
Polynesian people feel that they are discriminated against on this basis. But that‟s just purely 
on medical grounds, it‟s nothing to do with ethnicity.” 
Although specialists claim not to give anyone preferential treatment according to ethnicity or 
socio-economic status it is natural for a doctor to act as a supporter of each patient‟s needs 
and interests. Overseas, clinician bias has been shown to be correlated with ethnicity 
(Smedly et al., 2002, Ayanian et al., 1999), as well as patient influences such as obesity, age 
and smoking status (Schwartz et al., 2003, Madan et al., 2001, Rohrich et al., 2002). It 
should be accepted that some relationship between socio-demographic characteristics are 
evident when considering patients with regard to clinical prioritisation decisions. Within the 
booking system the advocacy role of clinicians often seems to override acceptance of the 
public health system‟s inherent need to ration elective services. One general surgeon 
acknowledges that: 
“The main problem is that surgeons and doctors are patients‟ advocates and they will try to 
get their patient through the system…and if they feel the patient needs surgery they will just 
make up the score.” (p97, McLeod et al., 2004a) 
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This leads us to consider how the specialist might wish to manipulate scoring and whether 
self-interest is a factor in determining whether the patient is led through public or private 
avenues for care. 
4.3.3 Specialist Manipulation of CPAC tools 
Some physicians have stated quite openly they will manipulate the system to ensure that a 
patient scores sufficient points to reach a threshold level required (Howden-Chapman and 
Ashton, 2000). One orthopaedic surgeon commented: 
“I think if you decide you need to operate on somebody you just simply make the score high 
enough so they get surgery (p96, McLeod et al., 2004a). 
This problem seems to be a hangover from the old triage-based (urgent, semi-urgent and 
routine) prioritisation that took place prior to 1998. That is, surgeons are making prioritisation 
decisions instantly by deciding whether the patient needs surgery and then fixing their 
calculation of the CPAC score to suit. In McLeod et al‟s (2004b) study 13.5% of surgeons 
reported that the financial threshold was a major consideration in their generation of CPAC 
scores. Many surgeons believe that their clinical judgement is the best form of prioritisation 
and lacked confidence in CPAC tools, labelling such criteria purely as a „management tool‟ 
(McLeod et al., 2004a). 
Specialists also have strong perverse incentives via their conflict of interests deriving from 
the fact that most hold positions in both the public and private sectors. This may contribute to 
both the generation and sustaining of waiting times and threaten the effectiveness of the 
booking system (Howden-Chapman and Ashton, 2000). In addition to weakening the 
performance of the booking system, self-interest can also generate a raft of inequalities. By 
denying many patients surgery through the public sector, access to elective surgery is 
further defined by ability to pay through the private sector which tends to exacerbate 
inequalities as the effects are felt most by ethnic minorities and other deprived communities 
as examined above. 
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4.4 Discussion 
Beyond issues faced by individual patients and clinicians, it is important that we observe 
community-wide interactions and take note of inequalities that are generated within the 
NZBS. Mooney (p101, 1998) observes: 
“…the nature of a health care system in a society can convey something more than desire to 
treat sick people. It is a „performance indicator‟ of the concerns for equity and caring in 
society”  
The interactions acknowledged above distinguish concerns of equity in the provision of 
elective surgery on both a vertical and horizontal basis. In New Zealand, unequal access has 
been observed in relation to age, ethnicity, cultural differences, socio-economic status, 
obesity, and financial resources. The NZBS was put in place to improve the transparency 
and national consistency of access but it seems that the booking process is creating 
inequalities in access for elective surgery. Derrett et al. (2009) assert that large variations in 
public provision would not exist if the booking system was working as it should. 
Guidelines have been suggested to aid the booking system to eliminate the explicit use of 
value judgements into clinicians‟ allocation choices (Giacomini et al., 2001). Guideline 
recommendations may however be underwritten by value judgements for patient 
prioritisation that include patients‟ mental state, behaviour, relationships with other people, 
financial resources, place in society and environment (McLoed et al., 2004).  
McLeod, et al (2004b) found that there was consensus among surgeons that a new 
nationally consistent method of prioritising patients for access to elective surgery was 
required. They believed their clinical judgement was the best tool for administering access 
and felt that further development of surgical scoring tools had the potential to better prioritise 
patients. Derrett et al (2003) identify the need for instruments capable of prioritising patients 
across treatment groups. This may solve some consistency related concerns. However, the 
tighter regulation of CPAC prioritisation tools or a compatible alternative may be the only 
way to achieve national consistency. Essential for this to occur will be the „buy in‟ of GPs, 
specialists and remainder of the medical community as they will continue to be the agents 
who apply prioritisation tools for those in need of elective surgery. 
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A population perspective is necessary to making prioritisation mechanisms work. For a shift 
to occur for support of a population health focus clinicians need to shift away from individual 
patient advocacy in which the scores allocated rely purely on CPAC measures. Clinicians 
should avoid consideration of patients‟ background (ethnicity, socio-economic status, age, 
sex,… etc.), financial thresholds, patient demands and personal interests (Hadorn, 2001). 
This will ensure horizontal and vertical equity are maintained while minimising inequalities as 
to who gets treated under the publicly funded health system. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The NZBS was set up in response to public concern over expanding waiting lists and with 
the aim of creating a more transparent and consistent method for determining access to 
elective surgery. The convoluted introduction of untested prioritisation criteria from 1998 and 
the on-going changes and variation of CPAC tools meant that the equity of access for 
publicly provided elective procedures did not improve.  
Waiting lists would inevitably disappear with the reassessment of all patients under the new 
prioritisation process central to the booking system. Many patients who had previously been 
on waiting lists for whom surgery was assessed as the best method of treatment were 
relegated to residual waiting lists and left in the care of their GPs. New patients lacking the 
appropriate TT scores were likewise referred back to their GPs until a time where their 
condition worsened. 
Waiting times replaced waiting lists in 1998 and as soon as patients had begun being 
reprioritised using the new CPAC tools and booking process waiting times began to 
diminish. Soon DHBs were meeting all MoH requirements despite significant unmet demand 
for elective surgery. Roake (2003) emphasises how waiting times continue to be perceived 
as a gauge of performance for the Ministry of Health and politicians. However, the length of 
waiting times has been shown to be a poor measure of community need and health status. 
Physician behaviour was reported as contributing to inequalities in the referral of patients to 
FSA and in the use of CPAC prioritisation tools. GPs were reported to „coach‟ patients to 
exaggerate symptoms in on-going assessment. The specialists‟ approach was suggested to 
account for a variation in access to surgery based on ethnicity, age, socio-economic status 
and other variables by considering these factors during assessment, the failure to use 
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prioritisation tools correctly, inconsistency of CPAC tools, manipulating scores and engaging 
in acts of self-interest. 
Issues of equity have been widely reported throughout the literature and it is evident that this 
variation in access is partly determined by the variation of CPAC tools. Achieving greater 
consistency of access is determined by universal prioritisation criteria and by having 
clinicians focusing less on their patient advocacy role and giving greater consideration to 
their role within the booking process would be to the greater good of the public health 
service. 
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5 Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the development of prioritisation criteria for the provision of 
elective surgery in New Zealand. That concludes the literature review section and we will 
return to the three objectives that this project is setting out to achieve. The first is to examine 
geographic differences in patients‟ access to elective surgery through the NZBS. The second 
is to observe individual factors, such that certain groups may experience different waiting 
times within the booking system. The third objective includes a contextual measure, the 
importance of the private hospital sector, in order to determine the extent to which this has 
influenced public surgical waiting times. Objectives 1-3 align with chapters 6 to 8, each 
chapter producing results in order to satisfy an objective. Chapter 9 discusses the results, 
the dissemination of interview transcripts and draws some conclusions. 
This chapter (5) is divided into five sections. Firstly the objectives are discussed in 
conjunction with the structure of the following proceeding chapters. Data collection, 
description and data processing are discussed in the second section of the chapter. Thirdly, 
methods of statistical analysis are considered according to each dataset. The fourth section 
provides a short summary of how Geographic Information Systems (GIS) were incorporated 
to allow a clear presentation of results and also details the interviews that were undertaken 
with a group of medical specialists and hospital managers. Finally, limitations that were 
experienced during analysis sections will be reported. 
5.2 Structure for Results and Discussion 
This chapter introduces the analysis that will take place to achieve the results in the following 
chapters of this thesis so it is important that the objectives are revisited before proceeding 
further. These are: 
 To observe the performance of the NZBS and to assess how the length of waiting 
times varies geographically. 
 
 To investigate how public surgical waiting times vary between different sub groups of 
New Zealand‟s population 
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 To examine contextual factors, specifically whether the provision of privately funded 
elective surgery is affecting public surgical waiting times. 
Figure 14 lays out the structure for the remainder of this thesis. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 are the 
results chapters, each of which focuses on one of the three objectives described above. 
Chapter 9 of the thesis is reserved for the discussion, interpretation of the results and the 
drawing of conclusions. Figure 14 also summarises the purpose and key themes for analysis 
that will be discussed within each chapter. Objective 1 is studied in Chapter 6, the purpose 
being to examine national and international variation in waiting times in elective treatments 
for New Zealand and Australia. Chapter 7 will examine objective 2 by observing social and 
demographic inequalities that affect patients‟ access to care within the NZBS, these will 
include age, gender, ethnicity and measures of individual deprivation. Chapter 8 will 
incorporate analysis for objective 3 relating to the contextual factors involved when 
determining geographic differences in waiting times. Firstly, waiting times will be controlled 
for urban-rural influence and by measuring the effect of the private hospital sector on public 
waiting lists. Chapter 9 will be used to discuss results found in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 and to 
interpret interviews that were conducted with medical specialists and hospital managers 
working in the field before taking the to draw any conclusions. 
 
Figure 14: Chapter Outline 
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Scale of Research 
The scale of research undertaken for objectives 1, 2 and 3 will focus on national level 
analysis broken down in most cases by DHB to consider how each health authority is 
performing in relation to others throughout the country. This will include results from analysis 
conducted in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Figure 60 (Appendix 2) shows the geographic distribution 
of District Health Boards that were providing health and disability services during the study 
period (2004-2007). The only exception is the inclusion of Australian data that has been 
produced as a result of a study undertaken by the Australian Medical Association (AMA) 
(AMA, 2009). Figure 61 (Appendix 2) depicts Australia‟s states and territories that are 
relevant to analysis within Chapter 6. 
5.3 Data Collection 
Data was collected from three major sources. These were: 
 the New Zealand Ministry of Health (MoH), National Health and Information Service 
(NZHIS) 
 the Australian Medical Association, Public Hospital Report Card 
 Statistics New Zealand, the 2006 New Zealand Census. 
As shown in Figure 15 each of the sources provided data for analysis and final results for 
this thesis. The blue circles indicate statistical analysis as well as geo-coding for final 
presentation of results and the boxes show datasets from each of the sources listed above. 
These datasets were used across the three objectives. Objective 1, which looks at 
geographic differences in waiting times, used the MoH‟s National Booking and Reporting 
System (NBRS) dataset in combination with the Australian Medical Association‟s Public 
Hospital Report Card to generate results on average waiting times for New Zealand and 
Australia between 2004 and 2007. Objective 2, which aims to examine individual 
determinants for waiting times, uses a combination of NBRS and New Zealand Census 
(2006) data to generate results applying to New Zealand. Objective 3, which sets out to see 
how the private hospital sector influences public waiting times, uses a combination of 
National Minimum Dataset (NMDS) records which reports hospital admissions in the public 
and private sectors, the NBRS dataset and the New Zealand Census (2006) to relate 
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hospital admissions data to waiting times. The information request for the New Zealand 
datasets from the NZHIS division of the Ministry of Health is now discussed. 
 
Figure 15: Data Collection and Analysis 
5.3.1 Obtaining Data 
An application was made to NZHIS in August 2010 to obtain the complete dataset of the 
National Booking and Reporting System (NBRS) and National Minimum Dataset (NMDS) for 
the period 2004-2007. The MOH‟s mandate to collect health information is set out in New 
Zealand legislation, in particular Section 22 of the Health Act 1956, Section 139 of the 
Hospitals Act 1957 and the Cancer Registry Act 1993. The collection, storage and use of this 
information is also governed by the Privacy Act 1993, the Health Information Privacy Code 
1994, and the Accident Insurance Act 1998. NZHIS currently manages the national health 
information systems and standards on behalf of the Crown. As a collector of information the 
NZHIS has several statutory obligations: 
 the need to protect patient confidentiality and privacy 
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 the need for connectivity between health information systems to promote 
communication and integrity 
 the need for standard data definitions, classifications and coding systems 
 the need to collect data once, as close to the source as possible and may use it as 
many times as required to meet different information requirements 
 the requirement for national health data to include only that data which is used, 
valued and validated at the local level 
 the need to address Maori issues. 
All health and disability service providers, agencies and organisations, as defined in the 
Health Information Privacy Code 1994, with access to national data are required to adhere to 
and comply with the national information standards, definitions and guidelines. These 
include the maintaining the integrity and security of the databases and the transmission or 
exchange of data only essential data between health and disability service organisations. 
Therefore, most of the data is coded in such a way that individual identity is not revealed but 
the data does give demographic and geographic information about patients and their 
relevant backgrounds. The datasets that were obtained are further discussed below. 
National Booking Reporting System (NBRS) 
The NBRS dataset contains information on the NZBS that is used to prioritise patients for 
publicly funded elective surgery as detailed throughout the previous chapter. The MOH has 
required each DHB to send monthly reports of each patients status within the booking 
system since 1 August 2001. Information is collected about the patient‟s date of entry into 
the system, their assessed priority, and their booking status. Information is also collected 
relevant to the: 
 specialty and procedure 
 age of patient at time of referral 
 gender of the patient 
 ethnic group of which each patient belongs 
 the DHB the patient normally resides in and the DHB the operation was performed in 
 each patient‟s domicile code 
 the particular hospital where the operation was performed 
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 each patient‟s Clinical Priority Assessment Criteria (CPAC) score and scoring tool 
used 
 date of referral 
 date of First Specialist Assessment (FSA) 
 days since last review for those patients places on AR 
 date surgery was performed. 
Unfortunately, some variables are incomplete which places some limitations on this study. 
For example, there is a significant amount of referral dates missing from the NBRS which 
limits analysis of patients‟ waiting times for FSA. 
Elective Service Patient Flow Indicator‟s (ESPIs) Reported Within the NBRS Dataset 
As mentioned in Chapter 4 most of the ESPIs are no longer relevant. The only two worthy of 
mention are ESPI 2 (patients waiting longer than 6 months for their FSA) and ESPI 5 
(patients given a commitment to treatment but not treated within 6 months). Unfortunately, 
many of the referral dates have not been recorded which has meant the dataset is unable to 
provide a reliable measure for ESPI 2. Analysis of ESPI 5 is possible but may not provide a 
true indication of who is receiving the best access to treatment. This is illustrated in Figure 
16 which shows the process involved in being referred for prioritisation and then onto 
treatment. 
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Figure 16: Route to Surgery 
A problem arises when patients are not given an immediate commitment to treatment during 
their FSA. The DHB will only commit to the treatment of a patient at a time when they have 
the funds to meet the financial cost of providing surgery. This may mean patients have 
subsequent assessments in which under the process of AR, their condition may eventually 
be deemed to have deteriorated enough to meet the required CPAC score and gain a 
commitment to treatment, but for the purposes of ESPI 5 this is not considered waiting time. 
Therefore, to obtain a true measure of waiting time the author took the period between FSA 
and surgery date and all ESPI measures were disregarded. As seen in Table 2 the period 
measured for this research includes the wait time from FSA until the patient is given a 
commitment to treatment right up to the day of surgery. As can be seen below in Table 2, the 
difference between the ESPI measure and the true wait time from FSA to surgery date is 
quite substantial. 
  
Chapter 5: Methodology 
101 
 
District Health Board Period between 
Commitment to Treatment 
and Surgery Date 
Period between FSA and 
Surgery 
Difference 
Northland 68 days 169 days 101 
Waitemata 85 days 120 days 35 
Auckland 82 days 132 days 50 
Counties Manukau 48 days 126 days 78 
Waikato 56 days 142 days 86 
Lakes 90 days 147 days 57 
Bay of Plenty 60 days 137 days 77 
Tairawhiti 111 days 156 days 45 
Taranaki 72 days 114 days 42 
Hawke's Bay 104 days 164 days 60 
Whanganui 78 days 109 days 31 
Mid Central 89 days 147 days 58 
Hutt Valley 113 days 162 days 49 
Capital and Coast 115 days 169 days 54 
Wairarapa 94 days 123 days 29 
Nelson Marlborough 75 days 170 days 95 
West Coast 121 days 171 days 50 
Canterbury 72 days 197 days 125 
South Canterbury 101 days 152 days 51 
Otago 107 days 145 days 38 
Southland 54 days 180 days 126 
Table 2: Difference between FSA and CT 2004-2007 (Mean score per DHB) 
National Minimum Dataset (Hospital Events) (NMDS) 
The NMDS is a national collection of public and private hospital discharge information, 
including clinical information, for inpatients and day patients. The NMDS is used by the 
Ministry of Health, DHBs, PHOs, clinicians, researchers and members of the public for 
statistical information, clinical benchmarking, and planning and funding. The NMDS is used 
for policy formation, performance monitoring, research and review. It provides statistical 
information, reports, and analyses about the trends in the delivery of hospital inpatient and 
day patient health services both nationally and on a provider basis. It is also used for funding 
purposes. All records must have a valid National Health Index (NHI) number. Data has been 
submitted electronically in an agreed format by public hospitals since 1993. 
The private hospital discharge information for publicly funded events, e.g., birth events and 
geriatric care, has been collected since 1997 (Ministry of Health, 2010b). 
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Information is collected on all hospital discharge events and lists a number of useful facts 
including: 
 specialty and procedure 
 operation date 
 length of stay 
 gender of the patient 
 ethnic group of which each patient belongs 
 the DHB the patient normally resides in and the DHB the operation was performed in 
 each patient‟s domicile code 
 the particular hospital where the operation was performed 
 New Zealand residency. 
2009 Australian Public Hospital Report Card  
The 2009 Australian Public Hospital Report Card was located on the internet and gave all 
the median waiting times and the percentage of patients that were treated within 90 days for 
each Australian state and territory over the years 2004-2007 (AMA, 2009). This provided a 
useful comparison between the New Zealand and Australian public hospital systems.  
The Australian results produced by the AMA are based on what the Australian Health 
System defines as „category 2 elective surgery patients‟ which encompasses all elective 
surgery patients who suffer some pain, dysfunction or disability that is unlikely to deteriorate 
quickly or become an emergency. Category 2 patients represent over 35% of elective 
surgery admissions nationally (AMA, 2009). The Australian Commonwealth Government 
recommends that patients with such conditions receive treatment within 90 days of specialist 
consultation (Australian equivalent to FSA). The definition of „category 2‟ elective surgery 
patients closely aligns with the low to medium urgency elective interventions in New 
Zealand, therefore it seems a useful and relevant comparison. However, it must be 
acknowledged that Australia and New Zealand have different systems and procedures in 
dealing with elective treatments. 
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Statistics New Zealand 2006 Census Dataset 
New Zealand Deprivation Index 
The New Zealand Deprivation Index (NZ Dep) 2006 is a composite index of social and 
material deprivation derived by principle component analysis. Calculated at Meshblock level 
NZ Dep2006 can then be aggregated into larger units. Meshblocks are geographical units 
defined by Statistics New Zealand, containing a median of approximately 87 people in 2006. 
The score is scaled to give a New Zealand average of 1000, with a standard deviation of 100 
index points. NZ Dep uses deciles (tenths of the population), where 1 represents the least 
deprived area and 10 reflects those areas that are most deprived (Salmond et al., 2007). For 
the purposes of most of the analysis NZ Dep 2006 deciles were converted into quintiles 1-5 
by grouping deciles 1 & 2, 3 & 4, 5 & 6, 7 & 8 and 9 &10. NZ Dep2006 is an updated version 
of the NZ Dep91, NZ Dep96 and NZ Dep2001 indices of socio-economic deprivation. NZ 
Dep2006 combines nine variables from the 2006 national census which reflect eight 
dimensions of deprivation. The variables for NZ Dep2006 are described in Table 3. 
Dimension of deprivation  Variable description (in order of decreasing weight) 
Income People aged 18-64 receiving a means tested benefit 
Income People living in households with income below an income threshold 
Owned home People not living in their own home 
Support People aged <65 living in a single parent family 
Employment People aged 18-64 unemployed 
Qualifications People aged 18-64 without any qualifications 
Living Space People living in households below a bedroom occupancy threshold 
Communication People with no access to a telephone 
Transport People with no access to a car 
Table 3: Variables that are Used to Produce NZ Dep2006 (Salmond et al., 2007) 
Urban-Rural Classification Dataset 
The Urban Rural Classification dataset was originally produced with the results of the 2001 
Census specifically for a report to provide a snapshot of differences that people face 
depending on whether they live in an urban or rural environment. The 2001 Urban Rural 
Classification explored the diversity of the social and economic characteristics of people 
living in all areas of the urban-rural spectrum; from the heart of Auckland, our largest city, to 
the remote areas of the South Island‟s West Coast. The project-specific classification 
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developed for this report re-categorised rural areas on the basis of the significance of urban 
areas as a source of employment. Smaller urban areas are re-categorised according to the 
proportion of people that work in a main urban area. The Report: “New Zealand: An 
Urban/Rural Profile” is based on statistics from Statistics New Zealand and other 
government agencies, including the 2001, 1996 and 1991 censuses of Population and 
Dwellings, the New Zealand Income Survey, and the Land Transport Safety Report 
(Statistics NZ, 2001b). 
 
Figure 17: Urban Rural Classification (Statistics New Zealand, 2010) 
The Urban Rural Classification was fundamentally changed following the census in 2006. 
The new version of the classification does not seem to address rural zones of urban 
influence as under the old classification. The updated version included six classifications at 
displayed in Figure 17, and they are defined as follows: 
 Main Urban Area = “Main urban areas are very large urban areas centred on a city or 
major urban centre. Main urban areas have a minimum population of 30,000”. 
 
 Secondary Urban Area = “Secondary urban areas were established at the 1981 
Census of Population and Dwellings. They have a population between 10,000 and 
29,999 and are centred on the larger regional centres”. 
 
 Minor Urban Area = “Minor urban areas are urbanised settlements (outside main and 
secondary urban areas), centred around smaller towns with a population between 
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1,000 and 9,999. This complies with international definitions of 'urban' population, 
which include towns with over 1,000 people”. 
 
 Rural Centre = ”Rural centres were established during the 1989 review of geo-
statistical boundaries. Rural centres have no administrative or legal status but are 
statistical units defined by complete area units. They have a population between 300 
and 999. These are not termed 'urban' under standard international definitions, but 
identifying these settlements enables users to distinguish between rural dwellers 
living in true rural areas and those living in rural settlements or townships”(Statistics 
NZ, 2010a). 
 
 Other Rural = All rural locations that do not satisfy the definition of a „rural centre‟, 
therefore live in a location with a population of less than 300. 
 
 Other (inland, inlet, oceanic) = Areas outside the Urban-Rural Profile, “There are 683 
meshblocks in this category, altogether comprising 1.7 per cent of total meshblocks 
in New Zealand” (Statistics NZ, 2010b). 
To get an understanding of the variation in waiting times experience between urban and 
rural residents domicile code was linked to their urban-rural classification and a code was 
assigned equivalent to the level of urban amenities available in their particular area of origin. 
Each patient within in the NBRS dataset has been allocated a urban-rural profile 
classification according to his or her home address. Since the data had been produced at 
meshblock level by Statistics New Zealand it was necessary to aggregate it up to census 
area unit level to attach the Urban Rural Classification codes to the NBRS dataset. 
5.3.2 Data Sorting 
In order to be able to analyse the datasets that were presented, data needed to be 
organised in such a way that it would produce results and satisfy each of the three 
objectives. Narrowing some of the datasets it helped support the specific analysis and 
eliminated some of the bias. For example, when ACC funded operations were included, the 
waiting times data was being distorted by many patients who were gaining publicly funded 
operations through the private sector. Figure 18 gives an overview of the steps that were 
taken to refine the datasets, create new variables and some basic tools used for analysis. 
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The left hand side of the flow chart shows stars to indicate which datasets each process 
applied to. 
 
Figure 18: Data Sorting 
The first major task was to narrow down the national dataset to the information that was 
required for the purposes of meeting each objective. Since the study is limited to elective 
surgery provision the author began by looking at the NMDS dataset and eliminating all non-
elective treatments that were completed during the years 2004-2007. 
Attention then focused on the private hospital section of the NMDS dataset. As objective 3 
aims to examine how private sector admissions have affected the provision of publicly 
funded surgery the author wanted to focus on surgical procedures that are most commonly 
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performed by the private hospital sector. The 10 most common surgical procedures were 
found and it was discovered that many of the treatments were grouped into broad types of 
surgery, (Table 4). The fact that specific surgery types were unable to be obtained and 
because the top 10 procedures only amounted to 36% of total private hospital admissions 
meant that to get a true representation of private sector influence, a wider range of 
treatments would have to be included in the study. For this reason the author chose to 
calculate the top 10 surgical specialties in the private sector as illustrated within Table 5. 
Number Procedure 
Per cent of 
Cases 
1 Other aftercare W/O catastrophic or severe CC 7.5 
2 Lens procedures same day 4 
3 Tonsillectomy and/or adenoidectomy 3.7 
4 Dental extractions and restorations 3.4 
5 Myringotomy W tube insertion 3.3 
6 Other skin subcutaneous tissue and breast procedures 2.9 
7 Inguinal and femoral hernia procedures age >0 2.9 
8 Other colonoscopy same day 2.9 
9 Other knee procedures 2.8 
10 Follow up W endoscopy 2.7 
Total 36.1 
Table 4: The Ten Most Common Surgical Procedures in the Private Sector 2004-2007. 
Table 5 displays the top ten surgical specialties which are far easier to specify. Also, the top 
ten specialties represent almost 98% of the NMDS (Private Hospital) dataset which provides 
a far better representation of the private sector‟s deployment of resources. However, the 
author wished to disregard all private sector treatment associated with maintenance of the 
elderly which has become a large function of the private hospital sector in New Zealand. In 
order to do this general medicine was eliminated from the analysis. The eleventh surgical 
specialty, Gastroenterological surgery was included in the place of general medicine, shown 
in Table 6. 
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Number Specialty Per cent of Cases 
1 General surgery 65.3 
2 General medicine 23.3 
3 Orthopaedic surgery 2.0 
4 Gynaecology 1.8 
5 Otorhinolaryngology (ENT) 1.6 
6 Ophthalmology 1.2 
7 Plastic surgery [excluding burns] .8 
8 Cardiology .7 
9 Gastroenterology .7 
10 Urology .4 
Total 97.7 
Table 5: The Ten Most Common Surgical Specialties in the Private Sector 2004-2007 
From here all cases other than those which fall within the ten chosen specialties were 
removed from the NMDS and NBRS datasets. This allowed further analysis by specialty and 
meant it was possible to concentrate on specialties where the private sector has a significant 
influence in the provision of publicly funded surgery and, therefore, influence over the NZBS. 
The author could now concentrate on arranging individual datasets for analysis. 
Number Specialty 
Per cent of 
Cases 
1 General surgery 65.3 
2 Orthopaedic surgery 2.0 
3 Gynaecology 1.8 
4 Otorhinolaryngology (ENT) 1.6 
5 Ophthalmology 1.2 
6 Plastic surgery (Excluding Burns) .8 
7 Cardiology .7 
8 Gastroenterology .7 
9 Gastroenterological surgery .2 
10 Urology .4 
Total 74.5 
Table 6: Specialties Chosen For Study 
Data Sorting (NBRS data) 
There was now referral and surgery data for every patient that was entered into the NZBS 
for the top ten specialties from 2004 to 2007. The next thing was to delete all cases except 
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those which had actually received treatment during 2004-2007. This eliminated duplicate 
booking events in the system. Also, all cases that were still in the system at the end of 2007 
would be retained. However, limited analysis took place on this subset of the data. Table 7 
summarises the booking status of all cases in the NBRS following these selections. 
Booking Status Cases 
Cases of Completed Surgery by the end of 2007     563 665 
Cases Booked for Treatment at the end of 2007 5 318 
Cases Given Certainty at the end of 2007   29 980 
Cases in AR at the end of 2007     8 750 
Cases Deferred at the end of 2007   3 284 
Cases Rebooked at the end of 2007   428 
Total Cases in the NBRS (2004-2007)   611 425 
Table 7: Booking Status of Cases in the NBRS 2004 to 2007 
Creating a new variable: FSA to Surgery Date 
After establishing which cases would be used from the NBRS dataset, the next task was to 
create a new variable which would measure the waiting time from FSA to Surgery date. 
SPSS software contains a date/time wizard to calculate the difference between two dates to 
create a new variable using days as the unit of measurement. This was applied to all cases 
of completed surgery to give the principle variable for analysis. 
Grouping Data 
Because of the large variation in waiting times from several days through to a matter of 
several years it was important to decide on periods that were relevant to the study. Because 
the MOH requires patients to be treated within 6 months of having being given a 
commitment to treatment it was considered that periods should loosely be aligned to ESPI 5, 
although it must be noted this is not the same measure. The periods of waiting that were 
assigned to cases are indicated in Table 8. This table gives an indication of the spread of 
waiting times in the dataset (between 2004-2007). 
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Waiting Period Number of Cases 
Percentage of 
Cases 
Not Yet Processed 47 814 7.8 
0-90 days   314 987 51.5 
91-183 days 112 053 18.3 
184-275 days 55 072 9.0 
276-365 days 26 864 4.4 
366-548 days 26 774 4.4 
549-730 days 12 034 2.0 
731 days + 15 827 2.6 
Total   611 425 100.0 
Table 8: Waiting Periods between FSA and Surgery for All Cases 
Ages and ethnicity were also grouped to allow further statistical analysis of the dataset. Ages 
were grouped as follows: 
 0-14 years 
 15-24 years 
 25-44 years 
 45-64 years 
 65-74 years  
 75 years plus. 
Because the dataset specified 26 different ethnic group codes it was necessary to group 
these into categories. The four most common ethnic groups in New Zealand provide useful 
analysis in Chapter 7. Ethnicity was grouped as follows: 
 European descent 
 Maori descent 
 Pacific descent 
 Asian descent 
 Other, not specified. 
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Importing new variables 
Because the domicile code is present for each patient within the booking system in the 
dataset the domicile code was able to be linked to NZ Dep 2006 at census area unit level. 
The New Zealand deprivation scores for 2006 were created for all cases to get an indication 
of patients‟ socio-economic backgrounds. Unfortunately, NZ Dep 2006 does not account for 
longitudinal change but since the scores were taken during the middle of our study period 
they should give a reasonable indication of deprivation for each case. Deprivation scores 
were linked to all cases according to the patients‟ domicile code listing in the census area of 
residence. The New Zealand Urban Rural Classification was also attached to the NBRS 
(SPSS) file using the same methods. 
Defining District Health Boards in the NBRS 
In the booking system patients often travel for operations outside of their home DHB. For 
example patients travel from the West Coast DHB for joint replacement treatment at 
Christchurch Hospital because of a lack of services on the West Coast. Where patients are 
coded for operations that are performed by a public provider outside their DHB they are 
considered a patient of the other DHB. In this case the DHB where the patient resides 
transfers the funding to the outside DHB to perform the operation using a standard cost 
schedule (per operation). Between 2004 and 2007, 766 patients throughout the country 
travelled outside their DHB for treatment, this represents just over 1% of the 563 665 
patients treated within this period. There is a field which links the patients‟ domicile code or 
home location and links each of the 21 DHBs. By using this code the author has ensured 
that each patient record has been correctly coded according to their DHB of residence. 
5.4 Statistical Analysis 
5.4.1 NBRS Analysis 
Mean and Median waiting times per DHB 
In SPSS, the final NBRS data was split into 21 DHB files. Mean and median waiting times 
were measured for each DHB over the years 2004-2007 to understand the average length of 
wait between FSA and treatment. This would establish geographic and temporal differences 
between regions in the performance of individual DHBs in providing prompt elective surgery 
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treatments according to patients‟ DHB of residence. The mean of the four years 
encapsulated by the study period were calculated and results are shown by DHB. 
Patients Waiting More Than 6 months and 12 months for Treatment 
For each DHB the waiting time data was sorted according to three time periods; less than 6 
months, less than 12 months and patents waiting over 12 months for treatment. The number 
of patients in each group over the years 2004-2007 were calculated in each SPSS NBRS 
DHB file and then pasted into Microsoft Excel for analysis. Percentages were taken for each 
DHB each year over the period 2004-2007 according to the number of patients waiting more 
than 6 months and more than 12 months for treatment. The mean of both 6 and 12 month 
waits were calculated between the four year period of the study and results are shown by 
DHB. 
Australasian Comparison of Median Waiting Times 
Median waiting times for the four years 2004-2007, and four year averages were reproduced 
from the NBRS dataset and the 2009 AMA report on Public Hospitals. By combining the 
datasets comparisons are able to be made between New Zealand (DHBs) and Australia 
(states and territories). 
Australasian Comparison of Percentage of Patients Being Treated Within 90 Days 
The author took the Australian Commonwealth Government‟s recommended standard of 
patients to be treated within 90 days and applied it to the New Zealand NBRS Dataset. 
Instead of taking 6 or 12 months, the author worked out all patients that were processed 
within 90 days and those of treated persons who fell outside this threshold. Results for the 
four years 2004-2007, and four year averages were produced from the NBRS dataset and 
copied from the 2009 AMA report on Public Hospitals. By combining the datasets 
comparisons are able to be made between New Zealand (DHBs) and Australia (States and 
territories). 
Median Wait Times for New Zealand Broken Down by Surgical Specialty 
Examining wait times in New Zealand across our chosen ten surgical specialties meant 
breaking down the dataset another level. The author split the NBRS file according to the top 
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five specialties that are found within Table 6, these are general surgery, orthopaedic surgery, 
gynaecology, otorhinolaryngology (ENT) and ophthalmology. This has allowed regional 
differences to appear in the provision of these services between 2004 and 2007. 
5.4.2 Median Wait Times by Individual Determinants Using NBRS and Census Data 
In order to meet the second objective which is to analyse waiting times by individual 
determinants of access, median wait times were calculated by: 
 age groups 
 gender 
 ethnicity 
 deprivation. 
Each of the categories was separated as explained under the grouping variables heading 
above. For analysis purposes there were six age groups, and five ethnic groups, and 
deprivation which was reported by decile was also aggregated into quintiles for separate 
analysis. 
Analysis of the Total NBRS Dataset by Individual Patient Attributes 
Once the NBRS data file was complete within SPSS, analysis was run on waiting times 
using age, gender, ethnicity and deprivation variables to bring out variations in access 
determined by individual factors. 
Analysis of Individual Patient Attributes by DHB of Origin 
To understand whether individually determined inequalities in waiting time vary 
geographically, analysis was run on ethnicity and deprivation for each of the DHBs. Medians 
were calculated for each ethnic group, and for each quintile of deprivation in each of New 
Zealand‟s 21 DHBs. 
Analysis of Ethnic Differences When Other Individual Factors are Considered 
As ethnic inequality is reported throughout Chapter 3 and 4, especially in relation to Maori 
and Pacific Island Communities it was decided to split the NBRS data file between this 
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subgroup of New Zealand patients and Europeans waiting in the booking system. This 
allowed the consideration of age, gender, urban-rural influence and deprivation-related 
effects on the waiting times of these two defined subgroups of the population; Maori/Pacific 
ethnic groups compared with Europeans. The author calculated the DHBs with the five 
highest and three lowest population proportion of Maori/Pacific communities in relation to 
Europeans. Then the waiting times of each group were separated by gender by each DHB, 
the discussion is focuses on both ethnic and gender differences.  
Median wait time was also used to make comparisons between urban and rural 
classifications. However, these results were seen as evidence of an environmental factor 
and were therefore thought to be more applicable to meeting objective 3. 
5.4.3 NMDS Analysis 
The third objective aims to understand contextual factors for patients‟ access to elective 
surgery. A major factor in determining public hospitals throughput of operations and 
ultimately patient waiting time has to be the presence of the private hospital sector since a 
large percentage of medical specialists work in both sectors. The private sector is thought to 
have positive and negative impacts on the efficiency and throughput of public services as 
has been discussed throughout Chapters 2 to 5. Therefore, it is useful to consider admission 
rates in both the public and private sectors to establish if private hospitals are having an 
overall beneficial effect on public waiting lists. 
Two measures were incorporated in this analysis. Firstly, overall admission rates for each of 
DHB were produced for the public and private sectors in provision of elective surgery during 
2004-2007 using hospital admissions data from the NMDS Dataset. Admission rates were 
extracted from NMDS databases for the years 2004-2007 separately for the public and 
private sector. These were then broken down by DHB in order to be able to examine 
regional differences in the provision of each kind of treatment. Rates were calculated for all 
elective surgery admissions as narrowed down and discussed previously in Section 5.3.2 
above. For the second measure, all admissions of those patients who originated from a CAU 
with a NZ Dep2006 score of 8, 9 or 10 were separated from the NMDS datasets and 
admission rates were calculated for this subset of the population. This gave a means of 
comparison between the total population‟s use of public and private health systems versus 
patients that come from more deprived communities. This is important to consider as lower 
Chapter 5: Methodology 
115 
 
socio-economic groups traditionally suffer lower levels of access to private services in 
particular. Admissions data is shown in Appendix 3. 
To compare the incidence of hospital admissions between the public and private sectors, it is 
important to make sure the difference observed is not simply due to the age structures of the 
populations involved. The fact that health outcomes change as we age means that we 
should consider standardising for age so comparisons can be made in hospital admission 
rates between the public and private sector. To do this the standard population by DHB in 
each of the predefined age groups was required. These are shown in Table 32 which is also 
attached in Appendix 3 and taken from the 2006 Census (Statistics NZ, 2006). The analysis 
would also require the populations for NZ Dep 2006 deciles 8-10 within New Zealand‟s total 
population. These figures were produced by Statistics New Zealand in 2001 as a projection 
using population growth models. This data was not produced as part of the 2006 census 
(Statistics NZ, 2001a). 
Standardisation 
The characteristics and distribution of the population within the admissions dataset may 
influence results. Age-based differences can present themselves where conditions require 
elective surgery are more common amongst older groups than amongst their younger 
counterparts (Borman, 1995). For example, you would expect an area with a high proportion 
of retirees, like Waikanae, located just north of Wellington, to have a higher demand for 
elective treatments than Wellington CBD which tends have a high proportion of young 
working age people. Crude rates do not account for such differences. It was for this reason 
that the author choose to age-standardise using the „direct method‟ admission rates from the 
NMDS dataset. 
By using the „direct method‟ to standardise admissions data it is assumed that the 
distribution of the population in various age groups of the studied group(s) is the same as 
that in the standard population. Essentially it determines how many elective surgery hospital 
admissions would have occurred in the study group if it had the same age structure as the 
standard population. The age-standardised rate is calculated by summing the age specific 
rates for each age group, dividing by the New Zealand standard population then taking the 
result and multiplying it by a constant (in this case 1000). 
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Once rates were standardised for each DHB in the total NBRS dataset and the reduced 
dataset (NZ Dep 2006 quintiles 8, 9, and 10) for both private and public services the ratio of 
public admissions to private admissions in each DHB was able to be reported and 
comparisons were able to be made between that of the entire NBRS and the NZ Dep 2006 
quintiles 8, 9, and 10 ratios. With these rates, confidence intervals and public/private ratios 
the author produced Table 28  comparing public and private systems and differences in the 
demand of elective surgery between the entire New Zealand NMDS dataset and further 
deprived communities. 
Confidence Intervals 
To give an indication of uncertainty for the calculation of age standardised admission rates 
confidence intervals were calculated. Statistical uncertainties arise because rates are based 
on a random sample of limited sample size from a population of interest. Confidence 
intervals are then used to assess what would happen if the same study was repeated using 
different samples each time. However, in this research, the dataset is not based on a sample 
and is therefore not subject to sampling error. It is, however, vulnerable to variations in 
referral practice, changes in coding procedures and accuracy of reporting. Therefore, the 
confidence interval is a way of expressing the stability of the admission rates. The smaller 
the interval, the more stable the rate. More admissions lead to a smaller interval, so 
admission rates in DHBs of low populations will have quite high intervals and rates are likely 
to be unstable. 
5.4.4 Combined Analysis of NBRS, NMDS and Census Datasets 
Correlation and Regression 
The methods of correlation and regression explained below were done to compare the 
results generated from each dataset. In fulfilment of objective 2, contextual effects on the 
hospital sector are able to be measured by comparing the public and private admission rates 
to public waiting lists experienced within the NZBS. 
Correlation and regression analysis were used to test the relationship between admission 
rates and waiting times resulting from NMDS and NBRS analysis. In this thesis the P value 
and R2 value were be used to validate the relationship between: 
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 public admissions and median waiting time 
 private admissions and median waiting time 
 public private admissions ratio and median waiting time 
 crude rates of private hospital admissions and the median waiting time for Europeans 
versus Maori and pacific islanders 
 crude rates of private hospital admissions and the median waiting time between the 
top and bottom 50 percentile of NZ Dep 2006 scores. 
The P value assesses the likelihood of observing an association at least as large as the one 
seen in the analysis (Koepsell and Weiss, 2003). P values with a score of <0.05 were 
considered statistically significant. The R2 value is a dimensionless value that measures the 
strength of the linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. R2 
values range from 0 to 1 representing a perfect fit between the data and the line drawn 
through them, and 0 representing no statistical correlation between the data and the line (Le, 
1998).  
5.5 Geographical Information Systems and Spatial Information Applications 
Rather than relying on tables and graphs which do not give a very good geographical 
representation of national and international results the author has decided to include maps 
by way of Geographical Information System (GIS) tools to present major findings. 
Coordinate Systems, Projections and Layers 
For maps limited to New Zealand, the New Zealand Map Grid projection was used in parallel 
with a New Zealand DHB administrative boundary layer to present results by health service 
provider. Each map is captured in a data frame. 
When results were combined with Australia separate data frames were used for results. For 
New Zealand results the World Geodetic System (WGS) 1984 was used and projected in 
New Zealand Transverse Mercator presented with a New Zealand DHB administrative 
boundary layer. In the Australian data frame the WGS 1984 coordinate system was used in 
combination with a layer containing the administrative boundaries for each State and 
Territory of Australia. 
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Process of Data Coding 
Results that were suitable for presentation using Arc GIS were copied into a Microsoft Excel 
sheet with according to which DHB, Australian State or Territory the result came from. In Arc 
GIS the data frame containing the appropriate coordinate system, projection and layers were 
then joined to the Excel spread sheet.  
Presenting Results 
In order to present results clearly the symbols were changed on each map to quantitiles 
(graduate colours) and the classification was changed to quintiles. The results were 
displayed in five equally distributed groups to avoid distortions. A colour ramp was 
developed and imported to Arc GIS from www.colorbrewer2.org which is a website that gives 
free colour advice for cartography. Maps were then labelled according to data frame and a 
legend, scale, title and north point were also added and exported to 300DPI JPEG files for 
final presentation in Microsoft Word. 
5.6 Interviews 
Interviews were conducted during a trip to Wellington over the period 1st to 9th of February, 
2010 with the intention of validating results and discussing various topics that have an effect 
on the delivery of elective surgery in New Zealand. Interviewees were a mix of medical 
specialists and hospital and management staff. They included: 
 Specialist A is a urologist who works exclusively in the private sector from his 
consulting rooms, operates out of Southern Cross Hospital and fulfils a senior 
appointment at the Wellington School of Medicine. Specialist A divides his time 
equally between the private sector and his university role. 
 Specialist B is an orthopaedic surgeon who divides his time between public and 
private practice based in Wellington. Specialising in lower arm Associate Specialist B 
also holds a senior academic appointment in the School of Surgery and Anaesthesia 
at the Wellington School of Medicine. He works four half days for the Capital and 
Coast DHB, five half days for the university and the other half day works in private 
practice based at Wakefield Hospital. 
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 Specialist C is an ophthalmologist who works a mixture of public and private practice 
and is based in Wellington. Specialist C operates at Wellington Regional Hospital 
one day a week and spends the remainder of his time working out of his private 
practice in the Wellington CBD. 
 Administrator A is a health administrator and the Chief Executive of the New Zealand 
Orthopaedic Association. The New Zealand Orthopaedic Association represents all 
orthopaedic surgeons as subscription paying members and their function is not only 
to provide training for surgeons coming through but to run advocacy work for 
orthopaedics. 
 Administrator B is a general physician who works exclusively in the public sector. He 
was also a board member for the Capital and Coast DHB and remains a senior 
lecturer at The Wellington School of Medicine. 
 Administrator C is the nurse manager of the waiting list for publicly funded 
orthopaedic surgery at Wellington Regional Hospital. 
The interviews have been transcribed and will be used in Chapter 9 when discussing the 
results and drawing conclusions about the research that has been carried out for this 
thesis. When referring to the interviewees in Chapter 9 names will not be provided, the 
author will simply name the source as a hospital administrator or a specialist. 
5.7 Limitations in Data Collection and Analysis 
Residual Waiting List 
The problem with the way the booking system has been set up means that patients that are 
on the „residual waiting list‟ are not reported. Instead patients that fail to meet the DHBs‟ 
financial threshold at FSA are referred back to their GPs for on-going management without 
being reported to the NBRS Database. Therefore, we are not able to get an indication of the 
size or makeup of this group. The residual waiting list as described in Chapter 4 contains a 
hidden group of patients and is an important aspect of this thesis that could not be 
examined. 
CPAC Scores 
CPAC scores are reported on the NBRS Database for the years 2004 to 2007 but could not 
be included in analysis for this thesis. It is evident that although CPAC scores were designed 
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to be consistent across the country, the Ministry of Health places little restrictions on the 
DHBs‟ implementation of CPAC scoring. Although some operations have a consistently used 
CPAC score many procedures are not consistent amongst all 21 of New Zealand‟s DHBs. 
This thesis aggregates up by specialty but for a number of specialties CPAC scores could 
not be relied on to provide an accurate measure of clinical need for each DHB. Because 
CPAC scores are not consistently generated using national prioritisation tools they were not 
included in the analysis of this thesis.  
Alignment with MoH Reporting Systems 
The MoH uses ESPIs to determine DHB performance in meeting timeframes for patients 
treatment. ESPI 5 indicates the number of patients who wait more than 180 days between 
their commitment to treatment and their date of surgery. Because DHBs have the ability to 
decide which patients get a commitment to treatment, DHBs only commit to the number of 
patients that they can conceivably treat within 180 days. For this reason, all the DHBs are 
meeting their targets as shown in Figure 12 and discussed throughout Chapter 4. Because, 
DHBs have the ability to alter the commitment to treatment the ESPI measure is not giving a 
true indication of need. In order to get a true indication of waiting time and a better indication 
of service delivery within each DHB the commitment to treatment was replaced with FSA. 
Problems with the NMDS Database 
After initial viewing of the NMDS database it was realised that something was not right with 
the private admissions data. After consulting the MoH the discovery was made that 
Canterbury DHB was the only DHB to report private surgical interventions by specialty. All 
other DHBs had reported private hospital admissions under general surgery. Originally, it 
was planned to work out the public and private specialty specific admission rates and relate 
these back to waiting times in the relevant specialty for the public sector. Derrett et al (2009) 
were able to successfully undertake similar analysis as they used individual procedure codes 
which the private hospital sector does report to the DHB and is found in the NMDS dataset. 
But, because the specialty codes are not reported, private admission rates could not be 
broken down to this level. 
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The Use of Means for Measuring Average Waiting Time 
It must be noted that the results shown in Table 9 consist of „means‟. When means are used 
as an average scores it can leave the results vulnerable to being skewed by numbers that 
are outside the normal range of the dataset. The NBRS data can be affected in this way 
particularly when patients are lost in the system for a number of years before their operation 
exaggerates waiting times in some DHBs. Table 8 on page 110 shows the distribution of 
patients that have waited certain lengths of time for surgery. Patients in the highest group of 
two years or more, contains some patients that have waited up to a maximum of 5356 days. 
2.6% of patients waited over 731 days for treatment and such patients may skew results for 
certain DHBs. For this reason the author shifted analysis to focus on median waiting times to 
eliminate such bias.  
Admission Rates 
When admission rates were standardised for age, populations for specific age groups 
throughout New Zealand were based on the population at the time of the 2006 census. Age 
group populations for NZ Dep 2006 and by ethnicity admission rates were based on 
population forecasts from the 2001 Census for the year 2006. Also, when the crude 
admission rates were calculated between Europeans and Maori and Pacific Islander at the 
end of Chapter 8 the European population includes all other minorities other than Maori and 
Pacific Island populations. This should not make much of a difference though because 
Europeans make up the majority of this group. 
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Figure 19: Aggregation of Mesh Block to Census Area Unit for NZ Dep96 (Lauer, 1999) 
There were also some surprising results that came out with high numbers of private patients, 
particularly those residing in highly deprived neighbourhoods. Firstly, this suggested that this 
could be due to outsourcing of surgery to the private sector but after consulting the MoH they 
told us that public hospital admissions that fall in the NMDS database are coded in such a 
way that they capture the small percentage of cases that are outsourced by way of contract 
to the private sector. The MoH suggested either they had either been coded incorrectly or 
problems had been created when NZ Dep 2006 meshblocks were aggregated up to CAU. 
This is caused when a CAU is used to represent a number of meshblocks in an area. Some 
CAUs represent ten or more meshblocks in some regions, especially urban areas of high 
density. Figure 19 shows this occurring in Christchurch City, area A represents CAUs and 
area B shows one CAU made up of many meshblocks. In this case the meshblocks vary 
between three and eight but because the analysis is aggregated up to CAU level the NZ Dep 
(1996) score is four. Therefore, problems can occur when CAU NZ Dep scores misrepresent 
the underlying meshblocks. 
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5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has summarised methods that have been used in analysis for the remaining 
chapters of this thesis. The chapter firstly outlined the structure of the results, discussion and 
concluding sections of this thesis. The scale of research and source of data have also been 
mentioned along with a detailed description of the information, particularly of that held within 
the NMDS and NBRS datasets. Then an outline was provided of on the organisation of the 
data and the process that was involved in analysis to deliver the results that are seen in the 
following chapters. Interviews were provided to aid the discussion and strengthen the validity 
of the research findings. The content and the process involved in arranging these interviews 
was then discussed before outlining the limitations that were found throughout the analysis. 
From here the thesis moves onto the three results chapters, the first discussing geographical 
differences in waiting times. 
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6 Geographical Performance of the New Zealand Booking System 
(NZBS) 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to satisfy objective 1. That is to display results which show 
how elective surgical waiting times vary geographically between DHBs between 2004 and 
2007. There are three specific aims that this chapter sets out to achieve. The first is to find 
out whether or not public waiting times vary by DHB. Secondly, to carry out Australian and 
New Zealand comparisons with results published by the AMA Public Hospital Report Card. 
The third aim is to identify inter-specialty variations to see if differences in public waiting 
times are inflated compared to that of the entire booking system. 
The chapter begins by displaying national results taken from each of the 21 DHBs that 
administer the NZBS. Significant national trends were generated from NBRS data during the 
study period and will be discussed. Australian waiting times were taken from the AMA Public 
Hospital Report Card and compared with NBRS waiting times over the same period. A 
significant gap between New Zealand and Australian performance in waiting times for 
publicly funded elective hospital procedures are observed and discussed. Median waiting 
times are finally broken down by specialty in the top five most common surgical specialties in 
the private sector. Results show a variety of regional differences from specialty to specialty 
but all show variance between peoples‟ access to elective surgery depending on where in 
the country they reside.  
6.2 Elective Surgery Waiting Times 
6.2.1 Mean Waiting times by DHB 
Mean waiting times are shown in Table 9 which illustrates the large variability of waiting 
times by DHB over the four year study period. Although waiting times trend downwards over 
the study period, for the country as a whole there is little continuity between individual DHBs. 
Some tend to be on the increase (e.g. Capital and Coast), others have decreased (e.g. 
South Canterbury) but many show yearly fluctuations with no apparent trend. 
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DHB 2004 2005 2006 2007 (04-07) 
Northland 166 189 171 151 169 
Waitemata 140 122 129 92 121 
Auckland 130 149 135 117 133 
Counties Manukau 141 177 104 84 127 
Waikato 168 115 134 151 142 
Lakes 145 139 159 144 147 
Bay of Plenty 130 155 136 127 137 
Tairawhiti 183 138 172 130 156 
Taranaki 91 123 124 115 113 
Hawke's Bay 169 154 171 161 164 
Whanganui 99 107 122 109 109 
Mid Central 151 147 166 122 147 
Hutt Valley 144 165 186 153 162 
Capital and Coast 141 152 193 193 170 
Wairarapa 111 128 131 121 123 
Nelson Marlborough 187 191 168 137 171 
West Coast 170 179 179 154 171 
Canterbury 248 236 209 102 199 
South Canterbury 198 192 133 101 156 
Otago 156 163 149 110 145 
Southland 196 201 186 141 181 
New Zealand 158 164 154 125 149 
Table 9: Mean Wait Time Between FSA and Surgery Date by DHB 
Figure 20 illustrates the yearly results over the study period for each DHB. It must be noted 
that maps showing temporal change throughout Chapter 6 are displayed independent of 
each other in quintiles so that the best and worst performing DHBs of each year are clearly 
illustrated. It is evident that in the first two years that North Island DHBs performed far better 
than their South Island counterparts. A shift occurs in 2006 and 2007 when South Island 
DHBs (with the exception of the West Coast) begin to outperform some of the North Island 
DHBs, particularly Capital and Coast, Hutt Valley and Hawkes Bay. The reader will also 
notice that for the most part Waitemata, Taranaki, Whanganui and Wairarapa DHBs seem to 
consistently perform well. DHBs that consistently struggle containing waiting times include 
Northland, Lakes, Hawkes Bay, Hutt Valley, Capital and Coast, and all of the South Island 
DHBs. 
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Figure 21 displays the mean waiting time for each DHB for the entire four year study period. 
This map clearly illustrates some disparity between the North and South Islands. As one 
would expect similar trends come through for better performing DHBs against those with 
higher waiting times. It shows a large range between Whanganui as the best performer with 
a mean waiting time of 109 days to Canterbury which has a mean waiting time of 197 days. 
 
Figure 20: Mean Waiting Times in 2004, 2005,2006 and 2007 by DHB 
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Figure 21: Mean Waiting Times over Period 2004-2007 by DHB 
Chapter 6: Geographical Performance of the New Zealand Booking System 
128 
 
6.2.2 Median Waiting Times by DHB 
Table 10 shows the median waiting times by DHB over the four year study period. As the 
reader will notice, figures are lower than mean scores which were created for the results 
depicted in Section 6.2.1. The median being the middle number within the sample avoids the 
exaggeration effect that is realised when using mean score as an average. For the 
remainder of the results sections of Chapters 6 and 7 medians will be used to calculate the 
average waiting time. 
DHB 2004 2005 2006 2007 (04-07) 
Northland 67 82 101 97 87 
Waitemata 72 58 65 49 61 
Auckland 69 77 79 62 72 
Counties Manukau 69 80 63 55 67 
Waikato 77 50 84 64 69 
Lakes 64 67 79 63 68 
Bay of Plenty 59 67 66 60 63 
Tairawhiti 51 47 77 70 61 
Taranaki 56 78 77 69 70 
Hawke's Bay 71 67 91 78 77 
Whanganui 55 55 62 54 57 
Mid Central 72 75 100 67 79 
Hutt Valley 96 119 119 86 105 
Capital and Coast 89 94 123 95 100 
Wairarapa 58 70 65 71 66 
Nelson Marlborough 85 90 80 72 82 
West Coast 68 64 94 92 80 
Canterbury 108 99 98 61 92 
South Canterbury 86 85 75 61 77 
Otago 94 78 90 71 83 
Southland 90 83 86 74 83 
New Zealand 75 76 82 65 74 
Table 10: Median Wait Time Between FSA and Surgery Date by DHB 
As well as lower averages produced using the median rather than the mean scores the 
reader will notice different variations in waiting times between DHBs. Most DHBs show year 
to year fluctuation but few DHBs show clear up or downward trends. This is mirrored in the 
overall New Zealand medians for each year within the study period. 
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Figure 23 still shows some evidence of a north-south gradient especially in 2004 and 2005 
but this trend disappears in 2006 and 2007. Figure 22 shows each DHBs median waiting 
time in a bar graph with a trend line confirming the north to south gradient. The reader will 
also notice similar trends apply from what was seen in the mean results, that is for the most 
part Waitemata, Bay of Plenty, Tairawhiti, Whanganui and Wairarapa DHBs seem to 
consistently perform well. However, when considering median scores Northland, Capital and 
Coast, Hutt Valley and Canterbury stand out as by far the worst performers all averaging 
above twenty days more than the national average waiting time. 
 
Figure 22: Median Wait Times per DHB 2004-2007 
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Figure 23: Median Waiting Times in 2004, 2005,2006 and 2007 by DHB 
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The underperforming DHBs are clearly illustrated (darker shading) in Figure 24 which 
displays the median waiting time for each DHB over the entire study period. 
 
Figure 24: Median Waiting Times over Period 2004-2007 by DHB 
6.2.3 Patients Waiting Over 6 Months for Treatment 
For the next two sets of results instead of using averages the author has calculated the 
number of patients who do not receive treatment within a given period, and then converted 
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this into a percentage per DHB. Table 11 displays the percentage of patients that were not 
treated within six months of their FSA. This is useful as it recognises the individual DHB 
performance against Ministry of Health targets, specifically ESPI 5. ESPI 5 states that 
patients who are given a commitment to treatment must be treated within 180 days. 
Although, by replacing commitment to treatment with FSA we are gaining a far more 
legitimate estimate of waiting time as we have discussed in previous chapters of this thesis. 
DHB (%)            Year 2004 2005 2006 2007  (04-07) 
Northland 27 29 31 29 29 
Waitemata 23 19 21 14 19 
Auckland 20 24 24 20 22 
Counties Manukau 24 28 16 9 19 
Waikato 29 15 25 25 23 
Lakes 21 20 24 20 21 
Bay of Plenty 21 26 22 19 22 
Tairawhiti 25 20 28 23 24 
Taranaki 11 24 24 17 19 
Hawke's Bay 27 24 29 26 27 
Whanganui 16 16 20 19 18 
Mid Central 24 25 30 20 25 
Hutt Valley 29 36 37 25 32 
Capital and Coast 26 29 36 29 30 
Wairarapa 20 24 26 20 22 
Nelson Marlborough 31 31 26 19 27 
West Coast 25 26 30 21 25 
Canterbury 39 36 33 12 30 
South Canterbury 34 31 21 17 26 
Otago 29 27 25 16 24 
Southland 32 31 26 23 28 
New Zealand 26 27 26 19 24 
Table 11: Percentage of Patients Waiting Over 6 Months For Treatment (%) by DHB  
Table 11 and Figure 25 show similar north-south variations in the years 2005 and 2006 then 
during 2006 and 2007 the trend seems to reverse, seeing fewer people treated within 180 
days in the North Island. However, the four DHBs that seem to be consistently bad 
performers are Northland, Hutt Valley, Capital and Coast and Canterbury. 
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Figure 25: Patients Waiting over 6 Months for Treatment (2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007) by DHB 
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Figure 26: Average of Patients Waiting Over 6 Months for Treatment (2004-2007) by DHB 
Figure 26 shows the percentage of patients that are not treated within 180 days in each DHB 
over the entire four year study period. This gives an accurate summary of performance 
showing the overall north south differences that we saw above in the waiting time averages. 
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6.2.4 Patients Waiting Over 12 Months for Treatment 
To take this analysis a step further, the same methods were used to calculate the 
percentage of patients that are left untreated 12 months after FSA. This was done to see if a 
different picture would appear. Table 12 shows the percentage of patients waiting over 12 
months for treatment in each DHB each year of the study and for the total period.  
DHB (%)            Year 2004 2005 2006 2007  (04-07) 
Northland 14 14 12 9 12 
Waitemata 10 7 8 4 7 
Auckland 8 10 8 7 8 
Counties Manukau 11 14 3 2 8 
Waikato 14 7 6 11 10 
Lakes 9 8 9 8 9 
Bay of Plenty 9 12 8 7 9 
Tairawhiti 14 9 14 7 11 
Taranaki 3 5 5 5 5 
Hawke's Bay 13 11 12 10 11 
Whanganui 4 6 7 5 5 
Mid Central 10 10 11 6 9 
Hutt Valley 7 9 14 9 10 
Capital and Coast 7 10 15 13 11 
Wairarapa 5 7 8 5 6 
Nelson Marlborough 15 16 12 7 12 
West Coast 13 14 11 7 11 
Canterbury 23 21 16 4 16 
South Canterbury 17 15 6 3 10 
Otago 10 11 9 4 9 
Southland 15 15 12 7 12 
New Zealand 11 12 10 6 10 
Table 12: Percentage of Patients Waiting Over 12 Months For Treatment (%) by DHB 
As can be seen in Figure 27 and Figure 28, the results are proportionately very similar and 
show the same trends as the analysis done for the 180 days. 
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Figure 27: Patients Waiting over 12 Months for Treatment (2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007) by DHB 
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Figure 28: Average of Patients Waiting Over 12 Months for Treatment (2004-2007) by DHB 
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6.2.5 Australasian Median Waiting Times 
The waiting times experienced by New Zealanders (listed in Table 10) were compared with 
Australian medians over the same period. These results produced by the AMA (2009) are 
displayed in Table 13. The mean of the study years was taken and compared with New 
Zealand results to create  
Australia (State/Territories) 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average (04-07) 
New South Wales 34 36 35 39 36 
Victoria 28 31 30 33 31 
Queensland 22 25 25 27 25 
Western Australia 27 28 29 30 29 
South Australia 35 38 40 42 39 
Tasmania 34 34 38 36 36 
Australian Capital Territory 45 61 63 72 60 
Northern Territory 28 30 35 43 34 
Australian Average 32 35 37 40 36 
Table 13: Australian Median Waiting Times by State/Territory During Years of Study 
Figure 29 depict large differences between waiting times experienced in New Zealand 
compared to those in Australia between 2004 and 2007. With the exception of ACT, New 
Zealanders waited on average about double the time for elective surgery than the Australian 
public during these years. 
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Figure 29: Australian and New Zealand Median Waiting Times by State, Territory and DHB (2004-2007) 
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6.2.6 Australasian Patients Waiting More Than 90 Days for Treatment 
Table 14 displays published results from the Australian Public Hospital Report Card (AMA, 
2009). These results show the percentage of patients in each state or territory that are 
treated within 90 days. For Table 15 the author has replicated the results for New Zealand 
so as to compare the New Zealand experience using the Australian Federal Government 
guidelines for recommended maximum wait time. 
Australia (State/Territories) 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average (04-07) 
New South Wales 71 70 74 75 73 
Victoria 76 72 75 70 73 
Queensland 91 84 82 83 85 
Western Australia 68 68 67 70 68 
South Australia 75 77 78 73 76 
Tasmania 53 57 53 48 53 
Australian Capital Territory 43 52 51 47 48 
Northern Territory 68 61 57 58 61 
Australian Average 68 68 67 66 67 
Table 14: Australia: Percentage of Patients Receiving Treatment Within 90 Days (%) by State/Territory 
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New Zealand (DHBs) 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average (04-07) 
Northland 57 53 47 48 51 
Waitemata 57 62 59 69 62 
Auckland 60 55 54 62 58 
Counties Manukau 58 54 61 68 60 
Waikato 54 69 52 59 59 
Lakes 60 60 54 62 59 
Bay of Plenty 61 58 59 62 60 
Tairawhiti 61 65 54 57 59 
Taranaki 68 54 55 60 59 
Hawke's Bay 57 59 50 54 55 
Whanganui 64 67 59 64 63 
Mid Central 56 56 47 60 55 
Hutt Valley 48 43 42 52 46 
Capital and Coast 51 49 41 49 47 
Wairarapa 62 57 57 56 58 
Nelson Marlborough 51 50 54 58 53 
West Coast 58 60 48 49 54 
Canterbury 46 48 48 65 52 
South Canterbury 51 51 56 61 55 
Otago 50 52 51 58 53 
Southland 49 53 57 57 54 
New Zealand 55 55 53 60 56 
Table 15: New Zealand: Percentage of Patients Receiving Treatment Within 90 Days (%) by DHB 
Figure 30 uses the average percentage from the four years, 2004 to 2007 in each country to 
compare the performance of each state, territory and DHB. As the reader will notice the 
results remain similar to Figure 29 in that Australia has a far faster turnaround for patients 
with a larger percentage of patients treated within 90 days. 
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Figure 30: Australia and New Zealand Comparison of Amount of Patients that were Processed and Treated Within 90 Days (2004-2007)  
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6.2.7 New Zealand Waiting Times Broken Down By Specialty 
For Table 16 the author broke down median waiting times for the 2004-2007 study period by 
the five most common privately funded surgical specialties (for elective treatments). In the 
right hand column is the median waiting time for each DHB for all elective procedures. As 
can be seen the median results for each of the DHBs vary considerably by specialty and 
some specialties perform better than others against the total elective median waiting time. 
General surgery had consistently lower waiting times than the other four specialties 
examined during 2004 and 2007. For each specialty a map was produced to show the 
geographical variation between DHBs. 
DHB General Surgery Orthopaedics ENT Ophthalmology Gynaecology Total 
Elective 
Northland 51 86 132 138 53 87 
Waitemata 42 60 63 79 72 61 
Auckland 63 71 63 78 62 72 
Counties Manukau 60 65 64 79 58 67 
Waikato 56 69 64 85 69 69 
Lakes 57 68 67 70 68 68 
Bay of Plenty 40 63 76 52 49 63 
Tairawhiti 53 63 49 145 56 61 
Taranaki 67 76 68 84 78 70 
Hawke's Bay 48 70 66 112 56 77 
Whanganui 43 77 83 102 102 57 
Mid Central 36 56 104 35 61 79 
Hutt Valley 71 99 85 165 90 105 
Capital and Coast 91 103 127 177 78 100 
Wairarapa 29 66 105 170 42 66 
Nelson 
Marlborough 
51 82 108 77 78 82 
West Coast 65 80 131 97 55 80 
Canterbury 46 85 104 105 63 92 
South Canterbury 41 74 99 61 60 77 
Otago 56 83 109 90 75 83 
Southland 49 77 88 105 69 83 
New Zealand 50 74 89 82 66 74 
Table 16: Median Waiting Times of Top 5 Most Common Privately Funded Specialties 2004-2007 
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General Surgery 
Figure 31 shows the median wait time specifically for general surgery procedures such as 
hernia repair, appendectomy, gallbladder removal, hysterectomy and so on. As can be seen 
in Figure 31 Taranaki, Capital and Coast, Hutt Valley and West Coast suffered some of the 
highest waiting times in New Zealand while Wairarapa DHB had a median wait time of less 
than half of these. This result shows huge variation in the waits experienced by patients but 
few regional trends. 
  
Figure 31: Median Waiting Time for General Surgery 
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Orthopaedic Surgery 
Figure 32 shows the median wait time specifically for orthpaedic surgery procedures such as 
joint replacement, repair of bone fractures, tendon or ligament reconstruction and so on. As 
can be seen in Figure 32 Northland, Capital and Coast, Hutt Valley and Canterbury suffer 
the highest median waiting time while Mid Central, Auckland, Counties Manukau, Bay of 
Plenty, and Tairawhiti DHBs show median wait times at least three weeks less. This is not 
quite as extreme as in general surgery but still presents a significant difference in patient 
access to care depending on where they live.  
 
Figure 32: Median Waiting Time for Orthopaedic Surgery 
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Gynaecology 
Figure 33 shows the median wait time for gynaecology during 2004 to 2007 for operations 
such as hysterectomy, laparoscopy and so on. As can be seen in Figure 33 Whanganui and 
Capital and Coast have by far the highest wait times whereas patients from Wairarapa and 
several others wait about half as long for treatment. Interestingly Whanganui which performs 
very well in the rest of the specialties has problems in the area of gynaecology. The 
difference between Whanganui and Wairarapa at the two extremes of waiting time is 60 
days. This represents large differences in patients ability to access care depending on where 
they live. 
 
Figure 33: Median Waiting Time for Gynaecology Procedures 
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Ear, Nose and Throat 
Figure 34 shows the median wait time for ear, nose and throat (ENT) surgery for operations 
such as tonsillectomy, sinus surgery, myringotomy and so on. As can be seen in Figure 34 
Northland, Capital and Coast and West Coast DHBs all have extremely high waiting times 
for ENT procedures and the remainder all show extremely high geographic variation. North 
of Auckland the difference is most pronounced where patients living in Waitemata DHB are 
accessing care on average in 63 days while those in Northland DHB are on average only 
accessing treatment within 132 days, a differential of 69 days. 
 
Figure 34: Median Waiting Time for Ear, Nose and Throat Procedures 
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Ophthalmology 
Figure 35 shows the median waiting time for ophthalmology treatments such as cataract 
removal, laser eye surgery, and corneal surgery and so on over the period 2004 to 2007. As 
can be seen in Figure 35 Northland, Tairawhiti, Capital and Coast, Hutt Valley and 
Wairarapa DHBs have the largest wait times in New Zealand. Large differences present 
themselves around the central North Island where Mid Central boasts a median wait time of 
only 35 days while neighbouring DHBs: Whanganui, Hawkes Bay, Wairarapa, Hutt Valley 
and Capital and Coast all have wait times over 100 days, Capital and Coast the highest with 
177 days over four times as long. This represents a major geographic inequity for patients‟ 
access to these services. 
 
Figure 35: Median Waiting Time for Ophthalmology 
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6.3 Conclusion 
In summary, results have shown major geographic and temporal variations by DHB over the 
study period. New Zealand results showed major differences in the length of time patients 
had to wait for treatment depending on where they live. A north-south gradient was observed 
in which patients were seen to wait longer the further south they resided. However, results 
showed that particular DHBs were performing particularly badly compared to the national 
average (Northland, Hutt Valley, Capital and Coast, and Canterbury), while others appear to 
be performing relatively well (Waitemata, Bay of Plenty, Tairawhiti, Whanganui and 
Wairarapa). It has been interesting to note that rural DHBs tend to be outperforming the 
urbanised DHBs which contain a large percentage of national hospital resources. The author 
has also compared the time patients have waited for surgery between 2004 and 2007 using 
equivalent results taken from Australia, and New Zealand patients were seen to be waiting 
longer for treatment than their Australian counterparts for similar types of surgery. 
Differences in waiting times were then depicted by specialty which inflated the geographic 
inequality between DHBs with regard to patients‟ access to timely elective treatments. Also, 
some specialties performed vastly better than others at providing efficient turnaround in 
waiting times. Overall this chapter has shown that major inequalities exist geographically for 
access to timely surgical intervention and that the speed of referral and treatment for publicly 
funded elective surgery certainly depends on the DHB in which you reside. The next chapter 
will investigate whether inequalities are apparent in waiting times for certain subsets of New 
Zealand‟s population particularly for lower socio-economic and ethnic minorities.  
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7 Socio-Demographic Variations in Public Waiting Times 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined geographical trends in access to elective surgery in the 
public sector between 2004 and 2007. The next two chapters will offer further explanation for 
the differences in waiting times seen throughout Chapter 6. This chapter will examine 
whether different subsets of New Zealand‟s population suffer poor access to elective surgery 
relative to the remainder of the population. By looking at individual determinants of access 
such as age, gender, ethnicity, and socio-economic status the focus shifts from objective 
one to objective two. This represents a shift in focus away from the geographic analysis of 
each DHB as a whole to concentrate on issues of equality for individuals depending on their 
socio-demographic makeup and environment. These groups are being examined because it 
is understood that geographic variations in waiting times are influenced by the population 
characteristics contained within each DHB. Population characteristics are important as noted 
in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 as certain groups suffer higher morbidity than others, particularly the 
elderly, lower socio-economic groups, as well as Maori and Pacific Island communities. This 
may place extra burden on the hospital resources of these DHBs and thus patients may 
suffer extra-long waiting times, predominantly these high risk patients. 
Initially the author will consider waiting times across the whole country broken down 
individual determinants such as age, sex, gender, ethnicity and deprivation to see whether 
differences in access are consistent across the entire booking system. Then analysis of 
ethnicity and deprivation will be further broken down by DHB to test whether there is 
contrasting access spatially across regions of New Zealand. The next section narrows the 
analysis to concentrate on waiting times by ethnicity, specifically differences between 
European and Maori/Pacific Island patients. Ethnic groups were aggregated to investigate 
whether Maori/ Pacific Island waiting times are better in DHBs where they comprise a larger 
proportion of the population or in those DHBs which have small ethnic communities. 
7.2 Analysis of the Whole Dataset 
Analysis will begin by re-examining the waiting times for New Zealand and the number of 
cases relevant in the NBRS dataset during 2004-2007. In Chapter 6 the author found that 
within the booking system there were 563 611 completed cases at a national median of 74 
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days waiting time from FSA to surgery date. Individual determinants of patient access will be 
investigated while concentrating on trends in New Zealand as a whole. The analysis will then 
differentiate waiting times by age, gender, ethnicity and deprivation before providing a further 
breakdown of group differences in waiting times by DHB. 
Age 
Figure 36 was created using results from Table 34 in Appendix 4. Figure 36 shows the 
relationship between age and average waiting times of patients by age group for all patients 
who entered and exited the booking system during 2004 to 2007 (see Table 34 in Appendix 
4) The results depict low waiting times for patients between aged 0-14 followed by a sharp 
rise of an average of 12 days for the age group 15-24, steadily decreasing waiting times for 
those aged 15-45 years and consistent waiting times for patients over 45 years of age. This 
graph indicates that those most vulnerable patients who are at the beginning or end of their 
life span tend to get faster access to elective surgery. 
 
Figure 36: Median Waiting Time by Age Group 2004-2007 
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gender as male patients have a higher mean by 3 days and women have a higher median by 
1 day. 
Gender Mean N Std. Deviation Median 
F 148 312 046 219 74 
M 151 251 552 224 73 
Total (Excludes U’s) 149 563 611 222 74 
Table 17: Waiting Times by Gender 2004-2007 
Ethnicity 
Table 18 shows the median waiting time experienced by patients from five ethnic groups for 
the study period. These included European, Maori, Pacific Island, Asian and „other‟ 
(representing all other ethnic groups reported in the booking system). There are differences 
in waiting time depending on ethnicity. Europeans have the lowest median waiting time of 72 
days, five days less than the Maori equivalent, six days less than Pacific peoples and seven 
days less than of that for people of Asian descent. This is an interesting finding which will 
leads us to consider whether differences are more evident at the DHB administrative level.  
Ethnicity Cases Mean Std. Deviation Median 
European 423 924 149 224 72 
Maori 69 815 153 221 77 
Pacific Island 27 382 145 198 78 
Asian 20 960 143 191 79 
Other 21 530 156 226 77 
Total 563 611 149 222 74 
Table 18: Waiting Times by Ethnicity 2004-2007 (Days) 
 
Deprivation 
Table 19 and Table 20 break waiting times into measures of deprivation using the New 
Zealand Deprivation Index 2006. The results are displayed in deciles and quintiles 
respectively in each of the tables. 
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NZ Dep2006 (deciles) Cases Mean Std. Deviation Median 
1 Very Low 31 939 149 226 74 
2 39 505 144 219 69 
3 Low 43 070 147 219 72 
4 45 471 154 231 74 
5 Medium 55 440 151 224 75 
6 58 482 147 215 73 
High 67 836 149 216 75 
8 80 301 152 224 75 
9 Very High 75 372 153 229 76 
10 65 302 146 212 73 
Total 563 611 149 222 74 
Table 19: Waiting Times by Deprivation in Deciles 2004-2007 (Days) 
NZ Dep 2006 
(quintiles) 
Cases Mean Std. Deviation Median 
1 Very Low 71 444 146 222 71 
2 Low 88 541 150 225 73 
3 Medium 113 922 149 220 74 
4 High 148 137 150 221 75 
5 Very High 140 674 150 221 74 
Total 563 611 149 222 74 
Table 20: Waiting Times by Deprivation in Quintiles 2004-2007 (Days) 
Figure 37 illustrates the median waiting times depicted in Table 20. The range between least 
and most deprived when looking at waiting times is only 4 days which is not significant. 
However, higher socio-economic groups seem to have better access to care than those 
more deprived communities and differences become more substantial when waiting times 
are broken down by DHB. 
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Figure 37: Median Waiting Time by Dep2006 in Quintiles (2004-2007) 
7.3 Analysis by DHB 
Before proceeding further it is important to take a brief look back at the results from Chapter 
6 to see how average waiting times vary between DHBs. As can be observed in Table 21 
medians in particular range between 60 and 103 days, a difference of 43 days. It will be 
interesting to note whether geographical difference is larger or smaller than individual 
determinants within each DHB. On that note, significant findings for each DHB have been 
demonstrated by breaking down waiting times by deprivation and ethnicity. 
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DHB Cases Mean Std. Deviation Median 
Northland 29 027 169 236 86 
Waitemata 52 838 120 171 60 
Auckland 37 052 132 177 71 
Counties Manukau 53 441 126 173 65 
Waikato 31 667 142 209 69 
Lakes 17 654 147 241 68 
Bay of Plenty 40 432 137 211 63 
Tairawhiti 9 153 156 271 63 
Taranaki 30 301 164 241 76 
Hawke's Bay 18 954 114 149 70 
Whanganui 23 985 147 207 77 
Mid Central 14 290 109 149 56 
Hutt Valley 27 973 169 223 99 
Capital and Coast 19 464 162 193 103 
Wairarapa 7 793 123 162 66 
Nelson Marlborough 28 403 170 250 82 
West Coast 8 498 171 262 80 
Canterbury 57 352 197 307 85 
South Canterbury 11 641 152 235 74 
Otago 27 702 145 190 83 
Southland 15 187 180 286 77 
New Zealand 563 611 149 222 74 
Table 21: Average Waiting Times by DHB 2004-2007 
Figure 38 depicts median waiting by NZ Dep 2006 for quintile groups one and five broken 
down by DHB (For further detail see Appendix 5, Table 35.). The median waiting times for 
those in the most highly deprived areas and the least deprived areas were used to create a 
bar graph which shows quite clearly that, with the exception of the Bay of Plenty and 
Southland DHBs, deprived communities wait longer for treatment.. However, the range 
between highly deprived and well off communities varies geographically. For example, in 
Hutt Valley DHB the range in median waiting times between the highest and lowest 
deprivation communities is 18 days compared to only 1 day in Lakes DHB. So not only are 
inequalities in waiting times determined by deprivation but the levels of inequality vary 
depending on the DHB in which a patient resides. However, regression analysis indicated 
that in only seven DHBs (Waitemata, Auckland, Counties Manukau, Hawkes Bay, Hutt 
Valley, Canterbury and Otago) was there a statistically significant relationship between 
waiting time and deprivation  
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Figure 38: Median Waiting Time by Dep2006 Quintile Groups 1 and 5 (2004-2007) 
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Ethnicity 
Table 22 shows the results when median waiting times were broken down by ethnicity. 
Figure 39 illustrates the information from Table 22 in the form of a bar graph showing the 
differences between differing ethnic groups‟ experiences waiting for treatment in each of 
New Zealand‟s 21 DHBs. Other ethnicities were excluded from the graph because they 
seemed to show little trend and provide meaningless results. For this reason the preceding 
discussion focused on New Zealand‟s four major ethnic groups. 
Ethnicity European Maori Pacific Asian Other Total 
Northland 83 96 90 78 87 86 
Waitemata 57 67 69 69 63 60 
Auckland 68 71 71 78 88 71 
Counties Manukau 58 71 77 73 68 65 
Waikato 67 79 70 69 76 69 
Lakes 65 73 64 66 76 68 
Bay of Plenty 63 62 70 67 63 63 
Tairawhiti 60 69 76 51 80 63 
Taranaki 70 71 68 72 55 70 
Hawke's Bay 76 77 69 92 78 76 
Whanganui 56 57 41 53 74 56 
Mid Central 76 85 94 96 79 77 
Hutt Valley 100 105 125 118 104 103 
Capital and Coast 97 100 104 117 112 99 
Wairarapa 66 67 36 79 61 66 
Nelson Marlborough 81 95 92 88 66 82 
West Coast 80 79 118 91 94 80 
Canterbury 84 90 95 83 99 85 
South Canterbury 72 88 79 69 89 74 
Otago 81 105 118 85 96 83 
Southland 77 75 73 78 65 77 
New Zealand 72 77 78 79 77 74 
Table 22: Median Waiting Times by Ethnicity 2004-2007 (Days) 
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In Figure 39 the European median waiting time is consistently and often significantly lower 
than other than for other ethnicities with the exception of Tairawhiti and South Canterbury 
DHBs where Asian patients are better off and Hawkes Bay, Whanganui and Wairarapa 
where Pacific populations are better off. In all other DHBs European patients are better off, 
in some cases vastly better off. For example in the West Coast and Otago patients of Pacific 
Island descent wait over 35 days longer than their European counterparts. With regard to 
Maori patients, with the exception of Bay of Plenty, West Coast and Southland DHBs, they 
consistently average around 5 to 10 days longer wait than European patients. Pacific 
Islanders‟ results vary considerably between DHBs. For example, in the Hutt Valley patients 
have a median waiting time of 125 days, whereas the neighbouring Wairarapa DHB has a 
median waiting time of 35 days, a difference of 90 days. Asian patients in most DHBs 
experience higher waiting times than Europeans with the exception of Northland, Tairawhiti, 
Whanganui, Canterbury and South Canterbury DHBs. In brief there are two major trends 
showing in these results: 
 Europeans experience shorter waiting times than any other ethnic group, although 
this result varies geographically. 
 Inequalities in patient waiting times are enlarged when considering patients‟ ethnicity. 
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Figure 39: Median Waiting Times by Ethnicity 2004-2007
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7.4 Ethnicity and Waiting Time in The New Zealand Booking System (NZBS) 
The previous analysis indicates that waiting times vary by both deprivation and ethnicity. 
Ethnicity seems to be the stronger of the two effects in particular the gradient between 
European to Maori/Pacific Island, and Asian waiting times. Since Maori and Pacific issues 
concerning access to elective surgery are frequently commented on in the literature in 
Chapters 3 and 4, differences between European and Maori/Pacific Island populations are 
explored here in more detail. The next section of the chapter compares these two subsets of 
New Zealand‟s population against age, deprivation and gender in relation to waiting times. 
Following this, the effects of ethnicity are examined in the five DHBs with the highest Maori 
and Pacific Island populations and the five DHBs with the highest European population. This 
will reveal whether or not the waiting times of Maori and Pacific Islanders are shorter in 
areas where they comprise a significant portion of the population compared to those DHBs 
in which Maori and Pacific populations fall into the minority. This may identify a need for 
better strategies to target Maori and Pacific Island needs in areas in areas with high 
concentrations of these ethnic groups. 
Ethnicity and Age 
 
Age Groups European Median Maori and Pacific Median N (European) N (Maori/Pacific) 
0-14 75 69 38 309 22 687 
15-24 85 79 19 578 7 064 
25-44 79 84 68 068 25 721 
45-64 70 78 111 832 27 079 
65-74 71 85 80 933 10 215 
75+ 69 90 105204 4431 
Total 72 77 423924 97197 
Table 23: European and Maori/Pacific Median Waiting Times by Age Group 2004-2007 
Table 23 shows waiting times and the number of European patients compared to Maori and 
Pacific Island patients in each age group. Figure 40 displays the results on a bar graph with 
a blue line representing European median waiting times and the red line indicating the Maori 
and Pacific Island median waiting times. This graph shows that during younger ages 
European people tend to wait longer than Maori and Pacific Island patients but sometime 
around the early 20s i.e., the 15-24 age group, this trend reverses and Maori and Pacific 
Island patients become worse off. Also as Maori and Pacific populations age waiting times 
tend to increase whereas European waiting times remain stable.  
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Figure 40: European and Maori/Pacific Median Waiting Times by Age Groups 2004-2007 
Ethnicity and Deprivation 
Table 24 shows national results for each ethnic group and, as indicated previously, it is 
evident that deprivation does not play a significant factor in the time that New Zealand 
patients wait for elective surgery. However, variation by ethnic group remains in each NZ 
Dep 2006.  
 Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
European 72.00 72.00 73.00 74.00 71.00 
Maori 77.00 79.00 78.00 78.00 76.00 
Pacific 78.00 75.00 76.00 75.00 79.00 
Asian 79.00 77.00 80.00 79.00 78.00 
Other 77.00 77.00 76.00 79.00 78.00 
Total 74.00 73.00 74.00 75.00 74.00 
Table 24: Median Waiting times by NZ Dep 2006 Quintile when Compared Against Ethnicity 
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Figure 41: Median Waiting Times by Ethnicity and Dep2006 in New Zealand over 2004-2007 
Table 36 (Appendix 6) shows European and Maori Pacific waiting times broken into quintiles 
indicating levels of deprivation and shows a similar trend for both Maori Pacific and 
European patients. Results again show more of an ethnic difference between Maori/Pacific 
and European with an average of just over five days difference between the groups. 
Because there appears to be such a significant ethnic difference analysis was undertaken of 
waiting times in the five DHBs with the highest and lowest proportions of Maori and Pacific 
Islanders in order to determine whether ethnic differences in waiting times were exaggerated 
in these DHBs. Ethnic concentrations are important as some ethnic groups have lower 
overall health status and place greater demands on the health system. This was seen 
throughout Chapters 2 to 4, and in New Zealand specifically related to levels of morbidity in 
Maori and Pacific populations. The five highest and five lowest DHB populations of Maori 
and Pacific Islanders proportionate to Europeans are shown in Table 25. 
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DHB % Maori-Pacific N (Maori-Pacific) N (European) 
Tairawhiti 47 21,057 22,662 
Counties Manukau 37 160,230 193,446 
Lakes 36 35,031 59,043 
Northland 32 47,229 93,336 
Hawkes Bay 26 39,174 98,028 
 
DHB % European N (European) N (Maori-Pacific) 
South Canterbury 79 42,555 3,606 
Nelson Marlborough 78 101,238 12,639 
Wairarapa 77 29,769 6,342 
West Coast 77 24,024 3,198 
Southland 76 80,886 12,903 
Table 25: DHBs With the Highest and Lowest Proportion of Maori and Pacific Islanders to Europeans 
In the next section of results the top two DHBs from Table 25 will be analysed to see 
whether ethnic differences in waiting time increase in accordance with deprivation at the 
DHB level. 
Tairawhiti DHB 
Tairawhiti DHB has the highest proportion of Maori and Pacific Islanders to European 
residents. Figure which displays these results shows that waiting times for Europeans are 
double the length of Maori and Pacific patients for least deprived residents but in all other 
levels of deprivation Europeans are waiting up to 18 days less than Maori Pacific patients. 
For more detail see Appendix 6 - Table 39.  
Counties Manukau DHB 
Counties Manukau DHB has the second highest proportion of Maori and Pacific Islanders to 
European residents. Figure 43 clearly shows that in Counties Manukau DHB, at every level 
of deprivation Maori and Pacific patients are waiting longer for treatment at an average of 16 
days more than European patients. For further detail see Appendix 6 – Table 40. 
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Figure 42: Median Waiting Times by Ethnicity and Dep2006 in Tairawhiti over 2004-2007 
 
Figure 43: Median Waiting Times by Ethnicity and Dep2006 in Counties Manukau over 2004-2007 
South Canterbury 
South Canterbury DHB has the lowest proportion of Maori and Pacific Islanders to European 
residents. Figure 44 shows that, apart from the least deprived communities, Maori and 
Pacific patients were waiting longer than European patients by an average of 13 extra days. 
Appendix 6 – Table 41 provides more detail. 
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Nelson Marlborough 
Nelson Marlborough DHB has the second lowest proportion of Maori and Pacific Islanders to 
European residents. Figure 45 shows that in Nelson Marlborough Maori and Pacific Island 
patients wait longer for treatment than European patients by an average of 13 days. For 
further detail see Appendix 6 – Table 42. 
 
Figure 44: Median Waiting Times by Ethnicity and Dep2006 in South Canterbury over 2004-2007 
 
Figure 45: Median Waiting Times by Ethnicity and Dep2006 in Nelson Marlborough over 2004-2007 
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In each of these four DHBs graphs are not suggesting very much of a trend for deprivation 
but are showing up clearly that Maori and Pacific Islanders are waiting longer for treatment. 
Gender Differences in Waiting Times 
In this next section of the chapter gender issues will be discussed in relation to ethnicity. 
Figure 46 depicts the analysis of the results from Table 43 to Table 48 in Appendix 7. The 
left hand graph shows European differences of waiting time for male to female patients and  
the graph on the right shows the Maori and Pacific Island equivalents. The European waiting 
times differential of between genders is the strongest in Tairawhiti and Wairarapa DHBs at 
eight and nine days respectively. For Maori and Pacific Island patients though the difference 
is much greater, especially in DHBs with the least Maori and Pacific Islanders relative to 
Europeans. The difference is greatest in Nelson Marlborough and Wairarapa DHBs where 
men waited 16 and 20 days more than females for treatment. 
  
Figure 46: Median Waiting Time by Gender, European versus Maori/Pacific Populations 
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7.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion we have found that waiting times over the 2004-2007 period varied 
considerably when considering individual patient determinants such as age, gender, 
ethnicity, and deprivation. The most significant determinants of access to publicly funded 
elective surgery were ethnicity and deprivation. In most cases minority populations tend to 
wait longer than the European majority within the New Zealand population, particularly Maori 
and Pacific Island peoples. This ethnic difference varied significantly by DHB with some 
areas showing little difference in wait times while others show a large disparity in access 
between ethnic groups. The deprivation effect means that patients from lower socio-
economic areas wait longer than those in affluent areas.  
The author found that when measuring ethnicity and deprivation, differences were more 
pronounced in some DHBs than others and a few DHBs showed the opposite trends 
emerging. However, ethnicity was shown to be a far greater influence on waiting times than 
deprivation. After calculating ethnic concentrations few differences in waiting times arose 
between DHBs with large or very small communities of Maori and Pacific population. Gender 
effects did not show up in waiting times unless ethnicity was also considered in which case 
Maori and Pacific Island men wait up to 20% longer than females as compared to European 
patients. Chapter 8 will examine environmental factors that may influence waiting times in 
the public hospital system. This will investigate whether urban rural factors play a part in 
access to elective surgery and also acknowledge the part the private hospital sector plays in 
the provision of elective procedures and the impact this has on waiting lists within the public 
booking system. 
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8 Contextual Factors Leading to Variation in Waiting Times 
8.1 Introduction 
The last two chapters have looked at geographic, temporal and individual factors 
determining New Zealanders access to public hospitals, in particular for elective services. 
Chapter 8 will consider the environmental factors that play a part in the equitable allocation 
of hospital services throughout New Zealand. This chapter will set out to meet objective 
three using four main aims. The first aim was to look for differences that are present in the 
waiting time of patients whether they reside in an urban centre or in a rural location. This is 
important to measure since we saw in Chapter 6 that highly urbanised DHBs such as Capital 
and Coast or Canterbury had longer waiting times than DHBs that are more distant from 
major cities such as Whanganui, Tairawhiti or Wairarapa. Secondly, admission rates will be 
examined to find differences of public/private practice and the level of certain socio-
economic inequalities affecting hospital access. Thirdly, admission rates will be considered 
in conjunction with the public waiting time results found throughout Chapters 6 and 7 to see 
whether private practice influences the performance of the public sector in delivering 
equitable hospital services. This is a very important and widely contested question that may 
give some explanation behind the regional variation in waiting times. 
To begin with the chapter examines the way the level of urban or rural influence plays a part 
in determining patient waits in the NZBS. The analysis then examines the NMDS admissions 
data at first by discussing the variances in the public versus private admissions rates over 
the years 2004-2007. Age standardised admission rates are calculated and results are 
discussed by DHB, public versus private practice and the admissions of lower socio-
economic communities in each of the DHBs. Admissions results are then related back to 
waiting times results to see whether there is a relationship between hospital admission rates 
and waiting times. Finally, private hospital admissions are calculated for Maori and Pacific 
populations versus the European population and highly deprived versus least deprived 
populations, these are then correlated with the waiting times experienced by these groups in 
each DHB to see whether relationships are more apparent when taking ethnicity and 
deprivation into account. 
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8.2 Urban-Rural Influence 
Most of the comprehensive hospital facilities and specialist services that deliver elective 
surgery are clustered in and around in the major city centres. Figure 62, Figure 63 and 
Figure 64 in Appendix 9 show the location of public and private hospitals in New Zealand‟s 
three major metropolitan cities. In the Auckland region Middlemore, Auckland and North 
Shore hospitals are the three major public hospitals which service the region, plus a number 
of smaller public and private hospitals located in close proximity. In Wellington the main 
public facilities are at Keneperu, Hutt and Wellington Regional Hospital while a number of 
private facilities are also located nearby. Christchurch has a similar pattern with the three 
major public facilities  in Burwood, Christchurch and Princess Margaret Hospitals. Several 
private institutions are located near Christchurch Hospital. The reasons behind the 
urbanisation of hospital services were discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, in brief, this occurs in 
the understanding that larger facilities produce efficiencies that a large network of small 
hospitals cannot provide. The reason private hospitals are located near the large public 
hospitals is partly so the specialists can work in both sectors and have access to university 
facilities which also tend to be located close to public hospitals. In addition, private hospitals 
are in urban centres where the majority of health insurance ownership is located so, in the 
case that something goes wrong,  the private hospital can ensure a fast transfer of patients 
to public emergency facilities and intensive care.  
In Chapter 6 the results suggested that waiting times for publicly funded surgery 
administered under the NZBS were shorter in less urbanised DHBs such as Whanganui and 
Wairarapa and longer in DHBs based around large city centres like Capital and Coast and 
Canterbury DHBs. This may be partly because in DHBs where comprehensive hospital 
facilities are nearby and readily available for use there tends to be greater demand for 
hospital care, as determined by Roemer‟s Law (Roemer, 1961), which states in general that 
as the hospital bed supply increases so does demand for those beds. (See earlier 
discussion in Chapters 2 and 3). This may be the reason why Hutt Valley, Capital and Coast 
and Canterbury perform so badly when it comes to providing access to elective surgical 
procedures. In areas of low demand DHBs have the luxury of providing shorter waiting times 
and better access to surgery. Also, because there is less demand the DHB can afford to 
purchase more services from the private hospital sector. Since the analysis that was 
undertaken in Chapter 6 only allowed results at the DHB level it may be useful to break 
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patients‟ access down by their residence to investigate whether urban patients really do wait 
longer than their rural counterparts. 
Table 26 displays average waiting times broken down by residence, this gives an indication 
of whether or not proximity to urban amenities including the most comprehensive hospital 
services matters when considering access to treatment. This measure is complicated by the 
fact that the New Zealand health system is broken down into many administrative units. As 
found in Chapter 6, waiting times varied considerably between DHBs given the fact that 
some DHBs are vastly more urbanised than others. However, each DHB contains a mixture 
of communities some of which may live in cities while others live in isolated farming 
communities. By using an urban-rural indicator to measure individual patient access to 
elective treatments the author is able to see whether the results found in Chapter 6 really 
relate to the level of urban amenities, including hospital services, that are available locally to 
the patient. 
Urban Rural Cases Mean Std. Deviation Median 
Main Urban 383 763 149 218 74 
Secondary Urban 52 790 146 226 69 
Minor Urban 62 428 151 223 75 
Rural Centre 14 566 160 239 77 
Other Rural 49 103 154 232 75 
Total 562 650 149 222 74 
Table 26: Waiting Times by Urban-Rural Influence for 2004-2007 (Days) 
Table 26 shows that there is some relationship between waiting time and urban-rural 
residence. Main urban areas tend to have higher waiting times than secondary urban areas 
then, as amenities decrease for minor urban areas and rural areas, waiting times tend to 
increase. However, there is very little difference between the time waited by patients from 
main urban centres and rural areas. 
Ethnicity and Urban Rural Profile 
Table 37 – Appendix 6 shows European and Maori Pacific waiting times broken into a 
measure of urban rural profile. The table also shows how many patients came from each 
classification in each ethnic group within the Urban Rural Profile. Figure 47 displays the 
results from Table 37. Figure 47 is a bar graph with a blue bar representing European 
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median waiting times and the red indicating the Maori and Pacific Island median waiting 
times within the urban-rural profile. Both lines show a similar trend with the exception of 
„main urban‟ and „other rural‟ areas where longer waiting times are experienced by 
Maori/Pacific patients are experienced by European patients. Because the Maori and Pacific 
Island line lies above the European line it exhibits more of an ethnic difference than a 
difference by urban-rural profile. There is an average gap of four days between the waiting 
times of Europeans and Maori/Pacific patients. 
 
Figure 47: Median Waiting Times by Ethnicity and Urban-Rural Classification in New Zealand over 2004-2007 
Deprivation and Urban Rural Profile 
Figure 48 displays results taken from Table 38 attached in Appendix 6 which shows waiting 
times of patients that reside in areas of very low or very high deprivation broken into a 
measure of urban rural profile. It also shows how many patients came from each 
classification by NZ Dep 2006 quintiles one and five, within the urban-rural profile. The bar 
graph has a blue bar representing patients from very low deprivation areas and a red bar for 
patients that come from very high deprivation areas. Highly deprived patients suffer higher 
waiting times in Main Urban centres and isolated rural communities but results show that 
they receive treatment faster than less deprived patients in Secondary Urban, Minor Urban 
areas and Rural Centre, with median differences up to 7 days. 
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Figure 48: Median Waiting Times by NZ Dep 06 Quintiles 1 & 5 and Urban-Rural Classification in New Zealand 
between 2004-2007 
Overall, urban-rural factors did not show a clear relationship that patients wait longer in 
urbanised areas as suggested in the results in Chapter 6. Nor did they suggest that waiting 
times varied by urban-rural classification when taking into account ethnicity and deprivation 
factors. 
8.3 New Zealand Hospital Admissions and Waiting Time 
8.3.1 Public and Private Hospital Admissions 2004-2007 
Table 27 displays results from the NMDS public and private admissions data that are age 
standardised for each DHB. Public and private admission rates are given per 1000 people 
over the 2004-2007 period for the whole New Zealand population. This includes a ratio of 
every public to private admission per DHB. The same information has been produced for 
individuals in NZ Dep 2006 groups 8, 9 and 10. Significant results were found between 
public and private admissions in each DHB between the admissions for the total New 
Zealand population and admissions of highly deprived communities. 
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Table 27: Age Standardized Rates of Elective Hospital Admissions 2004-2007 
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Figure 49: Public and Private Hospital Admissions between 2004-2007 (Rate per 1000) 
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Inter DHB Relationships 
Maps were drawn to illustrate geographical relationships in public and private admissions 
results. Figure 49 displays admission rates per 1000 people over the four year study period. 
This shows one important finding which is: public and private surgery between 2004 and 
2007 can be generally considered to substitute for each other. For the most part, there is a 
tendency for public (elective) admissions to be highest in those DHBs where private 
admissions are lowest and vice versa (Figure 50). 
 
Figure 50: Public vs. Private Hospital Elective Admissions 2004-07 
However, the regression coefficient, while negative, was not statistically significant.  To a 
large extent this reflects the influence of Capital and Coast which is has by far the highest 
rate of private admissions of the 21 DHBs, and shows clearly as an outlier in Figure 50. 
When Capital and Coast DHB is removed from the analysis the P Value drops to 0.057 just 
outside the significant range and the R2 Value increases to 0.188. 
NZ Dep 2006 Groups 8, 9 and 10 
The corresponding analysis on the most deprived populations shows a marked difference in 
admission rates in both the public and private sectors (Table 27). One would expect 
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deprived communities to demand higher levels of public treatments and fewer privately 
funded operations. For some DHBs this is the case but in some areas deprived communities 
seem to have greater access to private services. This trend shows up in the admissions 
ratios (highlighted in red) for Counties Manukau, Taranaki, Whanganui, West Coast and 
South Canterbury DHBs where a lower admissions ratio is observed among NZ Dep 06 
groups 8 - 10. 
There are two possible explanations for these unexpected results. Firstly, some DHBs 
purchase „no waiting‟ services from the private sector, through this mechanism patients from 
lower socio-economic backgrounds have been able to access the private sector via public 
outsourcing of services. Secondly, the result may reflect the way the NMDS dataset is coded 
as discussed earlier in the limitations section in the methodology chapter. Because the 
NMDS data records deprivation at CAU the level and the NZ Dep 2006 index is designed for 
meshblock analysis some CAUs do not adequately represent the lower level meshblock 
scores. This problem arises as individual CAUs may contain up to 15 meshblock scores. The 
process of aggregation is shown in Figure 19. Therefore, the NZ Dep 2006 groups, 8, 9 or 
10 CAU designations may include higher socio-economic meshblocks, containing people 
who are more likely to purchase private medical insurance or to pay for individual operations. 
8.3.2 Hospital Admissions and Waiting Times 
Figure 51 shows the relationship between public hospital admissions (specifically elective 
surgery) and median waiting time for each of New Zealand‟s 21 DHBs. While median waiting 
times decline as the level of public admissions increases, the relationship is not significant. 
However, it was previously suggested that treatment in the private sector can be considered 
a substitute for public surgery through the booking system. If this is to be the case, DHBs 
with low public admissions tend to have relatively high private admissions. So in DHBs with 
lower public admissions the public system may be competing for labour resources (such as 
doctors, nurses and other theatre staff) with strong private sector stakeholders and therefore 
may suffer higher waiting times as the public system loses valuable surgeon hours to the 
private sector. A further explanation is that DHBs with higher public admissions have a 
higher patient throughput and therefore, can maintain a greater efficiency which allows these 
DHBs to deliver a shorter median waiting time. 
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Figure 51: Public Hospital Admissions to Waiting Time 2004-07 
 
Figure 52 compares the relationship between private hospital admissions and median 
waiting time for each of New Zealand‟s 21 DHBs between 2004 and 2007. The trend line 
gives a positive relationship between the two variables with a R2 value of 0.29 and a P Value 
of 0.03 which is statistically significant. This is a very significant result as it confirms that 
DHBs with higher levels of private practice exhibit higher waiting times than those without 
private admissions. 
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Figure 52: Private Hospital Admissions to Waiting Time 2004-07 
There are two outlying points on this graph representing Hutt Valley and Capital and Coast 
DHBs that may affect the significance of the correlation and the predictability of the 
regression. The author choose to exclude Hutt Valley DHB at a median waiting time of 105 
days and a private admission rate of 65/1000, in which case the P Value decreases to 0.01 
and the R2 value increases to 0.44 which improves the significance and predictability of the 
regression line. This further reinforces that in areas of high private provision waiting times 
tend to be higher than those with less private practice. The author also tried removing the 
Capital and Coast DHB from the analysis which is displayed as the point at which private 
hospital admissions are 276/1000 and waiting time is 100 days but this action decreased the 
significance of the P value to 0.041 and decreased the R2 value to 0.224. 
Figure 53 shows the relationship between the national admissions ratio between 2004 and 
2007 which is reported in Table 27 with median waiting times reported in Table 10. The 
public/private ratio reports, for every one public admission in a DHB the amount of private 
admissions during the same period. The graph shows a negative trend line with an R2 value 
of 0.13 and a P value of 0.096 which means it is not quite statistically significant. Essentially 
it tells us a similar story that in DHBs with relatively more private practice had higher waiting 
lists over the period 2004 to 2007. 
y = 0.1284x + 66.044
R² = 0.286
P Value = 0.03
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
M
e
d
ia
n
 W
ai
ti
n
g 
Ti
m
e
 (
D
ay
s)
Private Hospital Admissions (per 1000)
Chapter 8: Contextual Factors Leading to Variation in Waiting Times 
179 
 
 
Figure 53: Admissions Ratio to Waiting Time 2004-07 
Figure 54 displays the same information in the form of two maps which allows the reader to 
visually see how low private admissions reflect higher waiting times. The highest waiting 
times which are reported in Capital and Coast and Canterbury DHBs correspond to the 
areas of highest private practice. On the other hand, Whanganui with the least private 
admissions has the lowest waiting times. It is believed that if admissions were broken down 
by specialty that the admissions ratios would form much stronger relationships with 
individual specialty waiting times. Unfortunately, as conveyed in Chapter 5, the NMDS data 
was not available to be broken down by specialty.  
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Figure 54: Private Admissions 2004-2007 beside Median Waiting Times 
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8.3.3 Private Hospital Admissions and Ethnicity 
The number of private hospital admissions was divided by the population of two groups for 
each DHB. The first being Maori and Pacific Island populations and the second being the 
remainder of the population, most of which is made up of Europeans. These two groups 
were then correlated with the equivalent public hospital waiting times as observed in the 
NZBS. The data relating to Figure 55 and Figure 56 are detailed in Appendix 8 –Table 49. 
Each point in the graph represents one of the 21 DHBs. 
 
Figure 55: Waiting Times for European Patients by Private Hospital Admissions 2004-2007 
Figure 55 does not show a statistically significant relationship between European private 
hospital admissions and waiting time but Figure 56, which compared these two variables for 
Maori and Pacific Island patients, does show a significant positive relationship and a R2 
value of 0.23. 
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Figure 56: Waiting Times for Maori and Pacific patients by Private Hospital Admissions 2004-2007 
8.3.4 Private Hospital Admissions and Deprivation 
As undertaken for ethnicity under section 8.3.3 the number of private hospital admissions 
was divided by the population of two groups for each DHB. The two groups are divided into 
patients that have a NZ Dep 2006 score of between one  and five which are determined to 
be the affluent populations and those patients that have scores between six and ten, taken 
from deprived populations. These two groups were then correlated with the equivalent public 
hospital waiting times as found in the NZBS. The data relating to Figure 57 and Figure 58 
are captured in Appendix 8 – Table 50. Both Figure 57 and Figure 58 show statistically 
significant positive relationships between private hospital admissions and public hospital 
waiting times with an R2 value of between 0.22 and 0.24. This does not represent a result 
any more significant than that seen between private admissions and median waiting time in 
Figure 52. 
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Figure 57: Waiting Times for NZ Dep 2006 Deciles 1-5 by Private Hospital Admissions 2004-2007 
 
Figure 58: Waiting Times for NZ Dep 2006 Deciles 6-10 by Private Hospital Admissions 2004-2007 
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8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the contextual influences on waiting times experienced in the public 
hospital sector with the aim of explaining some of the geographical variation in public waiting 
times found throughout Chapters 6 and 7. There were three significant findings that were 
made during this chapter. The first was that analysis of the urban/rural effect on public 
hospital waiting times within the NZBS did not show a significant or consistent relationship. 
Although when separating Europeans from Maori and Pacific patients, the second group had 
an increased waiting time between secondary urban and other rural areas when you 
disregard the main urban areas. Overall, the results showed no significant findings that 
would suggest longer waiting times were experienced by those who reside in urban areas. 
Secondly, admission results showed that private surgery can be considered to act as a 
substitute for treatment in the public system but that deprived communities in most DHBs 
have less access to „no waiting‟ private hospital services. Thirdly, when relating admission 
rates back to public hospital waiting times, statistically significant results showed that DHBs 
with high private admission rates also experience high public hospital waiting lists. This 
analysis was also broken down by ethnicity and deprivation. Although, most of the results 
proved to be statistically significant, the relationship did not strengthen in any case while 
comparing European to Maori/Pacific patients or when comparing high and low deciles of 
deprivation. The author will now discuss some of the findings from Chapters 6, 7, and 8 in 
relation to those from of other studies and try to draw some relevant conclusions in Chapter 
9. 
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9 Discussion and Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the key findings from objectives one, two and three in the light of 
feedback received from interviews that were conducted with a mixture of medical specialists, 
hospital managers and administrators in February 2011. For objective 1 the geographic 
differences in waiting time that were found are discussed along with some explanation of 
these results. Discussion relevant to objective 2 is examined in relation to variations found in 
waiting times according to individual social and demographic characteristics. Contextual 
factors that were found in accordance with objective 3 are then considered, particularly 
public private relationships in relation to effects on access to elective services. Next, some of 
the theoretical implications of research conducted for this thesis will be explored. Policy 
implications are then considered, in particular, reporting, prioritisation practices and the 
smart use of the private hospital sector to increase public access to elective services. 
Recommendations for future research will follow before a final concluding statement on the 
findings of this thesis.  
 
Figure 59 Conceptual Diagram for Discussion 
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9.2 Discussion 
This thesis has produced evidence to suggest that the NZBS is not operating under 
equitable, consistent and transparent prioritisation processes as was originally proposed. 
Little research has recorded patient access to elective surgery using waiting times as a 
measure since the CPAC prioritisation tools were introduced. Most have examined 
prioritisation processes (Derrett, 2005, Gauld and Derrett, 2000), and referral practices of 
physicians prioritising patients for surgery (McLeod et al., 2004a, McLeod et al., 2004b). 
These studies have found that the introduction of the booking system has favoured some 
patients while leaving others worse off. Derrett et al (2009) is the only author to have 
reported spatial variation in waiting times since the booking system was introduced in 1998. 
Derrett et al‟s (2009) study also found a relationship between waiting times in the booking 
system and private hospital admissions showing that in certain procedures patients were 
waiting longer in DHBs that also have high private hospital admissions.  
The three objectives of this thesis challenged the existing literature to see if past findings 
held true when the entire NZBS was considered over the period 2004-2007. The first 
objective sought to examine the spatial variation in waiting times, the second to establish 
any individual variations and determinants of waiting times and the third set out to 
investigate contextual factors in determining waiting times, specifically public private 
interactions. This chapter discusses the key results that have emerged from the research 
associated with these three main objectives and relate them to a number of key factors that 
identified in the literature and during interviews conducted with specialist physicians and 
hospital administrators. A summary of key results and critical factors that make up the 
discussion are illustrated in Figure 59. 
9.2.1 Geographical Differences in Public Waiting Times 
Objective 1 - Key Findings 
Results for objective one, which are found in Chapter 6 of this thesis, emphasised 
geographical differences in the time patients wait for elective treatments depending on which 
the DHB in which they reside. Results show a north-south gradient which shows southern 
DHBs reporting higher waiting times in general than their northern counterparts. Within New 
Zealand, Waitemata, Bay of Plenty, Tairawhiti, Whanganui and Wairarapa DHBs 
consistently have lower waiting times while Northland, Capital and Coast, Hutt Valley and 
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Canterbury DHBs which have much higher waiting times. As well as geographical 
differences, New Zealand DHBs showed a large degree of temporal fluctuation in waiting 
times over the four year study period. Large differences were also shown when waiting times 
were compared between New Zealand and Australian regions. Australian patients tend to 
wait almost half the time for elective procedures in public hospitals when compared with 
waiting times experienced in most New Zealand DHBs. 
Waiting times were also broken down by the five common surgical specialties of general 
surgery, orthopaedic, ENT, gynaecological and ophthalmologic forms of surgery. When 
reported by DHB for 2004-2007 different patterns emerged showing that some regions are 
strong in the delivery of some services but struggle when providing others. For example 
Whanganui performs amongst the best out of the DHBs in providing timely general, 
orthopaedic and ENT surgery but fails to provide timely ophthalmological and gynaecological 
services. These differences are widespread across New Zealand, in some cases there are 
more than 100 days of difference observed in median waiting times both within and across 
specialties. 
The results expressed above can be explained by eight particular processes listed below 
which are then discussed in detail: 
 the 1998 adoption of CPAC scoring systems which were supposed to provide a 
nationally consistent means of prioritising patients for publicly funded elective surgery 
under the NZBS. 
 Managerial inconsistencies in setting scores in relation to financial thresholds for 
surgery have had an impact on waiting times across specialties and spatially by 
DHB. 
 Residual waiting lists are an important factor. While it is not measurable and does 
not have an impact on waiting times, it does have an impact on patients‟ overall 
access to treatment through the public hospital system when patients do not meet 
the financial thresholds required to receive treatment. 
 The location of resources and inter-DHB contracts similarly have an effect on 
waiting times as patients living a substantial distance from a hospital often suffer poor 
access to essential services. 
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 Acute health events and trauma have a significant impact on elective services. 
When public hospital resources are tied up performing procedures on trauma 
patients and acutely ill there is less time available for elective surgery. 
 Increasing use of technology has also been a factor in the demand for elective 
surgery increasing waiting times in some areas. 
 The level of government expenditure may also contribute to waiting times as 
evidenced by the differences between New Zealand and Australian waiting times.  
CPAC Scores 
Evidence suggests that CPAC scoring systems vary across DHBs with some not opting to 
use them at all, as Specialist C mentions in his comment: 
“There is inconsistency in the adoption of CPAC scoring systems nationally, and you look at 
the waiting times, it shouldn‟t be like that. The whole point, there has been this real effort to 
make waiting times consistent throughout the country and it is very difficult to do that.” 
(Specialist C.) 
After conducting interviews with some key specialists and hospital administrators it became 
clear that some specialists were not even using CPAC tools, others left the job of allocating 
scores to hospital managers to administer scores. For example, specialist A had not heard of 
Clinical Priority Assessment Criteria (CPAC) tools before. He comments: 
 “I am at the sharp end, I just turn up to operate on the patients that are there and I really 
can‟t be bothered with the bureaucracy that goes on behind closed doors. I either circle 
routine or urgent or if I believe there is no clinical need for surgery I send the patient back to 
their general practitioner. I discourage people from having surgery if I think what they have is 
going to be a self-limiting thing. For example, people turn up with ganglia, a cyst on the back 
of the wrist, a condition that given time usually goes away by itself and I tell them to go away 
and let it go away by itself. Whereas some people insist, „no, I want this taken off‟ and when I 
put them into the system I don‟t circle urgent. These people fall into the hole, they receive a 
letter saying they are not able to have their surgery within six months.” (Specialist A.) 
When asked if he went through the process of individually scoring patients for surgery 
Specialist A replied “…no, I don‟t know who does but it is not me.” (Specialist A.) As it turns 
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out the author was introduced to the wait list coordinator, a nurse manager who acts as a go-
between for the patient, surgeon and DHB management. She comments: 
 “I book people‟s surgery and do so according to people‟s urgency so I don‟t really have a lot 
to do with reporting, that‟s my manager‟s responsibility. We use urgent (70 points), semi-
urgent (60 points) or routine (59 points). I book people from the waiting list, who are urgent 
and then I review the patients. They are sent assessment forms and review them to urgent if 
required, in consultation with the specialist. These patients are on active review and part of 
the process is every six months they are sent a self-assessment form which they fill in and 
we look at that and consider whether they need to have an outpatient appointment, need to 
be increased to urgent or needs to be discussed with their GP. After 18 months [..of…] 
patients […being…] under active review a decision has to be made whether they are given 
certainty for an operation and increased to urgent or sent back to their GP. The specialist will 
either place the patient on the waiting list as either certainty or under AR.” (Administrator C.)  
Other specialists interviewed did administer CPAC scores noting they had to use them as a 
standard scoring system for anyone entering the public hospital system. Although Specialist 
C commented that the nurse is supposed to do the scoring as this is meant to put more 
objectivity into the system but in reality he did most of the scoring. In ophthalmology CPACs 
are only available for cataract surgery so a lot of other treatments such as corneal 
transplants are scored but there is a lot of leeway in there. It depends how bad the vision is. 
In fact, most of the people who have surgery for corneal grafts the vision is so bad that their 
score is off the scale for both eyes anyway. Specialist C comments: 
“For things like squint surgery which is a significant part of ophthalmology where people with 
wandering eyes have their eyes straightened. It‟s almost impossible to kind of score that[sic]. 
It‟s basically urgent every time and you just make up a number which defeats the purpose a 
bit. But cataract surgery is probably the bulk of what we do and it is what the government 
obsesses about and it‟s reasonable to score that because its relatively objective. You give 
the patient a score for: visual acuity, hand movement, vision in both eyes (35 points), 
reading acuity, difficulty driving, carrying out daily activities, ability to work and other 
disabilities. So it is not completely objective, some fudging can go on there. For non-cataract 
stuff, someone who comes across with trauma enters the system as acute. So the score is 
irrelevant, or for infections the scores are very high as well. You just give a number between 
21 and 50, 21 is under the threshold and 50 is way over. In Wellington you can put the score 
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in and put what‟s called a „clinical override‟. For example, someone who is extremely short 
sighted and you have one eye done, and the eye operated on is no longer short sighted. 
They are hopelessly unbalanced, have real trouble driving and stuff like that but because 
they can see out of one eye their score goes right down. They may be under the threshold, 
but because they can‟t cope you put […in…] a clinical override, so you can override the 
scoring system. The whole thing about CPAC is to make it objective and fair in recognition 
that you have to ration services, it‟s as simple as that. I find the subject irritating because of 
the manipulation that goes on.” 
Specialist B reflects that for operating lists for urology there is consistency applied in CPAC 
scores across the Capital and Coast and Hutt Valley DHBs since all the Hutt Valley work is 
conducted in Wellington. He goes on to describe the CPAC form used by all five urologists in 
the Capital and Coast DHB: 
“We have a scoring system based on whether there is any evidence of malignancy, degree 
of social disruption for the patient, and the degree of symptomatology in terms of whether it 
is having an impact on their quality of life. There is also a little column in terms of social 
benefits. The form is such that it is basically impossible to get it wrong.” 
In some cases, as Specialist C has explained, the specialist has the ability to override the 
prioritisation scoring systems. Specialist A goes on to point out how he has the ability 
manipulate the waiting list to suit if a patient really would benefit from prompt treatment.  He 
cites a recent example: 
“I had a clinic on Tuesday and there was a man with a „trigger finger‟, trigger finger is not a 
life threatening condition. This guy wasn‟t using the finger because it was so painful when it 
locked and his partner had to straighten it out for him, but it would make her sick every time 
she did it. So I went up to the waiting list office and said what have I got on Monday? The 
nurse manager said these procedures and you have a cancellation. I said right, let‟s book 
this guy in on Monday.” 
With such a variable use of scoring systems and the specialists‟ ability to manipulate scores 
it is not surprising that waiting times vary so much across New Zealand. From the feedback 
seen above it seems clear that along with differences in CPAC scoring tools, specialist 
adoption and use of the prioritisation criteria also varies to a large extent. This inconsistency 
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in referral practices means that patients of equal need are not being served equally between 
DHBs and in many cases locally from specialist to specialist.  
The author will now examine a related factor which has an influence on the speed of which 
patients can expect access to elective treatments, which are DHB management practices 
and the continual revision of CPAC scoring thresholds. 
Managerial Inconsistencies 
In Chapter 3 population-based funding was seen as a key strategy introduced in New 
Zealand to create equitable access to health and disability services across the country from 
1983. This has not resulted in a guarantee of consistency between DHBs in providing 
elective treatments as DHBs retain the ability to shift funding between services which they 
deem important. Also, the advent of the NZBS has meant the introduction of performance 
indicators that the DHB management has significant control over, namely ESPIs described in 
previous chapters. Qualitative feedback suggests that hospital managers and administrators 
are now crucial to controlling waiting times as they are the ones who set and adjust the 
financial threshold for which patients need to score enough CPAC points to be considered 
for surgery. It is hardly equitable to drop people from waiting lists as a result of the DHB 
managers deciding to change a financial threshold especially if there is not consistent use of 
CPAC prioritisation tools, as seen above. 
Several of the interviewees expressed concerns about how the DHB regularly manipulated 
thresholds in order to meet Ministry of Health ESPI targets. Comments such as:  
“It seems to me like they are massaging the numbers, in that if someone doesn‟t appear to 
have something that needs to be treated urgently then they are put in a holding pen, they 
don‟t go on a waiting list which is really just massaging numbers and making things look 
better than they actually are.” (Specialist A.) 
“The DHB shifts the threshold around to keep waiting lists low, it‟s what we spend half our 
time arguing about at business meetings is the fiddling of , altering the threshold because 
the problem is they get threatened with sanctions, get money (funding) taken away if they 
are under the threshold. So basically patients get told, oh well we can‟t do your surgery. I 
could go on forever about this.” (Specialist C.) 
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Administrator B mentioned how important hospital managers were to DHBs in order to keep 
meeting the ESPI targets. In his experience as a DHB board member he reported cases of 
theatre lists falling behind as the result of managers leaving. This is not surprising as in 
ophthalmology services Specialist C said that the DHB increases or decreases the threshold 
three to four times a year and they are always mentioning it in meetings. The example of the 
approach taken by senior DHB executives is summed up extremely well by Administrator B 
who recollects the approach taken by Mid Central DHB:  
 “Well yes, we could put more people through for first specialist assessment to see whether 
they need surgery but we are meeting our targets so, instead, we are going to spend the 
money somewhere else.”  
Administrator B goes onto state “…there‟s probably a fair amount of unmet need in 
Palmerston North and that decision has been made by the CEO of the DHB. These 
decisions are taking place regularly. Yes there are probably a lot of people that are not 
getting the treatment that they need and some of the people would obviously fit into the 
lower deciles but they are not worried about it because if the Ministry is not asking […it…]of 
them then they are not going to do it. So that‟s also an issue.” 
As mentioned in earlier chapters all DHBs are currently meeting their ESPI minimum 
standards required by their central funder, the Ministry of Health. Administrator A responded 
by saying “…five years ago, it was a different story and I don‟t know whether they have 
improved productivity because of the fact that there has been a focus on trying to improve 
productivity.” Also, it is evident that DHB management has learnt how to plan ahead and 
manipulate waiting lists in order to ensure they meet ESPI targets by making decisions like 
those explained above. This may have been forced by way of government pressure in 
meeting ESPI targets which, as Specialist B mentions, filters down so DHBs are continually 
putting pressure on medical staff to get their waiting times down.  
Residual Waiting List 
Among other things, Chapter 5 identified the inability to measure the presence of a residual 
waiting list. This is a group of patients who the surgeon believes should be treated but are 
left without treatment because they do not meet the financial threshold set by the DHB as 
discussed above. This has been explained further in Chapter 4. When asked how often they 
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come across patients that should be treated but are not treated because they fall below the 
threshold, mixed feedback was received as shown as seen in the following comments: 
“Very seldom. Patients that I put on the waiting list usually have a need to get something 
done. (Specialist A.) 
“Of course, frequently, particularly [for] cataract surgery. Say someone with 6:18 vision, that 
does not meet the vision for driving, if you do one eye the score is going to go below the 
threshold because their vision is not good enough but they‟re driving with one eye and 
they‟re prone to falls, certainly less safe driving. Poor 3D vision, all that stuff so they‟d 
definitely benefit but their score falls below the threshold [sic]. (Specialist C) 
The residual waiting list is a very tangible group made up by two groups of patients. Firstly, 
patients that specialists consciously score below the financial threshold never make it onto 
the waiting list. Secondly, there are those patients that fall off the waiting list as a result of 
changes in the financial threshold. There is currently no measure of this group reported to 
the Ministry of Health and it is unreported by individual DHBs. An evaluation of patients 
which fall into this unfortunate group would be a unique measure of unmet need in the 
market for elective hospital treatments.  
Location of Resources 
The location of resources, such as hospital theatres and human resources e.g., specialists 
and anaesthetists, are not spread evenly around New Zealand. Medical specialists 
particularly choose to be clustered around hospital facilities that are contained within the 
main centres. Waiting times may be affected to a large degree by travel distances that 
patients have to travel to access specialist health care, Administrator B notes: 
“When you get into the geography of it all, I think that it really reflects the issue that 
Wairarapa people are right next door to the big city so if they need cardiac surgery it is going 
to be done in Capital and Coast DHB anyway, but on the other hand the West Coast  is far 
away from anywhere, and to my knowledge there is only one surgeon on the West Coast 
(General) but there must be more […patients…] coming over from Christchurch. So I think 
the geographical aspects of it are a very strong indicator of what you are able to produce. If 
you live in Haast the only way you are going to get near high tech anything is with a day‟s 
travel.” 
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Although patients are required to travel great distances to access specialist services, 
population demands on a DHB, like the West Coast or Wairarapa, are smaller than felt in the 
DHBs containing main centres like Capital and Coast, Auckland or Canterbury. Smaller 
DHBs may be able to afford to outsource surgery to the private sector as well as rely on 
other public resources of outside DHBs. For example, Administrator B expressed that 
currently in Wairarapa DHB a patient need not wait longer than 3 weeks for a hip 
replacement at present, whereas in Capital and Coast DHB a patient would struggle to be 
treated within 6 months. 
There are also experiences where resources are located in unusual places. Administrator B 
had spent time working in Ashburton and as he explains: 
“The guys that do surgery in Ashburton do a lot of elective surgery and when they are not so 
busy the Canterbury DHB has them drive up to Canterbury or Kaikoura once or twice a 
week, where surgeries would be undertaken in Kaikoura (if minor) or if required they would 
take them […the patients…] down to Ashburton to make use of the theatres. This may 
explain why people are falling onto these long lists.” 
Inter DHB Contractual Relationships 
Geographical differences in waiting times may be partly explained by the contractual 
relationships that exist between DHBs. As mentioned in earlier chapters some hospitals 
specialise in certain types of surgery, for example Capital and Coast DHB do not have a 
plastic surgery unit and rely on the Hutt DHB which has the National Plastics Centre. But this 
is a reciprocal arrangement as some services are not catered for in Hutt DHB so patients in 
specialties such as urology travel to Capital and Coast DHB for treatment Administrator B 
states “Currently about 42% or 43% of surgery for Hutt DHB is done by Capital and Coast 
DHB.”  Other DHBs which mostly comprise rural residents rely on the services of outside 
DHBs for specialist services. Administrator B demonstrates this in saying: 
“Everything that Wairarapa DHB is getting is being done in Capital and Coast DHB and the 
same issue comes with many patients from around the South Island receiving operations in 
Christchurch hospitals. We have these bizarre situations where patients have needed MRIs 
done and they could get it done at Hutt DHB tomorrow but they can‟t get it done at Capital 
and Coast for months. There are profound differences in the availability of other resources of 
which are needed before surgery that would add time to patient wait.” 
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Acute (Trauma) Event Effects on Elective Services 
The availability of theatre time for elective surgery procedures depends on the amount of 
trauma each DHB has to deal with in its hospitals. Administrator A explains: 
“The other factor to consider with orthopaedics is the impact of trauma, because that was 
always a problem. You know, you only need a bloody good road accident and there is no 
theatre available for two days to do electives. That might have been more of the case then 
but I don‟t think that is the case now, because as we have advocated strongly for DHBs to 
try and have a more dedicated theatre resource for electives, no matter what and a trauma 
theatre that is sitting there ready to go.” 
As recently experienced with the Canterbury Earthquake Disaster of 2011, we can see how 
large trauma events can tie up operating theatres for weeks and, as reported through the 
media, the first thing to be postponed will be elective procedures which may have to be 
carried out in a different DHB or much later in the DHB the patient resides in. Although, 
Specialist A believes New Zealand hospitals have not been under any more pressure than 
has been experienced in the past from trauma events, he explains: 
“I don‟t think this has changed over a 20 year period, I mean New Zealand‟s population has 
not gone up substantially and I don‟t think that we have any more trauma now than we ever 
had in the past. In fact, in years gone by the speed limit was greater and there was no 
compulsion to wear seatbelts our road trauma was vastly greater, in fact it‟s one of the 
reasons that the renal transplant rate is not that high in New Zealand now because we don‟t 
have that much carnage on the roads.” 
Increases in Technology 
Another factor which has an impact on waiting times for elective treatments in public 
hospitals by way of reducing surgical throughput are advances in medical technology which 
has been discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Specialist B gives an explanation of how this 
places strain on the sustainability of New Zealand‟s health system: 
“Say, for example, 10 years ago, to take a kidney of a patient out it was a relatively straight 
forward 90 minute procedure, now if you‟re taking a kidney out you will do it laparascopically, 
you will do it with telescopes and those procedures can take six or seven hours so the 
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surgical throughput is hugely diminished as a result of that. Similarly with excellent cardiac 
care at the moment you find that you are keeping patients alive a lot longer so what happens 
is that instead of having a heart attack and dying they have a heart attack and are 
readmitted to hospital for further care. So our advances in technology are not keeping 
people out of hospital. What is happening is, the advances in technology are making people 
live longer with more complex conditions that require higher readmission rates and longer 
periods of time in hospital. These days if you get an 85 year old coming in with really bad 
chest pain they may be admitted to put a stent in to open up their coronary arteries. Fifteen 
years ago they probably would have had a coronary and died, you know. So that person 
becomes a much greater burden on the system and those are very important factors that I 
think you are going to need to build in to make it complete.” 
Government Expenditure on Hospital Resources 
The author does not have much evidence of factors that could explain the differences of 
waiting times for elective surgery between New Zealand and Australia other than the amount 
of funding that is injected into each nation‟s health care sector per capita. As Administrator B 
expresses: 
“The amount of money that the Australian Government put into their public health system 
compared to what we do, is astronomical.” 
On the basis of per capita expenditure on health and disability services, the OECD reported 
New Zealand spent $9,134 USD with Australia spending $12,371 USD over the same period 
between 2004-2007 (OECD, 2010). These figures show that the Australian Government 
spends a quarter more on health and disability services per capita than New Zealand, which 
goes some way toward explaining the vast differences in waiting times for elective 
treatments. As waiting times are simply used as a form of rationing health services, diverting 
more fiscal resources to the public hospital sector means Australia has the ability to deliver a 
higher throughput of operations. On the 28th of April 2011 the media released updates of the 
National Government 2008 promise to invest money in twenty new dedicated elective 
surgery operating theatres in the hope that this would improve the throughput of elective 
treatments (Johnston, 2011b). Funding injections like this may help close the gap between 
New Zealand and Australia that has been shown throughout the results. However, New 
Zealand Minister of Health, Tony Ryall acknowledged there is “…no definite period for 
completing the theatres, although it may be over the next five years.” 
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9.2.2 Socio-Demographic Differences in Public Waiting Times 
Objective 2 - Key Findings 
Results for objective 2, which are found in Chapter 7 of this thesis, show inequalities in 
patient access to timely elective surgery in the NZBS depending largely on individual 
determinants such as age, sex, ethnicity and socio-economic measures of deprivation. The 
most interesting results that came out of this analysis were comparing waiting times 
experienced between patients of different ethnicity and between socio-economic groups. It is 
important to note that when comparing ethnicity against deprivation differences, ethnicity had 
a far more pronounced effect over the waiting times patients experienced over the study 
period. 
Small ethnic differences of up to seven days median waiting time showed up immediately 
when analysis was conducted on the entire booking system during 2004-2007. These 
differences were noted particularly between Europeans and minority ethnicities such as 
Maori, Pacific Island and Asian patients.  When results were broken down by DHB 
differences in waiting times significantly inflated, the most dramatic being that of 90 days 
between neighbouring Wairarapa and Hutt Valley DHBs. It was shown that Europeans 
experience shorter waiting times than any other ethnic group but differences vary 
geographically. 
Differences in waiting times were shown of up to five days between patients of highest and 
lowest social deprivation when analysis was conducted across the whole booking system. 
Those from deprived backgrounds tend to wait longer than affluent patients. Differences 
waiting times when considering individual patients‟ deprivation increased when results were 
broken down by DHB. Although, when waiting times were measured by NZ Dep 2006 
deciles in each DHB only the results from seven were considered significant results after 
using correlation analysis to test this relationship. These were Waitemata, Auckland, 
Counties Manukau, Hawkes Bay, Hutt Valley, Canterbury and Otago DHBs which 
experienced differences of up to 10 days median waiting times between patients depending 
on their individual deprivation score. 
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The results that were found in Chapter 7 and summarised above indicate that: 
 Maori and Pacific Island patients as well as socially deprived patients have longer 
waiting times for elective surgery. Previous literature and the feedback from 
qualitative interviews of medical specialists and hospital administrators has provided 
some critical reasons factors for this. Cultural differences mean that certain ethnic 
populations, in particular Maori and Pacific Island patients are reluctant to seek 
medical care.  
 Both, socio-economically deprived and Maori and Pacific Island individuals also tend 
to suffer a higher level of co-morbidity which can also lead to longer waiting times. 
 Lower decile status also impact upon patient‟s ability to get elective surgery as they 
tend to have higher rates of co-morbidity as a result of high environmental risk 
factors and are financially unable to seek treatment independently. 
 There are apparent social and ethnic biases in the allocation of health services. 
Cultural Differences 
One of the major findings from Chapter 7 was the variance in waiting times depending on a 
patient‟s ethnicity. There are two major factors that seem to be operating which both grow 
out of the fact that there are significantly different cultural processes at play when specifically 
Maori and Pacific Island patients seek care. Many studies report that there are cultural 
differences in patients‟ choosing whether or not access primary care and higher levels of 
specialist treatment as described in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Specialist B comments: 
“I think certainly in terms of the Maori/Pacific population, they certainly are much more 
reticent about seeking care and very rarely put personal pressure […on…]to be put up 
waiting lists, they are much more withdrawn in terms of that, so that is definitely a factor. So I 
think the average Pakeha is a lot more pushy in terms of what they want and there is no 
question that that is a factor and that is a cultural thing. It is not a reluctance of the doctors to 
put Maori and Pacific Islander‟s on the list it‟s just the way people‟s personalities are I guess. 
And also, you find that Maori and Pacific people present much later and therefore, their 
conditions are often much more severe.” 
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This is reiterated by a comment made by Administrator B: 
“One of the things that more than a few people have commented on is that Europeans as a 
group would be putting on a significant amount of pressure, whereas some of these other 
folk are far more, „whenever I can have it done‟[sic]. The expectations are very different and 
the anxiety to get something done right now is much more of a Pakeha trait than it is in these 
other groups.” 
These findings have been seen throughout other literature on ethnic exclusion in the use of 
health services. In line with  specialist B‟s comments, Haynes et al (2008) found that 
ethnicity was strongly associated with late presentation of common cancers in New Zealand, 
particularly for Maori and Pacific Islanders.  Even, after controlling for stage of presentation, 
such groups still have a poorer chance of survival from cancer, suggesting that other 
institutional factors were at work within the health system in determining access to care for 
these groups. Other research from a variety of national contexts also supports such 
institutional „biases‟ in the delivery of care (Bach et al., 1999, Haggstrom et al., 2005, Morris 
et al., 2004, Mathur et al., 2010). 
Research that has followed the provision of elective services as administered through the 
booking system has discovered differences in patient behaviour leading to preferential 
treatment and the way that Pakeha put pressure on specialists to move faster through the 
system, i.e. the „squeaky wheel phenomenon‟ (Gauld and Derrett, 2000, Roake, 2003, 
Howden-Chapman and Ashton, 2000). This could be reflected by some of the above results 
that show European patients moving through the system faster and being subject to shorter 
waiting times in most DHBs. Others, as reported throughout Chapter 4, found that some 
specialists  took into account the patient‟s ethnicity, giving preferential treatment to Maori 
and Pacific Island patients (McLoed et al., 2004), in which case you might see the opposite 
trend arising as seen in Whanganui or Wairarapa DHBs where Pacific Islanders experience 
significantly lower waiting times than European patients.   
Co-morbidities 
Part of the explanation of why Maori and Pacific Island patients remain longer on waiting lists 
may be the existence of co-morbidities. These are specifically found in overweight patients 
who carry additional risk of illnesses such as diabetes, kidney disease and respiratory 
illness. These conditions plus their obesity pose extra risk during surgery. These conditions 
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of co-morbidity are far more common in Maori and Pacific patients and the reason these 
delays surgery are summarised by Administrator A: 
“The other thing you have got to remember with the ethnicity thing is that […you…] have co-
morbidities that are probably significantly higher in Pacific Islanders. Orthopaedic surgeons 
don‟t like operating on big fat, heavy, overweight Pacific Islanders because it is dangerous, 
they quite often say to them, „I can‟t operate until you go and lose 20 kilos‟. This is what 
happens.” 
As seen in Chapter 4 other literature has acknowledged the presence of co-morbidities 
contributed to longer waits by patients, especially from Maori and Pacific Islanders and lower 
socio-economic groups (McLoed et al., 2004, McLeod et al., 2004b). 
Low Decile Effects 
The other major finding from Chapter 7 was that patients from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds seem to have delayed access to elective treatments. This can result because 
people from lower socio-economic backgrounds have higher environmental health risk 
factors such as smoking, poor quality housing, and poor diet which lead to more serious and 
complicated conditions as discussed in Chapter 2 Specialist B stated: 
“If you are a vascular surgeon in a low decile area those patients with vascular problems are 
much more likely to have other issues. They are more likely to be diabetic, they are going to 
be overweight, have respiratory disease, therefore, the total burden of illness for the patient 
is so much greater and what that means is your surgery becomes more time consuming and 
much more complex, you get much higher re-admission rates following your complications 
and re-admission rates block up your hospital beds and all of a sudden you find that your 
waiting list goes out. So those are the sort of factors that are very important to take into 
consideration.” 
As specified by Specialist B literature and reported in  Chapter 4 patients from a low socio-
economic background also tended to suffer from co-morbidities with the result that they are 
usually subject to longer waiting times (McLeod et al., 2004a). McLeod et al (2004b) also 
noted that socio-economically disadvantaged patients tend to move home frequently  and 
are thus more likely to be lost in the booking system. 
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Social and Ethnic Bias 
Although not mentioned in any one of the interviews, social and ethnic bias is a factor that 
may play a part in explaining the higher waiting times that are experienced by highly 
deprived as well as Maori and Pacific Island patients. Lower rates of diagnosis, referral and 
treatment have been associated with groups of higher material deprivation in the UK, 
France, Denmark, Scotland, Switzerland and Japan (Jack et al., 2006, Berchi et al., 2004, 
Norredam et al., 1998, Rapiti et al., 2006, Fukuda et al., 2005, Barry and Breen, 2005). 
Ethnic bias has also been found relating to disproportionately low diagnosis and treatment 
rates in African American and Hispanic cancer patients in the US (Haggstrom et al., 2005). 
The results of this thesis provide evidence that this ethnic bias may be occurring for Maori 
and Pacific patients as they were seen to wait a significantly longer time for elective surgery 
in some DHBs. 
9.2.3 Contextual Differences that Affect Public Waiting Times 
Objective Three - Key Findings 
In achieving objective three as described in Chapter 8,  contextual factors were examined to 
determine waiting times within the NZBS. Initially, a measure of urban-rural classification 
was used to determine whether waiting times varied considerably for patient access to urban 
services. Unfortunately, the results showed only small differences in a patient‟s access to 
care depending on their proximity to urban amenities.  
Other analysis set out to understand how the public hospital sector interacts with private 
hospitals and the effect on public access to the NZBS. Findings show how services that are 
provided privately can be shown as a substitute to publicly funded elective surgery. Patients 
from a low socio-economic background were found to have lower admission rates to private 
hospitals representing an income effect in the market for private hospital care. Also, results 
show that Maori and Pacific Islanders suffer lower access to these services, which may be 
explained by the over representation of these communities in lower socio-economic groups. 
Furthermore, significant results were found when private hospital admission rates were 
correlated with public waiting times. DHBs with high private hospital admission rates were 
subject to longer public waiting times and vice versa. 
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With feedback from medical specialists and hospital administrators the author was able to 
further discuss some critical factors as to why this may be the case: 
 Private health insurance ownership is an important factor because  membership 
varies geographically by socio-economic status (Schoen et al., 2000, Blumberg, 
2006). 
 Specialist behaviour needs to be taken into account as the literature indicates that 
some specialists prefer working in private hospitals to maximise personal income 
(Howden-Chapman and Ashton, 2000, Yates, 1995); 
 Public-private contracting influences waiting times where there are higher  private 
hospital admission rates.  
 ACC payments for surgical treatments required after an accidentals impact on public 
waiting times as specialists have to divide their time between public elective 
operations and ACC funded operations.  
Private Health Insurance Ownership 
In Chapter 8 admission rates between public and private surgery were seen to substitute for 
each other. Results were not statistically significant but showed that for the most part DHBs 
with low public admission rates tended to have relatively high rates of private hospital 
admission as shown in Figure 49. This  seems plausible in a two-tiered health system like 
New Zealand‟s. The more private health insurance ownership and, therefore, private 
provision undertaken in an area could plausibly help to reduce the demand within public 
hospital systems. This understanding is expressed in Specialist B‟s comment: 
“The other issue that probably has an effect on public waiting lists is the proportion of 
patients within a certain area that are privately insured, so for example, if you are living in 
Christchurch, the proportion of privately insured patients is much higher than in Wellington, 
for example, and therefore you will find that the private sector can take a lot of the burden off 
the public hospital system. If you are in a very low decile area, for example, somewhere past 
the Hawkes Bay, you may find a far lower proportion of patients that are insured within that 
area, so that will have an effect. Therefore, the greater burden falls on the DHB.” 
In fact DHBs, such as Capital and Coast and Canterbury, have among the highest waiting 
times in New Zealand, and hospital admission results show patients of these DHBs to be 
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amongst the highest users of private hospital care. Also, as Specialist B suggests, the 
population within the Hawkes Bay and Tairawhiti DHBs do tend to have less access to 
private health insurance and therefore private health care. But, this does not seem to be 
increasing the burden on these DHBs. Instead, results show that these areas display vastly 
lower waiting times when compared to highly insured areas such as Canterbury. There must 
be some further explanation behind these results. 
Specialist Behaviour 
The literature discussed throughout Chapters 2 to 4 shed light on the influence specialists 
have on public hospital systems as they look to balance workloads between public, private 
and in some cases academic responsibilities. Some authors (Howden-Chapman and 
Ashton, 2000, Yates, 1995), have reported conflicts of interest for some specialists who look 
to profit by doing maximum workloads within private hospitals where they carry out simpler 
operations leaving more complex operations for the public system to deal with. Administrator 
B discusses his experience with specialists‟ ability to manipulate the system for personal 
gains: 
“I do think there are colleagues that try to game the system but I don‟t think the system is 
easily „gamed‟ and a lot of what people project onto it. I think many aspects of the nature of 
when people can get operating times is so far beyond what the surgeons can call it‟s not 
funny. I‟m not saying they are not busy up the road doing what they are doing but I don‟t 
know that, I think this is partly to fill in the time that they don‟t have in public. If you have long 
waiting times then there should be expectation on the public side of the system to fix that. 
The Ministry has set those expectations and they have their own formula for it.” 
From the qualitative feedback received it seems as though specialists have little control to 
manipulate the system for personal benefit. All the specialists interviewed had particular 
contracts with the DHB which specifically set out when, and for how long they work in public, 
how long they can work in private around public obligations and in some cases also have 
time designated for academic appointments. Specialist A outlines the division of time he 
spends between each of these obligations: 
“I have a set day that I operate in public, Monday at Kenepuru Hospital, that‟s my public 
hospital day. Then I have other days during the week when I work in private but I don‟t not 
do work in public when I am working in private. I still do my one day a week in the public 
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hospital operating theatre to fulfil my contractual obligations to the DHB. I‟m contracted to 
work four half days a week for them. I have a joint contract with the University of Otago and 
the DHB, five half days with the university and the other half day is when I‟m allowed to do 
my private practice. But then they let me do an extra half day of private practice as well.” 
This insight shows that it is less about the way the specialist decides to divide his or her 
times and more about the contractual relationships that are formed between them and the 
DHB. If the DHB could afford to employ individual specialists for longer, you would expect 
that the DHB could negotiate new contracts but in the long term, specialists cannot waiver 
from their contractual obligations. Administrator B points out that: 
“The behaviour of the surgeons is different, but I think you will find from [sic] most specialists 
is they have less control over their waiting lists than most people think. There is this thing 
that surgeons are putting operations off because they are busy in private. I think it will also 
be related to what is available here. For instance, much of eye surgery is contracted out to 
the private sector. At one stage more than half of stuff was done outside the hospital 
grounds.” 
Public/Private Contractual Relationships 
One thing that has a particularly large impact on public waiting lists is the contractual 
arrangements between individual DHBs and private hospitals. As Administrator A points out, 
a significant number of DHBs have been contracting out elective surgery to the private 
sector because they have not had the resources to do it in the public. This is especially the 
case in DHBs with less sophisticated hospital facilities, areas of the country like the west 
coast of the South Island, Tairawhiti, Northland or Taranaki. These DHBs buy private 
hospital services from providers in main centres such as Auckland, Wellington and 
Christchurch. When this occurs specialists of the DHBs located in the main centres such as 
Waitemata, Auckland, Counties Manukau, Hutt Valley, Capital and Coast and Canterbury 
have more work on their hands and may choose to do less public work and more private 
work for better money in the private hospital sector. In this case there would be fewer 
surgeons available for work in public hospitals which may influence the inflation of waiting 
times in these DHBs. Specialist C said: 
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“I think New Plymouth outsources it, typically small centres have done that for logistical 
reasons because they are not doing huge volumes of ophthalmology it is more efficient to do 
it at a private hospital.” 
This also occurs in the larger centres as Specialist B states: 
“The ability of the DHB to buy operating time from the private sector, which is what they do, 
has a huge impact. With Capital and Coast health, the ability of them to contract out cardiac 
surgery, ENT services, I think they probably contract out cataract surgery as well which has 
a huge impact on their own waiting lists, it is a very big factor.” 
One thing that has a large effect on the amount of surgery that is outsourced to the private 
sector is the enforcement of ESPI targets where the Ministry of Health will threaten to reduce 
funding to individual DHBs in the case where they do not meet their obligations. Specialist C 
comments further: 
“One of the other things that they tend to do is suddenly they will contract a whole lot of 
surgery out to the private sector in an attempt to keep the waiting lists down to get extra 
funding and they get in the situation where they have 400 cataracts to do in three months 
and they become price-takers rather than price-makers, in other words you will get two or 
three people saying ‟We can do that but you are going to have to pay us this much‟. 
Whereas, if they dribbled them out through the year people would say ‟Well I will do it for 
whatever you want because it fills up my time‟, it is not well managed. The public sector 
does not manage its need for resources all too [sic] well.” 
As Specialist C has described the DHB becomes a price-taker rather than a price-maker 
when they have no choice but to tender out services to the private sector. In cases where 
the local private hospitals cannot sustain demand and if the DHB is in a rush to get surgery 
done it is not unheard of for management to send people offshore for treatment, which can 
be an expensive task. Administrator B reflects on one occasion where this was the case:   
“In 2007-08 the backlog for elective surgery was huge, and we had to send about 50 odd 
people to Sydney to have operations.” 
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Specialist B comments further on this: 
“I think it happens quite often and it is just a reflection of the pressure that the DHBs are 
under, so they will go to great lengths to get waiting lists down, for sure.” 
Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) Effects 
Administrator A notes over 50% of elective orthopaedic surgery is paid for by the ACC, and 
some of that is done in public under contracts but most of it is undertaken in private 
hospitals. The author has removed all ACC cases from the NBRS dataset to remove the bias 
that would be encountered with so many patients utilising private care under ACC. (See 
Chapter 5,  section 5.3.2.) Because specialists are having to commit time to operate on 
these ACC cases, this has an indirect effect on the amount of time they are available to 
undertake surgery within the booking system. So the amount of ACC patients in a DHB may 
affect waiting times as the same surgeons are operating on both booking system and ACC 
patients. Administrator A comments on contractual arrangements for ACC: 
“About 80% of ACC surgery is done in the private hospitals, but it is not the patient‟s choice, 
they would have it done under a contract that is usually held by the private hospital. They 
basically bid for a contract. Say in Wellington, Wakefield would have a contract, Southern 
Cross would have a contract and the public hospital would also have a contract. ACC think 
that this keeps the private sector honest and competitive. Under the ACC contract they are 
paid by ACC at the contract price that they have agreed. But when they are doing contract 
work for the public sector, yeah, they do get screwed by the DHBs as much as possible, they 
get forced down in terms of price, I understand. But not hugely because the DHBs concern is 
to get the work done. But ACC are skewing things at the moment.” 
ACC has significantly decreased the number of clients for surgery in the last 18 months so 
even though someone might have had an accident ACC have decided that it is not an 
accident and therefore they are not going to pay. These people still need their operation, and 
no one is certain what is happening to those patients. They would have to go onto the 
waiting list but they are usually of fairly low priority, so they probably don‟t even get on the 
waiting list and we don‟t know what is happening to them. In all probability they enter the 
booking system at FSA and will not meet the CPAC score to proceed to surgery so enter the 
residual waiting list, as described above (Administrator A). 
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9.3 Theoretical Implications 
This thesis has made an important contribution to knowledge of the social and geographical 
inequalities evident in the provision of elective services in New Zealand. Through a mixture 
of quantitative and qualitative research this work has found significant differences in public 
access for a variety of communities in different areas of New Zealand. No health geographer 
to the author‟s knowledge has undertaken research on the rationing of elective surgery 
through the New Zealand public hospital sector in the manner set out in this thesis. 
Geographers have long approached issues of health service delivery but focus has often 
been limited to an analysis of „change‟ within hospital systems, specifically, assessing 
pressures that have led governments to adapt health systems in order to meet the needs of 
society (Barnett and Copeland, 2009, Barnett and Barnett, 2009). Some research has 
examined geographical differences in hospital resources, including Roemer‟s Law, through 
analysis of the number of hospital beds in a region and comparing this with hospital demand 
or universal measures of need (Brown and Barnett, 1992). Few studies have taken account 
of public hospital service provision following the introduction of the NZBS in 1998 the way 
that this thesis has. 
As far as rationing goes, geographers have discussed the rationalisation of hospital services 
(Barnett, 1999), and to some extent actions of filtering in PHC systems (Brown, 1988, Blank, 
1994), but they have not approached the contentious issue of waiting times. The 
examination of waiting times in elective surgery has been left to sociologists (Spicker, 2008, 
Roake, 2003), economists (Frech and Hopkins, 2004) and public health researchers within 
the medical profession (Howden-Chapman and Ashton, 2000, Derrett et al., 2009). Little 
research has attempted to recognise geographical variations in health service delivery 
between provider organisations with the exception of Derrett et al‟s (2009) study which 
compares waiting times across New Zealand DHBs for several elective surgical procedures. 
This thesis provides detailed spatial analysis of the performance of different DHBs against 
each other and also shows comparisons with Australian results, differences which have not 
been observed from any other source. 
Much research has been published by public health commentators on the implementation of 
the NZBS since 1998. Most have commented on equity of access to public hospital systems 
since the introduction of the new clinical prioritisation tools and processes (Howden-
Chapman and Ashton, 2000, Gauld and Derrett, 2000, Roake, 2003, Derrett et al., 2003). A 
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body of qualitative research was undertaken which reported on clinicians‟ attitudes and 
reflections having had to deal first hand with the new clinical prioritisation criteria tools 
(McLeod et al., 2004a, McLeod et al., 2004b, McLoed et al., 2004). This research has raised 
issues of inequality between different ethnic and socio-economic groups in facing different 
levels of access to elective treatments. As seen throughout other literature (Howden-
Chapman and Ashton, 2000, Yates, 1995), analysis also found evidence that some 
specialists were manipulating the booking system for personal benefit. Findings from this 
study have suggested that there are large inconsistencies in the way that patients are 
prioritised for surgery as well as wide variation in specialists‟ use of national scoring tools. 
Feedback from interviews indicated that many DHBs have dropped patients off waiting lists 
as prioritisation criteria toughened, many patients of which would have previously been 
eligible for surgery in the public hospital system before 1998 are now left untreated and 
managed through the primary health care system. 
Geographers have examined theories of inequality and exclusion in relation to environmental 
risk and other related vulnerabilities. They have also found in many cases that people living 
in relatively deprived circumstances suffer higher levels of morbidity and mortality amongst 
the remainder of society (Dew and Kirkman, 2007a). Some have shown that these 
individuals suffer poorer access to health services, in particular to PHC systems (Barnett and 
Lauer, 2003). Much of the analysis takes account of the income effect that limits patient 
access to PHC services, specialist consultation and private hospital treatments (Schoen et 
al., 2000). Geographers have also looked as the way that Maori and Pacific Islanders also 
have poorer access to health services through their lower socio-economic status (Brown, 
1999) and higher levels of morbidity when compared to the remainder of the New Zealand 
population Salmond and Crampton, (2000). To the author‟s knowledge, no geographer has 
considered the effects of ethnicity and deprivation on the individual process of prioritisation 
and referral or waiting times for elective surgery. This thesis has found that certain ethnic 
minorities, particularly Maori and Pacific Island people and patients from low socio-economic 
communities have significantly longer waiting times in some DHBs. 
In comparing public/private interaction in the market for hospital care and the effects on 
public hospital systems, one New Zealand sociologist has a particularly large influence. 
Fougere (1974, 2001) blames the private hospital and medical insurance industry for the 
poor performance of publicly funded hospital systems. The only geographers that are known 
to have reached a similar conclusion are Barnett and Barnett (1989) who commentated on 
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this during their work on the privatisation of hospital systems and they found that higher 
private hospital admissions were associated with longer waiting lists in the public hospital 
sector. Twenty years later Derrett et al (2009) published a similar study which compared 
New Zealand waiting times for specific procedures (total joint replacement, prostatectomy 
and cataract operations) with hospital admissions data for the public and private sector over 
the period 2000 to 2005. Derrrett et al (2009) confirmed that waiting times for each 
procedure increased in line with higher levels of private practice in the DHB of origin. Derrett 
et al (2009) also illustrate how highly deprived individuals have lower private admission rates 
than the affluent and tend to rely on the public system for elective surgery. This research has 
shown similar results noting that in DHBs with high private admission rates, patient were 
subject to longer waiting lists in the public hospital system. 
The author based certain aspects of this thesis on Derrett et al‟s (2009) work but instead 
focused on higher level analysis across the NZBS for a more recent period. There has been 
further examination of geographic differences and the author has added ethnicity and a 
number of other measures in relation to access for public treatments and conducted similar 
public/private analysis relevant to the entire public booking system. This thesis supports the 
hypothesis that private practice places strain on public hospital resources and further 
reduces access to hospital services for vulnerable populations, particularly Maori and Pacific 
and highly deprived patients. 
9.4 Policy Implications 
This next section will discuss a few policy implications and recommendations that have 
arisen as a result of this thesis. Firstly, the inconsistency of CPAC tools will be examined 
and recommendations are made to improve the geographic equality of access to hospital 
services so that the likelihood of treatment does not depend on where a patient lives. 
Secondly, the research shows that there is no universal measure of need for elective surgery 
in New Zealand that takes into account patients that fall onto the residual waiting list, so 
suggestions are made to create a clinical needs register would include every patient that 
gets referred from their GP to specialist care. Faults in the Ministry of Health‟s reporting and 
penalty systems are mentioned which encourage DHBs to do the minimum required and 
support inefficient use of the private sector. A recommendation is made that there be 
separate operating theatres for elective and acute operations to avoid delays in the booking 
system as a response to several comments made by hospital specialists and administrators. 
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Finally, about ways to best make the best use of a private hospital sector that specialises in 
the market for elective services. 
Clinical Priority Assessment Criteria (CPAC) Tools 
The problem with CPAC tools at present is that they are not being used universally across 
DHBs. In 1998 when the booking system was introduced one of the key principles was to 
increase equality across New Zealand by using universal clinical priority tools. Below are the 
recommendations for the Ministry of Health: 
 Introduce national scoring tools for the use of specialists, nurses and administrators 
individually by specialty. 
 Enforce the use of the CPAC tools for each DHB. This may go some way to reducing 
the inequality that is seen for waiting times between DHBs. It will also allow better 
evaluation of how individual DHBs perform against other DHBs simply by observing 
CPAC score thresholds that are set for patients‟ commitment to treatment. 
Measure of Need 
This research has shown that there is no meaningful way of recording clinical needs for 
elective surgery that is currently being practiced by each of the DHBs. Because CPAC 
scoring systems are nationally inconsistent, such scores are meaningless when compared 
with one another. If CPAC scoring tools were consistent across all DHBs, administered and 
recorded accurately, need would be able to be registered nationally for meaningful analysis. 
This would ensure consistency and transparency for the Ministry of Health to judge how well 
each DHB is delivering services. Transparency is one of the main goals which has never 
been realised since the NZBS was created in 1998. 
The thesis has also found that there are no records kept of patients being dropped from the 
booking system and sent back to their GP. Although some patients may not have required 
surgery as warranted by the specialist, others return to their GP because they did not reach 
the financial threshold to advance to surgery within the 18 months active review period, as 
shown in Figure 16. These patients form part of a hidden group that make up the residual 
waiting list. If DHBs kept a record of how many patients are falling out of the booking system 
(referred back to primary care) this would give a better understanding of the needs that New 
Zealand‟s population has for elective surgery. 
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Ministry of Health Reporting Systems 
The Ministry of Health‟s ESPI reporting systems are not operating to provide a correct 
measure of need and encourage efficient service delivery within each DHB. There are three 
reasons why this is the case. The first is because ESPI target five which states that „DHBs 
should not have any more than 5% of patients waiting more than 180 days between when 
the DHB gives a commitment to treatment and date of surgery‟ gives DHB management the 
ability to adjust patients‟ commitment to treatment. The second is that DHBs have the ability 
to manipulate waiting times by continually altering the financial threshold at which patients 
come on or drop off the waiting list, depending on whether the DHB is meeting targets. 
Finally, penalties for not meeting ESPI are forcing DHBs to make inefficient decisions such 
as sending large numbers of patients across to the private sector here and abroad to avoid 
MoH sanctions. The author recommends: 
 Switching the, commitment to treatment for ESPI 5 to first specialist assessment (in 
particular for those patients that end up meeting the score required to proceed to 
surgery). This would give a truer measure of waiting time and take away the ability 
for DHBs to manipulate waiting lists the way they do currently. 
 Setting a CPAC score threshold for patients to receive treatment that can only be 
changed every 180 days by a DHB. This would give patients assurance as to when 
they will receive treatment. 
 Requiring DHBs to utilise private hospital resources throughout the year to avoid 
large volumes of surgery being forced through at the end of each ESPI reporting 
period. 
Public Hospitals 
Feedback from the specialists and administrators suggested that the amount of work 
associated with trauma and acute surgery cases has a huge effect on the ability to deliver of 
elective surgery. It has been suggested several times that separate theatre suites be set-up 
with some designated for trauma and acute events alone and with other theatres designated 
specifically for the purpose of elective surgery. It is understood the demands and importance 
of some trauma events absorb large amounts of resources and in some cases the 
cancellation of elective surgery cannot be avoided.   
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Smart Use of the Private Hospital Sector 
There is argument against the expansion of New Zealand‟s private hospital sector. While this 
thesis has confirmed that the private hospital system has been of some detriment to the 
public system in the inflation of waiting times, much argument has come from executives like 
Terry Moore, President of the New Zealand Private Surgical Hospitals Association 
(NZPSHA), who claim that the private hospital sector can provide advantages by 
complementing the public sector in many respects. In the past the NZPSHA has promoted a 
„balanced health care model‟ in which “…the public and private health systems work together 
co-operatively to meet the health care needs of New Zealanders” (Moore, 2011). The ability 
for private hospitals to specialise in elective surgical procedures with their dedicated clinical 
teams and purpose-built facilities means they are very efficient providers of elective 
interventions. As these hospitals are profit-maximising private organisations it is in the 
private provider‟s interest to maximise the difference between its costs and the price it 
charges. For this reason it is not uncommon for the public hospital sector to be held to 
ransom by private hospitals and be charged a price well above what it costs to provide these 
treatments. Therefore, it is crucial that DHBs negotiate a fair price with private providers 
when they choose to outsource surgery. If public providers maintain the ability to negotiate 
fair prices with the private sector this balanced care model makes sense but if private 
hospitals inflate the price of their services, the complementary role of private medicine 
becomes unsustainable. 
The public hospital system sometimes disadvantages itself through its rationing processes 
which restrict the most efficient use of the private hospital sector. In this case the problem 
lies not with the private health care practices but through rigid public prioritisation processes. 
There are some instances when CPAC scoring system disadvantages patients who are 
willing to utilise the private sector. Specialist C provided an example of how this can be the 
case in ophthalmology;  some patients are willing to get one eye operated on in the private 
sector and have the second done in a public hospital with the understanding that public 
hospitals are short of resources. But the problem is if they get one done in private their 
CPAC score falls below the threshold. So they have to wait to get the first one done in the 
public sector before getting the other done in the private system. Patients like those 
described by Specialist C recognise that the public system works under a rationing system 
and are willing and able to pay for one eye to be treated, but because of the rigid rules that 
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apply to the scoring procedure they risk not having the second eye done and have to wait to 
get both eyes treated in the public system. 
9.5 Recommendations for Future Studies 
Looking back at this research it was unfortunate that the analysis was not able to be 
conducted by specialty to correlate admission rates to waiting times as a result of data being 
incorrectly coded or not recorded in the NMDS dataset by DHB administrators. If the author 
had known this at the outset, when planning the research, procedure codes that which are 
correctly coded could have been used to compare individual operation waiting times to the 
equivalent admission rates. 
It would be very useful, as others have described (Gauld and Derrett, 2000), to examine the 
residual waiting list either throughout the country or locally in one DHB. Fiona Pimm, a 
hospital manager for Canterbury DHB who spoke to the author during the planning of this 
thesis said that the Canterbury DHB was retrieving information on all patients referred back 
to primary care. This would provide an interesting dataset to analyse, in order to understand 
the status of the residual waiting list. 
Some suggestions were received from interviewees for analysis to include in the study. 
Unfortunately, because this thesis was limited to one year in duration the author had to limit 
the scope of the project and was unable to include some of the recommended analyses. 
These suggestions are discussed below along with some other comments on the way this 
research could have been done differently. 
Administrator B commented that it may have been useful to talk to surgeons and 
administrators from a selection of DHBs to try and understand the way different DHBs 
administer waiting times and to find out how interconnected the DHBs are throughout the 
regions. As a research project this could be undertaken using in-depth qualitative 
interviewing between neighbouring DHBs, for example comparing Canterbury with South 
Canterbury DHBs. For a more in-depth study this could be undertaken nationwide, or in 
either the North or South Island to a gain greater understanding of inter-DHB contracting and 
specialist work practices.  
Administrator B also recommended establishing the number of specialists employed in each 
DHB by specialty and correlate this to waiting times. More depth could be provided to this 
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research if each specialist‟s work time was recorded by how many days they work between 
the public and private hospital sectors. The scope of such a project if undertaken nationally 
could become unmanageable so the analysis could be limited to one surgical specialty e.g., 
orthopaedics. This would provide an excellent measure of the labour resources that are 
available to each DHB and would provide further insight into the effect of the private sector 
on public waiting times.  
Specialist B suggested making correlations between the percentages of population privately 
insured against waiting times experienced in the public sector for each DHB. Analysis such 
as this would be very useful but there may be limitations on access to private insurer 
membership data as these private organisations look to retain a low profile. 
All the medical specialists and hospital administrators interviewed were impressed with the 
results that were produced during the quantitative analysis sections of this thesis. This thesis 
has provided analysis and reported on an important area of health services geography. 
Although, there is much more scope for other researchers to study discover and report on 
the rationing of elective services in the New Zealand public hospital system.  
9.6 Conclusion 
The New Zealand „Waiting Times Project‟ was envisaged to improve equity of access to 
public elective surgery by increasing the consistency and transparency of prioritisation 
processes. The reality is that since 1998 when the booking system was introduced 
implementation has not followed the key strategies that were originally set out. Prioritisation 
criteria vary significantly between New Zealand‟s 21 DHBs providers, which mean there is 
no universal measure of need. From 1998 thousands of patients were dropped from waiting 
lists as prioritisation criteria tightened, creating a residual waiting list of patients that require 
surgery but do not meet the criteria to receive it. At the same time DHBs have filtered away 
surplus resources to fund perceived higher priority areas, such resources could otherwise 
have been available for elective procedures. DHBs are driven by organisational pressures 
focused on meeting targets and specific goals that are set by the central funder of health and 
disability services, the New Zealand Ministry of Health.  
The New Zealand health system was the first in the world to introduce comprehensive social 
security legislation in health and the government continues to operate a single payer tax-
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funded public health system. Such systems usually favour principles of equity, to ensure 
universal access and impose pressures of efficiency and in some respects effectiveness. 
The NZBS is an explicit form of health service rationing that restricts patients‟ access to 
publically funded surgery. Governments that operate such tools must ensure that they 
operate in a fair and equal way to cater for all their citizens. This thesis found that this was 
not the case in New Zealand during the period 2004-2007. Waiting times were shown to vary 
substantially across New Zealand with people of high material deprivation as well as Maori 
and Pacific Islanders waiting substantially longer for treatment in some regions. Also, waiting 
times were shown to be highest in DHBs that have more private practice. The reality is that 
there are many people who suffer with often chronic conditions who would truly benefit from 
treatment but who may never meet the priority criteria for surgery. Unfortunately these 
individuals tend not to be able to afford private health insurance and are left to suffer rather 
than seeking care through private hospital facilities. 
 
Appendix 
216 
 
10 Appendix 
Appendix 1 
 
Appendix 
217 
 
 
Appendix 
218 
 
  
Appendix 
219 
 
 Appendix 2 
 
Figure 60: Map of District Health Boards (DHBs) 
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Figure 61: Map of Australian States and Territories 
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Appendix 3 
  
DHBs           Age 0-14 15-24 25-44 45-64 65-74 75+ Totals 
Northland 4003 1092 4356 9110 5909 5418 29888 
Waitemata 11203 3414 13425 17336 11111 12995 69484 
Auckland 7723 1981 7539 9593 5572 7006 39414 
Counties Manukau 12581 2979 11487 18189 10176 9717 65129 
Waikato 7538 2267 7862 13966 9671 10628 51932 
Lakes 2720 837 3522 5057 3036 2932 18104 
Bay of Plenty 4850 1672 6552 11367 8069 9149 41659 
Tairawhiti 1448 489 1754 2734 1413 1401 9239 
Taranaki 2448 1216 3511 5828 4211 4697 21911 
Hawkes Bay 3954 1595 4435 7735 5066 5185 27970 
Whanganui 2162 914 2950 4273 2699 2975 15973 
Mid Central 3540 1395 4190 6059 4181 4346 23711 
Capital and Coast 3573 1303 4760 7409 4085 4086 25216 
Hutt 5664 1805 5547 6980 4294 4571 28861 
Wairarapa 849 381 1281 2047 1316 1310 7184 
Nelson Marlborough 3183 1492 4660 7722 4778 5522 27357 
West Coast 872 516 2057 3007 1441 1162 9055 
Canterbury 8126 4175 12727 17568 10252 10824 63672 
South Canterbury 1519 682 2252 3299 2231 2317 12300 
Otago 3371 1924 4605 8015 5563 6915 30393 
Southland 3114 1006 3094 3866 2468 2489 16037 
Overseas 63 31 75 110 47 38 364 
Other 11 0 9 9 5 11 45 
Totals 94515 33166 112650 171279 107594 115694 634898 
Table 28: Total Public Elective Hospital Admissions 2004-2007 (NMDS) 
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DHBs            Age 0-14 15-24 25-44 45-64 65-74 75+ Totals 
Northland 670 666 2092 4906 2111 1745 12190 
Waitemata 4074 2645 7220 9970 2752 1816 28477 
Auckland 3841 2348 5936 6538 1736 1236 21635 
Counties Manukau 2249 1456 3769 4996 1306 716 14492 
Waikato 2548 1951 6234 12286 4565 3354 30938 
Lakes 598 529 1435 3689 1615 1309 9175 
Bay of Plenty 960 621 2668 6550 2846 1716 15361 
Tairawhiti 105 97 359 1168 508 552 2789 
Taranaki 70 109 320 690 252 120 1561 
Hawkes Bay 717 534 1945 4015 1361 1128 9700 
Whanganui 137 92 319 601 296 272 1717 
Mid Central 583 649 2099 3870 1378 808 9387 
Capital and Coast 2134 2628 8450 13709 5413 4489 36823 
Hutt 1180 1020 3240 6431 2435 2082 16388 
Wairarapa 225 118 510 1536 667 508 3564 
Nelson Marlborough 445 457 1574 3332 1066 658 7532 
West Coast 120 76 269 563 180 110 1318 
Canterbury 5515 3384 11411 22500 8728 8114 59652 
South Canterbury 334 210 826 1785 614 564 4333 
Otago 1498 1938 3829 6437 2265 1805 17772 
Southland 1015 813 3055 5379 1914 1487 13663 
Overseas 330 181 543 752 357 189 2352 
Totals 29348 22522 68103 121703 44365 34778 320819 
Table 29: Total Private Hospital Admissions 2004-2007 (NMDS) 
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DHBs          Age 0-14 15-24 25-44 45-64 65-74 75+ Totals 
Northland 2016 636 2759 5829 3752 3569 18561 
Waitemata 1437 477 1974 2944 1621 1729 10182 
Auckland 1875 493 2178 2859 1436 1516 10357 
Counties Manukau 1130 430 1586 2549 1270 1139 8104 
Waikato 2263 911 3271 5585 3907 4354 20291 
Lakes 1014 466 2019 2787 1629 1548 9463 
Bay of Plenty 1278 636 2513 4246 2999 3314 14986 
Tairawhiti 721 327 1200 1750 877 946 5821 
Taranaki 523 297 977 1791 1446 1604 6638 
Hawkes Bay 1961 792 2461 4132 2504 2483 14333 
Whanganui 1293 515 1745 2880 2225 2515 11173 
Mid Central 795 500 1725 2403 1533 1744 8700 
Capital and Coast 975 517 1497 1767 827 741 6324 
Hutt 835 386 1734 2456 1297 1142 7850 
Wairarapa 235 142 437 658 367 377 2216 
Nelson Marlborough 440 362 1122 1583 1082 1451 6040 
West Coast 180 160 694 1233 618 538 3423 
Canterbury 1184 911 2706 3002 1474 1744 11021 
South Canterbury 69 45 121 229 157 123 744 
Otago 585 515 944 1555 1054 1558 6211 
Southland 646 216 797 1082 713 613 4067 
Totals 21455 9734 34460 53320 32788 34748 186505 
Table 30: Public Elective Admissions 2004-2007 for Dep 8, 9, and 10 by Age Group (NMDS) 
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DHBs         Age 0-14 15-24 25-44 45-64 65-74 75+ Totals 
Northland 422 403 1240 2705 1129 1085 6984 
Waitemata 242 229 669 688 186 143 2157 
Auckland 477 594 1348 1103 286 139 3947 
Counties Manukau 527 446 1219 1295 364 208 4059 
Waikato 673 671 1883 3403 1316 1110 9056 
Lakes 262 227 619 1585 585 611 3889 
Bay of Plenty 204 173 642 1658 735 481 3893 
Tairawhiti 51 50 175 604 262 340 1482 
Taranaki 17 44 136 287 103 56 643 
Hawkes Bay 132 105 415 868 295 326 2141 
Whanganui 214 255 763 1476 612 489 3809 
Mid Central 52 40 123 279 137 138 769 
Capital and Coast 226 657 1472 1662 476 419 4912 
Hutt 312 204 737 1148 505 367 3273 
Wairarapa 64 46 144 365 164 146 929 
Nelson Marlborough 83 112 349 547 162 141 1394 
West Coast 40 34 110 217 65 38 504 
Canterbury 653 650 1860 2956 1057 1205 8381 
South Canterbury 61 51 166 381 136 119 914 
Otago 187 628 627 915 304 278 2939 
Southland 131 124 458 877 280 238 2108 
Totals 5030 5743 15155 25019 9159 8077 68183 
Table 31: Private Admissions 2004-2007 for Dep 8, 9, and 10 by Age Group (NMDS) 
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DHBs          Age 0-14 15-24 25-44 45-64 65-74 75+ Totals 
Northland 34,776 17,157 35,691 39,354 12,342 9,117 148,437 
Waitemata 104,553 67,710 143,109 113,295 28,545 24,405 481,617 
Auckland 76,092 67,251 136,179 86,322 19,758 19,011 404,613 
Counties Manukau 112,110 65,115 124,065 93,648 22,113 16,032 433,083 
Waikato 77,358 48,924 90,147 80,040 23,466 19,251 339,186 
Lakes 23,862 12,459 26,685 23,607 6,579 5,127 98,319 
Bay of Plenty 43,611 22,611 48,840 48,963 16,518 14,388 194,931 
Tairawhiti 11,652 5,751 11,202 10,527 2,916 2,421 44,469 
Taranaki 22,713 13,080 27,174 25,875 7,935 7,500 104,277 
Hawkes Bay 34,098 18,210 38,058 37,341 10,914 9,624 148,245 
Whanganui 13,800 7,851 15,219 15,558 5,151 4,641 62,220 
Mid Central 33,924 24,090 40,902 37,578 11,946 10,398 158,838 
Capital and Coast 30,843 18,483 39,084 32,244 8,298 7,146 136,098 
Hutt 51,915 42,360 85,287 58,983 15,108 13,008 266,661 
Wairarapa 8,151 4,221 9,093 10,830 3,363 2,961 38,619 
Nelson Marlborough 25,773 14,688 34,086 36,342 10,140 9,039 130,068 
West Coast 6,396 3,393 8,385 8,820 2,433 1,902 31,329 
Canterbury 91,689 66,507 131,667 113,850 31,953 30,738 466,404 
South Canterbury 10,506 5,805 12,987 14,865 5,055 4,662 53,880 
Otago 31,914 31,728 45,150 44,742 13,431 12,435 179,400 
Southland 21,813 13,743 31,128 26,349 7,491 6,309 106,833 
Totals 867,549 571,137 1,134,138 959,133 265,455 230,115 4,027,527 
Table 32: Age Structure for New Zealand‟s Population 2006 (by DHB) 
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DHBs           Age 0-14 15-24 25-44 45-64 65-74 75+ Totals 
Northland 20377 11663 19918 20973 7150 5681 85763 
Waitemata 18388 11872 23337 14597 3959 3369 75522 
Auckland 32103 26034 51192 28707 6989 5182 150207 
Counties Manukau 59647 33914 59073 37556 9430 6388 206007 
Waikato 27832 21380 29957 25611 8133 6715 119627 
Lakes 13776 8613 14771 11772 3756 2880 55567 
Bay of Plenty 20612 11054 20556 18843 6727 5659 83451 
Tairawhiti 8215 4721 7479 6889 2096 1873 31272 
Taranaki 17002 9873 17073 14553 4645 4065 67210 
Hawkes Bay 5753 3701 6277 6747 2568 2381 27428 
Whanganui 10920 8770 12158 11278 4618 4208 51951 
Mid Central 8321 5538 8646 8290 2993 2808 36597 
Capital and Coast 12325 12770 18892 10720 2715 1978 59400 
Hutt 9736 5978 11704 8451 2268 1950 40085 
Wairarapa 1650 978 1661 1667 597 445 6996 
Nelson Marlborough 3610 2684 5090 3874 1271 1679 18207 
West Coast 2492 1601 2919 3562 1247 1043 12863 
Canterbury 15745 16354 26714 18414 5376 6191 88795 
South Canterbury 1407 1217 1882 1985 893 1029 8414 
Otago 4144 13997 7329 5890 2071 2558 35988 
Southland 5597 3913 6756 6276 1959 1734 26234 
Totals 299651 216624 353383 266653 81459 69816 1287584 
Table 33: Age Structure of New Zealand‟s Population for Dep 8, 9, and 10 for 2006 (by DHB) 
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Appendix 4 
 
Age Groups Cases Mean Std. Deviation Median 
0-14 65809 123 164 72 
15-24 28941 164 226 84 
25-44 104602 157 226 81 
45-64 151335 157 240 72 
65-74 97873 152 227 73 
75+ 115051 142 214 70 
All Ages 563611 149 222 74 
Table 34: Age Group Summary of Waiting Times 2004-2006 (Days) 
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Appendix 5 
 NNNZ Dep 2006 (Quintiles) R
2
 and P Values Based on Decile Scores 
DHB Very Low Low Medium High Very High Total R2 Value P Value 
Northland 84 87 84 86 88 86 0.312 0.093 
Waitemata 57 59 60 62 66 60 0.886 0.000 
Auckland 65 69 72 72 72 71 0.571 0.011 
Counties Manukau 59 63 62 65 70 65 0.778 0.001 
Waikato 68 64 66 69 73 69 0.346 0.074 
Lakes 67 64 64 72 68 68 0.000 0.952 
Bay of Plenty 61 66 68 68 53 63 0.108 0.354 
Tairawhiti 64 56 65 54 63 63 0.137 0.328 
Taranaki 64 67 68 72 67 70 0.195 0.202 
Hawke's Bay 72 71 72 80 80 76 0.530 0.017 
Whanganui 50 63 59 57 55 56 0.024 0.668 
Mid Central 77 76 73 76 83 77 0.013 0756 
Hutt Valley 91 108 104 104 109 103 0.542 0.015 
Capital and Coast 94 97 103 99 102 99 0.324 0.086 
Wairarapa 59 69 66 67 63 66 0.009 0.805 
Nelson Marlborough 79 80 80 83 80 82 0.276 0.119 
West Coast 79 85 73 78 87 80 0.286 0.111 
Canterbury 83 84 83 86 91 85 0.549 0.014 
South Canterbury 75 71 72 75 83 74 0.140 0.361 
Otago 80 85 83 84 78 83 0.849 0.005 
Southland 77 77 72 79 77 77 0.010 0.786 
New Zealand 71 73 74 75 74 74 - - 
Table 35: Median Waiting Times by Deprivation 2004-2007 (Days)
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Appendix 6 
Deprivation European Median Maori and Pacific Median N (European) N (Maori/Pacific) 
1 Very Low 70 76 60685 4414 
2 Low 72 78 74545 6916 
3 Medium 73 77 92427 12401 
4 High 74 78 114964 22896 
5 Very High 71 77 80686 50382 
Total 72 77 423307 97009 
 
 European  Maori Pacific  
Deprivation 25th Percentile 75th Percentile 25th Percentile 75th Percentile 
1 Very Low 28 178 31 173 
2 Low 28 178 31 181 
3 Medium 29 178 31 180 
4 High 29 181 31 182 
5 Very High 28 176 31 182 
Table 36: European and Maori/Pacific Median Waiting Times and 25
th
 and 75
th
 Percentile by Dep06 2004-2007 
Urban Rural 
Classification 
European Median Maori and Pacific Median N (European) N (Maori/Pacific) 
Main Urban 72 78 278098 70272 
Sec Urban 68 74 44273 6060 
Minor Urban 74 77 49702 10414 
Rural Centre 77 78 11220 2865 
Other Rural 73 80 39956 7395 
Total 72 77 423249 97006 
 
Urban Rural 
Classification 
European 
25th Percentile 
 
75th Percentile 
Maori Pacific 
25th Percentile 
 
75th Percentile 
Main Urban 29 177 32 78 
Sec Urban 27 170 29 74 
Minor Urban 29 181 29 77 
Rural Centre 29 189 27 78 
Other Rural 28 181 29 80 
Table 37: European and Maori/Pacific Median Waiting Times and 25
th
 and 75
th
 Percentile by Urban Rural 
Classification 2004-2007 
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Urban Rural 
Classification 
Very Low 
(Quintile 1) 
Very High 
(Quintile 5) 
N (Quintile 1) N (Quintile 5) 
Main Urban 71 75 53215 99051 
Sec Urban 68 62 3413 10153 
Minor Urban 78 75 2234 23213 
Rural Centre 77 75 608 3825 
Other Rural 72 78 11948 4422 
Total 71 74 71444 140674 
Table 38: NZ Dep 06 High and Low Deprivation Median Waiting Times by Urban Rural Classification 2004-2007 
Deprivation European Median Maori and Pacific Median N (European) N (Maori/Pacific) 
1 Very Low 69 34 205 48 
2 Low 54 59 810 128 
3 Medium 64 71 1072 371 
4 High 43 61 161 152 
5 Very High 60 70 3124 2972 
Total 60 69 5372 3671 
Table 39: Tairawhiti DHB: Waiting Times by Dep2006 European versus Maori Pacific Populations 
Deprivation European Median Maori and Pacific Median N (European) N (Maori/Pacific) 
1 Very Low 57 66 6409 578 
2 Low 58 75 2381 356 
3 Medium 58 76 6356 1421 
4 High 60 69 3157 1584 
5 Very High 60 75 8326 14593 
Total 58 74 26629 18532 
Table 40: Counties Manukau DHB: Waiting Times by Dep2006 European versus Maori Pacific Populations 
Deprivation European Median Maori and Pacific Median N (European) N (Maori/Pacific) 
1 Very Low 76 71 988 35 
2 Low 70 87 2087 70 
3 Medium 70 76 2893 111 
4 High 73 98 3599 229 
5 Very High 81 99 825 27 
Total 72 85 10392 472 
Table 41: South Canterbury DHB: Waiting Times by Dep2006 European versus Maori Pacific Populations 
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Deprivation European Median Maori and Pacific Median N (European) N (Maori/Pacific) 
1 Very Low 79 105 2515 95 
2 Low 80 92 7133 376 
3 Medium 79 83 6510 330 
4 High 82 101 8334 716 
5 Very High 80 93 1510 142 
Total 81 94 26002 1659 
Table 42: Nelson Marlborough DHB: Waiting Times by Dep2006 European versus Maori Pacific Populations 
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Appendix 7 
Gender European Median Maori and Pacific Median N (European) N (Maori/Pacific) 
F 56 66 2763 2063 
M 64 70 2609 1607 
U 0 103 0 1 
Total 60 69 5372 3671 
Table 43: Tairawhiti DHB: Waiting Times by Gender, European versus Maori Pacific Populations 
Gender European Median Maori and Pacific Median N (European) N (Maori/Pacific) 
F 59 72 14193 10961 
M 58 76 12440 7571 
U 0 6 0 1 
Total 58 74 26633 18533 
Table 44: Counties Manukau DHB: Waiting Times by Gender, European versus Maori Pacific Populations 
Gender European Median Maori and Pacific Median N (European) N (Maori/Pacific) 
F 65 75 6908 3047 
M 65 71 5103 1913 
Total 65 73 12011 4960 
Table 45: Lakes DHB: Waiting Times by Gender, European versus Maori Pacific Populations 
Gender European Median Maori and Pacific Median N (European) N (Maori/Pacific) 
F 73 82 6140 280 
M 71 95 4252 192 
Total 72 85 10392 472 
Table 46: South Canterbury DHB: Waiting Times by Gender, European versus Maori Pacific Populations 
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Gender European Median Maori and Pacific Median N (European) N (Maori/Pacific) 
F 79 91 13715 1039 
M 82 107 12289 620 
Total 81 94 26004 1659 
Table 47: Nelson Marlborough DHB: Waiting Times by Gender, European versus Maori Pacific Populations 
Gender European Median Maori and Pacific Median N (European) N (Maori/Pacific) 
F 62 56 3558 563 
M 71 76 2952 396 
Total 66 64 6510 959 
Table 48: Wairarapa DHB: Waiting Times by Gender, European versus Maori Pacific Populations 
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Appendix 8 
 Median Waiting Times European Population Maori and Pacific Island Population 
DHB European Maori-Pacific Admissions Population Admission Rate/1000 Admissions Population Admission rate per 1000 
Northland 83 96 12190 97740 125 1253 51905 24 
Waitemata 57 68 28477 424090 67 1411 85530 16 
Auckland 68 71 21635 360610 60 1514 87590 17 
Counties Manukau 58 74 14492 279770 52 1526 166910 9 
Waikato 67 78 30938 258400 120 1434 83630 17 
Lakes 65 73 9175 64950 141 729 38750 19 
Bay of Plenty 63 63 15361 149910 102 750 54630 14 
Tairawhiti 60 69 2789 21830 128 223 23080 10 
Taranaki 70 71 1561 87550 18 104 17545 6 
Hawkes Bay 76 77 9700 107420 90 315 42730 7 
Whanganui 56 56 9387 47030 200 448 17275 26 
Mid Central 76 87 1717 134850 13 92 31950 3 
Capital and Coast 100 112 36823 223130 165 1325 50760 26 
Hutt Valley 97 102 16388 104690 157 954 33520 28 
Wairarapa 66 64 3564 32250 111 124 6835 18 
Nelson Marlborough 81 94 7532 123530 61 204 13410 15 
West Coast 80 79 1318 27220 48 46 2870 16 
Canterbury 84 91 59652 427070 140 1067 43760 24 
South Canterbury 72 85 4333 49990 87 49 3600 14 
Otago 81 106 17772 167030 106 530 14450 37 
Table 49: Ethnic Differences when Comparing Public Hospital Waiting Times with Private Hospital Admissions  
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  Median Waiting Times Affluent Population (NZ Dep 2006 1 to 5) Deprived Population (NZ Dep 2006 6 to 10) 
DHB 1 to 5 6 to 10 Admissions Population Admission Rate/1000 Admissions Population Admission rate per 1000 
Northland 85 86 2830 30077 94 9359 119568 78 
Waitemata 58 62 21108 334995 63 7358 174505 42 
Auckland 69 72 13868 225904 61 7763 220975 35 
Counties Manukau 61 68 9251 170422 54 5235 276258 19 
Waikato 66 70 14504 117158 124 16401 224872 73 
Lakes 68 68 3641 38943 93 5534 64757 85 
Bay of Plenty 66 62 5821 51444 113 9529 152810 62 
Tairawhiti 62 63 1189 8396 142 1599 36514 44 
Taranaki 71 80 759 32060 24 800 73035 11 
Hawkes Bay 66 70 3004 56144 54 6693 93241 72 
Whanganui 75 78 4215 20700 204 5172 43605 119 
Mid Central 56 56 537 66383 8 1180 100417 12 
Capital and Coast 97 103 27287 177176 154 9516 96714 98 
Hutt Valley 98 105 9482 60636 156 6906 77574 89 
Wairarapa 64 66 1072 12615 85 2492 26470 94 
Nelson Marlborough 81 82 4251 67237 63 3280 69703 47 
West Coast 78 82 424 10322 41 892 19768 45 
Canterbury 83 88 40771 296511 138 18880 174319 108 
South Canterbury 72 75 2366 30544 77 1967 22950 86 
Otago 82 84 10412 96970 107 7346 84510 87 
Table 50: NZ Dep 2005 Differences when Comparing Public Hospital Waiting Times with Private Hospital Admissions 
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Appendix 9 
 
Figure 62 Auckland Region Hospital Network overlaid on NZ Dep2006 Map  
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Figure 63 Wellington, Porirua and Hutt Valley Hospital Network overlaid on NZ Dep2006 Map 
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Figure 64 Christchurch City Hospital Network overlaid on NZ Dep2006 Map 
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